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This thesis explores the factors that influence Iranian women’s choice of hijab and 
its transitions.  Compulsory hijab in Iran and even voluntary practice of hijab exert 
a great deal of influence on the lives of the Iranian women worldwide. My thesis 
investigates how cultural, social and political factors interweave with theological 
and jurisprudential debates leading to diverse forms of practicing hijab and its 
transitions in one’s life. For the first time in the anthropology literature, my thesis 
portrays and explains the current status of, and developments in, hijab amongst 
Iranian women who have been raised in Iran and now live in London.  My research 
is based on the data and cultural knowledge I gathered through conducting 40 in-
depth interviews with Iranian women in London, and interviewing four prominent 
male Muslim intellectuals, scholars and clerics who have worked on and talked 
about hijab in Iran (Kadivar, Eshkevari, Fanaei, and Torkashvand). In addition to 
narrating the history and transformations of hijab policies and hijab jurisprudence 
in Iran from the constitutional revolution to the present, in this research, I have 
identified five schemas of dress code amongst Iranians in London (full traditional 
hijab, full progressive hijab, partial-hijab, conservative scarf-less and radical hijab-less) 
which challenge the current categorizations and generalisations regarding the hijab. 
By describing the features of each of the schemas this thesis provides a useful descriptive 
and explanatory tool that will enable a better understanding of hijab dynamics among 
Iranian women in London. I have demonstrated that hijab is a very fluid term. Hijab 
varies between individuals in practice, style, rationale, and purpose, and it is neither 
simply oppressive nor empowering. 
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Note on Translation and Transliteration 
In this thesis I have translated all the interviews from Persian to English myself. For 
the transliteration of Persian words I have followed the Iranian studies scheme 
shown on the table below. 
With the exception of the ‘ to signify the Arabic letter ‘ayn (as in ‘shari‘a’ and 
‘marja‘iyya’) and ` to represent hamza (as in ‘Kho’i’ and ‘Qur’an’), diacritics are not 
used in this thesis. The hamza itself is only used when it occurs within a word (as in 
‘Khamene’i’) but not when it occurs at the end (thus ‘‘ulama’ rather than ‘‘ulama’’). 
With the two notable exceptions of the terms ‘‘ulama’ (singular ‘‘alim’) and ‘maraji‘’ 
(singular: ‘marja‘’), the plural forms are usually indicated by adding an s to the word 
in the singular, as in “fatwas” (rather than “fatawa”).  
Iranian Studies transliteration scheme 
Consonants 
z ض b ب 
t ط p پ 
z ظ t ت 
‘ ع s ث 
gh غ j ج 
f ف ch چ 
q ق h ح 
k ک kh خ 
g گ d د 
l ل z ذ 
m م r ر 
n ن z ز 
h ه zh ژ 
v و s س 
y ی sh ش 
‘ ء s ص 
 
Vowels 
IX 
 
short long diphthongs 
a (as in ashk) a or ā (as in ensan or āb) - 
e (as in fekr) i (as in melli) ey (as in Teymur) 
o (as in pol) u (as in Tus) ow (as in rowshan) 
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Glossary  
Awrah: (pudendum) in Islamic fiqh refers to the parts of the body that need to be 
covered in prayer and in front of men who are namahram. 
Basij: paramilitary establishment founded after the Islamic Revolution by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. It consisted of volunteer civilians who initially joined to take part in the 
Iran-Iraq war.  
Chador: a long round black fabric that covers from the head to toe. There are 
different types of chadors used by Muslim women in different parts of the world. 
The Iranian chador is open in front and women hold it with their hands. 
Chaqchur: very loose trousers that women wore to cover from their waist to their 
toes.  
Fatwa: a technical term meaning the jurist’s legal judgment on specific topics in 
Islamic jurisprudence. 
Fiqh: refers to jurisprudence, and means ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’. Fiqh is 
the intellectual activity of trying to discover divine blueprints, bringing rules and 
legal systems out of the divine terms, and enforcing duties upon believers. 
Gashte ershad: means moral police. It is the branch of police in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran responsible for fighting against those citizens who do not obey the 
conventional Islamic codes of dress and behavior with the other sex—for example, 
women who do not follow a proper Islamic dress code or women or men who engage 
in ‘improper interactions’ with the other sex. The moral police are located in 
important and crowded parts of the city, and they have large vans that drive around 
the city. They will first tell women to cover their hair, and if the women disobey they 
arrest them. 
Hadith: refers to sayings and acts of the Prophet Mohammad and twelve Shia 
Imams. 
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Haraam: In Islamic law there are a number of key essential terms, which the jurists 
use to explain the permissibility of a certain action by Muslims. haraam is the term 
used for those acts that are completely forbidden like drinking alcohol. 
Hijabi:  the term used for women who wear hijab. 
howze: is an Islamic Shia centre of learning that educates students in Islamic fiqh 
(jurisprudence). Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran are the two leading howzes in the Shia 
world. 
Ijtihad: is an Islamic term that refers to making religious decisions based on rational 
deduction from the traditional sources of religious law. Ijtihad requires a full 
knowledge of theology, revealed texts, and legal theory, as well as competence in 
legal reasoning and a complete knowledge of Arabic. 
Mahram: refers to husband and all male relatives with whom marriage is forbidden 
i.e. father, son, brother, uncle, father-in-law, nephew, grandfather and mother’s and 
father’s uncles. According to mainstream Islamic jurisprudence women should wear 
hijab in front of all men other than the ones mentioned who are mahram. 
Manto: a type of clothing similar to a dress or long tunic that covers the body, has 
long sleeves, and is loose enough to hide the shape of the body. According to the 
Islamic republic of Iran all women are obliged to wear manto in public. 
Magnae: a kind of headscarf, which is closed in front, and only the face is evident. It 
is obligatory for all females to wear it at schools, universities and offices. 
Marja: means religious reference and refer to those clerics who have the authority 
to make legal decisions in the Islamic law for their followers. In Shia Islam after 
Quran, prophet Mohammad and the Imams, marja is the highest authority. 
Mustahab: in Islamic law there are a number of key essential terms, which the 
jurists use to explain the permissibility of a certain action by Muslims. Mustahab is 
one that means recommended or favoured but not obligatory or compulsory.  
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Mujtahid: an Islamic scholar who exercises ijtihad and is an expert in interpreting 
Islamic law. Mujtahid exercises ijtihad on the basis of Quran, Sunna, consensus 
(ijma) and reason (aql).    
Namahram:  are men who are not mahram. 
Piche: a piece of fabric that women used to cover their face, tied to their head with 
a ribbon. It is not used in Iran today.  
Resale:  a manual of practical rulings on Islamic law. Every marja has a resale for 
their followers. 
Rusari: a square shape scarf that anyone can find in London’s shops. It is the most 
popular style of head covering used by Iranian hijabi women. 
Ramadan: is one of the Islamic calendar months, during which Muslims from all 
around the world fast. Fasting is one of the five pillars of Islam, and it is obligatory 
for all Muslims except the ones who are ill or travelling. Fasting lasts from dawn in 
the morning until the sunset of the same day, and observant Muslims should not eat, 
drink, smoke, or have sexual intercourse during the fasting period. 
Vajeb: In Islamic law there are a number of key essential terms that the jurists use 
to explain the permissibility of a certain action by Muslims. Vajeb is an act that is 
compulsory for Muslims (like praying five times a day and fasting during Ramadan). 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I have often found myself drowning in deep thought, reliving those significant 
moments in my life that have greatly affected and influenced me. One such reverie 
related to my hijab: how I came to wear it, what it meant to me, and how I perceive 
it today. Until recently, my hijab was a part of me: an appendage the presence of 
which I rarely felt or questioned because I relished wearing it as a practicing Shia 
Muslim. The term ‘hijab’ is more than a topic of a research for me. Hijab is more than 
a concept or practice for me. Hijab has been a part of me since childhood, and 
therefore my own understanding of hijab has been very central in this research.  
I can remember the questions that I had in mind as a child when I encountered 
women who did not cover their hair properly. Although my educated non-imposing 
parents had raised me in a relatively liberal manner, my school and peer-group 
socialisation had shaped my thoughts in a way that made me wonder why others 
showed their hair even though they knew that they would ‘burn in hell’. I cannot 
describe my shock the first time that I left Iran at the age of eight and encountered 
women without hijab at London’s Heathrow airport.1 I was very careful not to let 
any of my hair be seen. At that young age I thought that if my hair came out I would 
die immediately and go to hell. I did not know why women wore hijab. I took it for 
granted, and thought that was how it should be. Even when my family lived in 
London when I was between the ages of eight and ten, I would tell my English 
classmates at school, “You should cover your hair, otherwise God will punish you.” 
One night, I cried under my duvet because I thought that a houseguest had seen me 
through the open door of my room while he was talking to his mother, who was 
sleeping next to me. There were several similar incidents when a male relative who 
was not mahram2 saw me by mistake, and each time I cried because I thought I had 
committed a sin, despite my father, as a Muslim intellectual, assuring me that I had 
not done anything wrong. The very fact that my mother - as my role model - had 
                                                        
1 In post-1981 Iran state-sanctioned law requires all women, irrespective of their religious belief, to 
wear a kind of hijab in all public spaces. Women are allowed to be hijab-less in private spaces. 
2 Mahram refers to husband and all male relatives with whom marriage is forbidden i.e. father, son, 
brother, uncle, father-in-law, nephew, grandfather and mother’s and father’s uncles. According to 
mainstream Islamic jurisprudence women should wear hijab in front of all men other than the ones 
mentioned who are mahram. 
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chosen to wear hijab was enough to make hijab desirable for me and to worry me if 
I were seen without it.  
I tell my own story here because it led me to initiate the research for this thesis. After 
I came to London for my Masters and subsequent PhD, many aspects of my views 
about hijab changed. I encountered many Iranian women, some who were my 
friends, who removed their headscarf or hijab after living in London. I always 
questioned why they changed their views. However, I found myself questioning 
hijab more closely after I started this research. My doubt was instigated by a book 
written by Iranian cleric Alireza Torkashvand (2010) about the history and 
evolution of the hijab at the time of the prophet Mohammed. 
Torkashvand argues, based on historical and jurisprudential evidence, that the hijab 
the prophet Mohammad stipulated for women to wear was quite different from how 
it is currently understood.3 For me, this was a momentous realization. Although in 
theory I have altered my views, I still wear hijab as I have always done. There seems 
to be a disjunction between my ideas and beliefs, and the heavily significant and 
demanding act of wearing the hijab in public. Nonetheless, after engaging with the 
new interpretations and jurisprudential rulings about hijab, many things changed. I 
became interested to see how other women understand and perceive hijab. If they 
were practicing hijab, I became interested in how and why they practice it. Along 
with the answers provided by my informants, as far as my study required, I tried to 
understand the everyday living contexts of Iranians in London from multiple angles.  
Aims and scope 
In this research, I investigate the features, motivations, implications, and changes in 
the practice of hijab amongst the Iranian diaspora in London. I begin by clarifying 
what women from different groups understand the hijab to be, how they practice 
hijab, how this understanding changed after they moved to London, and how they 
react to other women who hold and display different viewpoints on the subject. I 
would like to understand how their social interactions have changed since leaving 
                                                        
3 Torkashvand argues that the Prophet Mohammad told Muslim women to cover themselves from 
the lower neck to the knee. This is in contrast with common juristic position on hijab (see Chapter 
Three). 
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Iran, and which factors caused this change. While I focus on their hijab transition 
after leaving Iran, I also consider these diasporic women’s recollections of 
experiences in Iran. 
The secularization debate has been one of the most controversial debates over the 
last few decades in social sciences, including anthropology. My study will attempt to 
push the boundaries of this debate further by examining the developments of hijab 
of women who have lived in Iran, a Middle Eastern country that has been in the 
spotlight in most public and academic debates about the contemporary role of 
religion. The occurrence of the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), followed by a broad 
‘Islamization’ of society, led to some unique consequences with regard to the 
religious life of women in Iran. Although the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran is often regarded as evidence of the revival of religion, there have not been 
many anthropological studies of what this development involved in terms of 
changes in the daily stylistic choices and dressing of Iranian women.  
Public religiosities have emerged globally and have challenged the classical social 
scientific belief that as societies become more modern they become less religious 
(Weber 1993). According to Max Weber and most classical social theorists, religion 
and modernity are not compatible. The mainstream of contemporary anthropology 
and sociology of religion, however, has questioned the assumption that religion will 
necessarily decline at both macro- and- micro levels as modernity and 
modernization expand in a given society (Osella & Osella 2006). One of the starting 
questions, therefore, examines the causes of new religious revivals, including 
Islamism. 4 
According to Asef Bayat (2007a), Islamism seeks to build an ideological community. 
Islamism imagines Islam as a “complete divine system with its superior political 
model, cultural codes, legal structures and economic arrangements—a system that 
responds to all human problems” (Bayat, 2007b, p. 14). At the core of Islamism is a 
mixture of obligation, piety and duty. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran is one 
                                                        
4 Islamism refers to a variety of contemporary social and political movements inspired by Islam that 
center on "the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life"(Berman, 
2003). 
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example of Islamism. Bayat first used the term post-Islamism to describe the 
situation in Iran after the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and subsequent reconstruction 
under president Rafsanjani (1989-1997). Bayat (2007b, p. 19) states that post-
Islamism is an “endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and 
liberty.” While Islamism emphasizes duties and a unified voice, post-Islamism 
highlights rights and plurality. 
My study attempts to deconstruct the hijab outside of an overtly religious 
framework in order to articulate its processual, temporal, and contextual 
understandings by and interpretations amongst Iranian women in London. Drawing 
on my ethnographic research, I argue against the common assumptions that Islam 
is monolithic, static and incompatible with modernity. I contest stereotypes that 
Muslim women who wear hijab are oppressed or backward thinking, but I also 
contest the assumption that hijab is empowering in all cases and situations. In my 
analysis, I deconstruct the idea that wearing the hijab necessarily signals a religious 
or religio-political expression of identity, or that it equates unproblematically with 
piety. 
My main research aims are to understand what hijab means for Iranian Shia women 
living in London, their different schemas of dress code, how this has changed 
amongst different groups of women and more importantly why this change or shift 
has occurred. Towards the end of identifying the causes or reasons behind this shift, 
I also want to determine factors that contribute to changes of attitude towards hijab, 
including the diaspora conditions, residential location, occupational specialisation 
of students, family contexts, ‘styles of religiosity’, age, marital status, occupation, 
friends, social networks, political orientation and personal histories. 
In my research on the concept and practice of hijab and veiling, I critically engage 
with ‘Islamic feminism’ (see Afshar 1999; Badran 1991; 1996; Mahmood 2001; 
2004; Moghissi 1991; Poya 1999; Tabari 1986; Mir-Hosseini 2000). One way of 
looking at feminism is the concern with ‘female subordination’ or ‘male dominance.’ 
More recent broader definitions include attempts to increase women’s rights and 
opportunities (Torab, 2006). These debates are multi-faceted and complex and they 
emerge out of the context of engaging with modernity in Muslim contexts. What I 
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have tried to do in this area is to provide a narrative of the broader themes of the 
contested areas and suggest by way of my case study an addition to these debates. 
Hijab plays a significant role in the daily life of the women in my study. It is shaped 
not only by the personal experience of individuals, but also by the historical contexts 
from which they arise. Therefore, this research will examine the context of the 
Iranian diaspora living in London, and the effect of modern Iranian history on their 
way of thinking and negotiating daily life.  
It is important to see how the notion of hijab and its definition have changed 
throughout history, and how they have been affected by political developments, 
especially those in 1936 and 1979. In 1936, Reza shah banned the hijab in Iran. This 
led to a radical change in the way people wore hijab. In 1979, Iran faced the Islamic 
revolution. A year after the revolution, wearing hijab became compulsory. This new 
policy on hijab also produced shifts in religious beliefs. Understanding this shift is 
essential to understanding the dynamics of Shia Iranian identity and how the 
concept and practice of hijab is conceptualized in the contemporary world.  
This study is not attempting to describe and explain the current status and changes 
of hijab amongst ‘Shia women’ in general. The focus is limited to a sector of the 
female Iranian Shia diaspora in London and changes in their ideas and experiences 
regarding the hijab as compared to the time they lived in Iran. I examine the 
relations between gender, identity, modernity, and the ideas of homeland and 
diaspora. In doing so, my study considers aspects of both ‘embodied piety’ and 
‘discursive piety’ since hijab is both a kind of clothing and a product of discourse of 
covering, as Deeb (2006) highlights. 
Embodied piety is the way that religion becomes visible through bodily practices. 
This can occur in many ways, but according to Lara Deeb (2006), the most visible 
form of embodied piety is dress and hijab: the way Shia women dress up in society 
and the way they practice their belief in being a pious woman by wearing specific 
clothes and covering their hair and parts of their body. Discursive piety (Deeb, 2006, 
p. 118), on the other hand, accounts for foregrounding the pious dimension of hijab 
amongst scholars and the veiled women themselves as piety is also inscribed in 
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pious discourse which is spread, debated, authenticated and re-evaluated during 
social gatherings and interaction.    
Background 
There is no clear-cut category of hijab. Muslims around the world have many 
different ways of practicing hijab. When we talk about the veil or hijab, the most 
common image that comes to the mind is the headscarf. But the headscarf is not 
worn alone; there are many different ways a woman can observe hijab in her choice 
of clothing. Hijab has different shapes and styles in different Muslim countries and 
contexts. The most conservative form of hijab is the face covering that is common in 
societies like Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan which results from the jurisprudential 
interpretations of the Muslim communities living in these countries. However, 
covering the face is not common in Iran today. The most conservative Iranians wear 
a black chador, but they no longer wear a piche (face veil), which was worn before 
1936.  
Hijab is not a word with a fixed and certain meaning. Unlike what comes to many 
people’s minds, hijab has many different interpretations and there are many ways 
women practice it. One objective of my research is to challenge the idea of a singular 
definition; therefore, I avoid providing a monolithic and single definition of hijab 
here. The most general, dominant and conventional definition of hijab is the act of 
covering all parts of women’s body except for the hands and face. However, hijab is 
not only about physical covering. It is a set of codes of behaviour that defines 
relationship of Muslim women with men in society.  
According to Shia jurisprudence, there are different requirements for women’s 
coverings. We must note here that when we speak of Shia jurisprudence, we are 
referring to a fluid set of doctrines with various degrees of diversity. Expressions of 
these jurisprudential rulings may be different from country to country (as one might 
see in the cases of Lebanon and Iran). The predominant view is that a woman should 
cover all parts of her body except for the hands and face, and wear loose clothes to 
hide her shape. In the following paragraph, when I use the word hijab, I refer to this 
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conventional form, but not all women who self-identify as hijabi (a term I use here 
for women who wear hijab) follow this definition.  
There is a wide range of literature on hijab and veiling from different perspectives, 
because hijab has been an important issue of struggle between traditionalists and 
modernists. It has been used as an index to gauge the emancipation or repression of 
women. On the one hand, early Iranian feminists, in line with modernist views, 
assumed that hijab is a form of female confinement (see Naghibi 1999); this 
approach was of course influenced by a secularist approach to feminism. On the 
other hand, a growing number of scholars argue that the claim about the subjugation 
and oppression of hijabi Muslim women has been overstated (see Ahmed 1992; 
Guindi 1999; Mahmood 2004; Sandikci & Ger 2005; Mir-Hosseini 2007; Alvi et al. 
2003; Bowen 2008; Shirazi 2003). Based on my ethnography, I argue against this 
binary of hijab as oppression or empowerment. The concept and practice of hijab 
and the incentives for its use are far too complicated to be reduced to such dualistic 
generalisations. One must separate different spheres and motives regarding hijab. 
Whether it is oppressive or empowering differs from individual to individual and 
from context to context. 
The words ‘hijab’ or ‘veil’ are found in many book titles in the social sciences. There 
is a vast literature on the politics of hijab, but there has been relatively little work 
done on its practice. Anthropologists have conducted research on hijab practice, 
giving voice to women from different parts of the world. Some of this works has been 
done in the Islamic countries and some in the diasporic Muslim communities of the 
West. The latter work has focused on second and third generation Muslims who 
have been born and brought up in the West (e.g. Alvi et al., 2003; Kariapper, 2009; 
Tarlo, 2009). The kind of diaspora I deal with is different because its members were 
not born in London. My informants were all raised in Iran, and therefore the media 
and educational milieu in Iran has played a significant role in their lives. Their 
identity, as a result, has been shaped differently from Muslims who were born in 
London or other Western cities. My research is distinct because I examine how these 
women have changed after moving to and living in London.  
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In line with Emma Tarlo’s (2009) work, I will show that, unlike what some people 
believe about hijab making women invisible, the headscarf makes women more 
visible in London. Tarlo argues that Muslim fashions and anti-fashions are reduced 
to binary opposition between veiled and unveiled. She believes that this results in 
conceptual blindness, and argues that we should move beyond relating the 
oppressed and submissive to the veiled women and the liberated, free and 
progressive to the unveiled. She argues that this reduction has led to state 
sanctioning of cultural stereotypes and has shaped policy. She demonstrates that 
however personal a woman’s decision to adopt hijab is, it is always influenced by 
social interactions and discourse which both form and are formed by it, a view that 
also complements my research. 
Discourse is central to this research. 5  In light of theories of discourse, the 
meanings of hijab and veiling can be seen as a discursive construct. Amongst the 
most influential cultural elements that form the meaning of hijab are the teachings 
and rhetoric of religious leaders who consider veiling an integral part of religious 
life along with the exclusion of unveiled women from organised religious rituals 
and institutions. It is also important to note that beside the issue of teachings and 
rhetoric, the dominant (almost total) majority of religious leaders are male and 
there are very few female religious authorities who can shape the discourse based 
on their authority.   
Understanding what hijab entails for Muslim women requires more than seeing 
them and interviewing them. To have a fuller appreciation of what it means for a 
woman who comes from Iran and lives in London to observe hijab, one needs to be 
a ‘hijabi’ oneself. This is particularly important for appreciating the dynamics of 
embodied piety. As I mentioned earlier, there is a large literature on veiling and 
hijab, but none of the writers of these works are hijabi themselves except Katherine 
Bullock, though after the completion of her research she started veiling. Other 
                                                        
5  Discourse is about both language and practice. As Michel Foucault first elaborated, discourse 
constructs the topic and is “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way 
of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment. … Since 
all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all 
practices have a discursive aspect” (Hall 2001: 72). According to Foucault, nothing that is meaningful 
– including Hijab, the subject of this thesis - exists and operates outside discourse and power-
relations.  
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authors do not observe the conventional hijab, and the majority of those who have 
worked on hijab in the Iranian context are not hijabi either. This is an important 
point to take into account because the issue of hijab is not merely a detached 
academic interest; women who practice it or are influenced by policies and 
doctrines of hijab face authentic existential issues. Therefore, writing about hijab, 
interrogating it, problematizing it by someone who indeed practises hijab in one 
form or another brings a new perspective to the filed and gives fresh insight into the 
dynamics of the practice of hijab. 
My own story and the journey I took are therefore rather unique, both from the 
beginning and especially during the years of my PhD, because as an insider I can feel 
with my flesh and bone what hijab means. At the same time, I agree that being an 
‘insider’ could have blinded me in some ways. I have, however, tried to minimize 
this blindness by cultivating a comparative approach through sympathizing with 
works of others who have studied hijabis as outsiders. Overall, my situation is 
different from that of most scholars who have worked on hijab. 
Before starting this PhD, I believed that I had chosen to wear hijab, and as a 
practicing Muslim I was quite confident that the requirement to do so came from the 
word of God. 6 I frequently debated with my friends about hijab and the reasoning 
behind it. I believed that those individuals who practiced hijab very strictly both 
thought and acted like I did. I hypothesised that Iranians in London who wore hijab 
did so because they believed it was a religious requirement, that they did so with 
consent, and that it was their choice. I believed that through my research I could 
show that, unlike the media portrayal of women oppressed by their hijab, there 
were people like myself who had truly chosen to observe hijab. All these pre-
suppositions were refuted in the course of my research journey. 
I read Torkashvand (2010) at the beginning of my PhD in 2010. After I started 
reading and doing fieldwork, many things changed, and I drew conclusions that I 
had not earlier thought of or predicted. When I started my research, I had not 
                                                        
6 In this thesis, by stating someone believes in hijab, I mean he/she believes Muslim women should 
wear hijab as a religious obligation and that hijab is divinely mandated by Allah through Prophet 
Mohammad. 
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imagined that I would come to the conclusions I have now reached. My results were 
both valuable and painful to me. I started this journey to explain the transformation 
of hijab, but as subsequent chapters reveal the place where I am standing now is 
quite different from where I started.  
Themes 
In my research, I approach hijab as a fluid term, configured by the following factors: 
1) Location, including Iran and London, 2) Temporality, including the period of 
history considered, 3) hermeneutics of approaches to the Quran and hadith, which 
jurists employ to interpret these foundational texts in multiple ways, 4) Individual 
circumstances, including family histories and women’s own perspectives. 7 
From my research, I identify five schemas of dress code amongst diasporic Iranian 
women governing how they approach hijab while living in London. I will talk about 
the five-part scheme in detail in Chapter Five. The first, termed ‘traditional full hijab,’ 
describes the dress of those who are religious and who have been practicing hijab 
very strictly as prescribed by the predominant Shia jurisprudence. The primary 
reason women veil in this manner is religious. This does not posit a religious realm 
distinct from the cultural, political or social. These are all entwined, but it is religion 
that comes to the fore in this case. Women dressed in full traditional hijab cover all 
parts of their body except their face and hands. They even cover some parts of their 
face, and they wear very long and loose clothes so that their figure does not show at 
all. They do not wear makeup in front of namahram.8 Women in this group are very 
strict and will not compromise the limits they believe in for any reason.  
The second category is the ‘full progressive hijab,’ which refers to women who wear 
full hijab following mainstream Shia fiqh with a more modern style. 9 They cover all 
                                                        
7 Hadith, in this thesis, refers to sayings and acts of the Prophet Mohammad and twelve Shia Imams. 
8 Namahram are men who are not mahram. Mahram is a man who is allowed to see a woman without 
hijab. Mahrams include a woman’s father, spouse, brother, son, father in law, grandfather, uncle, 
paternal uncle, nephew, and stepchildren. 
9 Fiqh refers to jurisprudence, and means ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’. Fiqh is the intellectual 
activity of trying to discover divine blueprints, bringing rules and legal systems out of the divine 
terms, and enforcing duties upon believers. 
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parts of their body except for their face and hands, but they wear more colourful 
clothes that are not necessarily very long or loose.  
The third category is ‘partial-hijab,’ which refers to women who wear a headscarf 
but do not cover all parts of their hair and neck, and whose clothing does not follow 
the restrictions given by mainstream Shia fiqh.  
The fourth scheme is ‘conservative scarf-less,’ which refers to women who believe 
in limiting their dress code but do not wear a headscarf. Their limits are much more 
open than the first three schemas, but they maintain some restrictions in what they 
wear.  
The last scheme is ‘radical hijab-less,’ which refers to women who, at least in theory, 
do not believe in any religious limits in what they wear. In practice, they might or 
might not necessarily be comfortable wearing very revealing clothes.  
It is important here to note that these categories are purely ideal typical and for 
heuristic purposes. They do not necessarily imply that there cannot be overlaps in 
some of these categories. 
This project is evidently personal, as it relates to an issue that is part of my everyday 
life. Through auto-ethnography (Ellis, 2002, 1995; Goodall, 2006; Hooks, 2000) and 
discussion with diasporic Iranian Shia women resident in London who share similar 
or conflicting ideologies in this matter, as well as discussion with women who have 
undergone a transition in their dress code, I hope to divulge the multiple 
interpretations and dilemmas posed by the hijab and to identify the reasons for 
them. Along with auto-ethnography, my main methods are participant observation, 
semi-structured interviews, narratives, net-nography and focus groups.  
Chapter outline 
In Chapter Two, I review existing literature related to hijab and outline my research 
methods. The literature review engages with theoretical debates about Islam and 
modernity, a narrative and critique of colonial policies and Orientalist literature 
with specific focus on issues of women. 
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In Chapter Three, I describe the history of hijab policies and hijab jurisprudence 
from the constitutional revolution to the present providing a critical review and 
assessment of the major politic events which have contributed to the discourse on 
hijab in Iran. I conclude by talking about new juristic positions on hijab based on my 
interviews with four mujtahids10, and considering the effects of the history of hijab 
policy and hijab jurisprudence on the practice of hijab by Iranian women today. The 
views of all of these male scholars are reported critical with my own reflections 
within the thematic distinctions I make. 
Chapter Four begins with a critical assessment of some of the literature about 
diapsoric Iranian communities in London and reconnects with the theme of 
secularism from chatper Two. I also look at communities and social spaces in 
London with religious functions and investigate some of the social, political and 
intellectual dynamics of these spaces in terms of their relation to dress code of 
Muslim Iranian women. 
In Chapter Five, I provide detailed ethnographic description of hijab and the five 
categories of dress code amongst Iranian women in London in a critical manner. The 
categories are interwoven into the the assessment of each schema of hijab against 
the themes which draw on the theoretical question posed in chater Two. 
Chapter Six analyses the contextual factors of wearing hijab, including 
individual/personal, religio-cultural, jurisprudential, and socio-political. I explore 
causes and rationales for choosing each scheme of dress code and for transitioning 
from one scheme to another across individual life histories. Responses from 
informants are interrogated and assessed in light of critical assessment of the three 
themes of choice/agency, oppression vs. restriction and issues of secularity. 
                                                        
10 Mujtahid is an Islamic scholar who exercises ijtihad and is an expert in interpreting Islamic law. 
Mujtahid exercises ijtihad on the basis of Quran, Sunna, consensus (ijma) and reason (aql). The 
muqallids—that is, lay people who lack specialised religious knowledge—are expected to submit to 
the judgment of a mujtahid in religious disputes. In due course, a hierarchy of mujtahids has formed, 
at the top of which are the marjas. The muqallids decide which marja‘ to follow using a set of not 
clear-cut criteria.  
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The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the research in a broader 
narrative identifying the themes, questions that drive the research and some notes 
on the way forward. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and 
Methodology 
Introduction 
In this chapter I review the relevant literature on Islam and modernity, Islam and 
gender, and hijab practice. I develop a multi-perspectival theoretical framework for 
my fieldwork to avoid reductive oversimplification. Subsequently, I discuss the main 
methods I have used in my research, my fieldwork procedure, the problems I faced, 
and the insights I developed. I approached my research with theoretical ideas and 
expectations that framed my approach and perspective, and I will therefore explore 
the effect of these expectations on my project. 
Twelver Imami Shia Islam represents the largest of the surviving Shia sects and Iran 
is the only country in the world where hijab is compulsory for all women in all public 
spaces throughout the country. However, hijab amongst the Shia Iranians, the 
subject of my study, have hitherto received but scant attention, partly because of the 
difficulties and costs of empirically or ethnographically researching the subject of 
the study: hijab transitions amongst Iranian women. One could even argue that no 
subject is as sensitive as this in the eyes of the Iranian government and that few 
groups seem as inaccessible and closed to foreigners and non-Muslims as that of 
religious hijabi women.  
Compulsory hijab in Iran and even voluntary practice of hijab exert a great deal of 
influence on the lives of the Iranian women worldwide. My thesis is an attempt to 
explore the factors that influence Iranian women’s choice of hijab and its transitions. 
It will try to show how cultural, social and political factors interweave with 
theological and jurisprudential debates leading to diverse forms of practicing hijab 
and its transitions in one’s life. To put it simply, my thesis aims at portraying and 
explaining the current status of, and developments in, hijab amongst Iranian women 
who have been raised in Iran and now live in London.  
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Theoretical and historical backgrounds of a tension 
In my research, I investigate the connections between views of modernity and 
piety11, focusing on hijab practice amongst Iranian Shia women in London. I asked 
women how they define being modern, and how modernity is compatible with their 
religious beliefs. In other words, I want to determine how they feel that piety, and 
public displays of piety, fit with life in a Western country. How do they understand 
the modern and the traditional? And what implications do being modern have for 
understanding the performance of women’s piety in a diasporic context? These 
questions will be further explored in detail in subsequent ethnographic chapters. 
For now I address the existing literature that pertains to this subject. In what follows 
below, I have traced the historical and theoretical roots of some of these questions 
and how they pose challenges not only for women but also for academics. 
Islam, Modernity and Secularism: Backgrounds of a Confrontation 
The Muslim world in contemporary times is facing unprecedented challenges, 
which are primarily of a political nature but socially, economically and 
intellectually, Muslims face various kinds of challenges. The tragic events of 9/11 
in the US and 7/7 in London gave a much stronger impetus to what was already in 
place with regard to ‘Islam’ and Muslims around the world and also in Western 
societies. The emergence of the ISIL and various offshoots of violent groups that 
operate under the name of ‘Islam’ has not only led to bloodshed and tragic events 
perpetrated by these groups but has also exacerbated the situation which existed 
before. A new turn of events has further enhanced the image of an ‘Islam’ which is 
seen contrary to rationality, freedom, human rights, democracy, and, in sum, 
values of the Western civilisation. 
 
The debate about Islam, in almost every sphere, is replete with false and 
constructed binaries in which ‘Islam’ is portrayed by not just its detractors but also 
even by Muslims as the very embodiment of backwardness. It may be perhaps a 
little strong and over-reactive but there is certainly an element of truth in how 
Joseph Massad captures this dichotomy: one has to choose between either Islam or 
                                                        
11 By piety, I mean religious devotion or spirituality. 
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liberalism (his focus is on liberalism here) and that “unless one is a barbarian, a 
despot, an irrational psychopath, a neurotic, a totalitarian, an intolerant brute, a 
misogynist, a homophone, in short a Muslim, the answer must be the latter” 
(Massad, 2015, p. 2). The underlying arguments for such perceptions are 
connected with how Edward Said forcefully deconstructed the Orientalist tradition 
in his ground-breaking work Orientalism (1978). The roots of the discourse which 
led to such binaries goes far back in history, as early as the first encounters of the 
Crusaders with Muslims, but there is a key concept which is closely interrelated 
with the perpetuation and genesis of this image: modernity. 
It is particularly relevant to bring to the fore the context in which modernity came 
to be viewed as the categorical other to Oriental societies in general and to ‘Islam’ 
and Muslims in particular. Max Weber is particularly responsible for articulating 
the language which described modernity in a singularly European sense. 
Modernity and all its values were seen by Max Weber as unique and peculiar to 
Occidental societies: 
 
Only the Occident knows rational law, made by jurists and rationally 
interpreted and applied, and only in the Occident is found the concept of 
citizen… but a rational science and in connection with it a rational 
technology remained unknown to those civilizations. Finally, Western 
civilization is further distinguished from every other by the presence of 
men with a rational ethos for the conduct of life…Magic and religion are 
found everywhere; but a religious basis for conduct that, when consistently 
followed, had to lead to a specific form of rationalism is again peculiar to 
Western civilization alone (Weber 1961, pp. 232-3) 
 
As we can see in Weber’s account, rationality is at the heart of his articulation but 
it is also closely related to how, according to him, Oriental societies engage with 
religion. Oriental societies have religion, magic, superstition and an enchanted 
world which is seen categorically at odds with the project of modernity that Weber 
described. For Weber, modernity is closely connected with the Christianisation of 
Europe and the rise of capitalism which he elaborates in the context of Protestant 
ethics. Weber did not have much time to extensively study Islam but his views, 
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however crude, did have a lasting influence not only on the European language of 
modernity but also, surprisingly on the way Muslim reformers engaged with 
problems of their own societies. 
 
Weber’s inadequacies with regard to Muslim societies and Islam have been 
extensively criticised but the potent ideas which led to the perpetuation of the 
binary of Muslims and Orientals as the Other remain in place and are even further 
sharpened in the context of contemporary events in the 21st century. Not only 
Weber’s consistent and monolithic perception of modernity has been challenged 
among European scholars, but the peculiarity of ‘Islam’ has also been subject of 
heated debates and ferocious challenges, both by Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The fault line of these debates are around questions such as: Is Islam compatible 
with democracy? Is Islam compatible with human rights? Is Islam compatible with 
freedom of speech? And more closely relevant to the question of this thesis: is 
Islam compatible with women’s rights? In all of these questions, the persisting 
theme is the uniqueness and the singularity of both Islam and every other category 
which is put forward for examination of whether it is compatible with Islam or not. 
All of these monolithic concepts have been powerfully deconstructed but they still 
remain in force and shape our world.  
 
One of the solutions provided to the problem is through drawing attention to the 
diversity of interpretations in Islam and shifting the emphasis from ‘Islam’ as an 
abstract idea, open to multiple interpretations to Muslims as individual and 
collective agents who are the centre of such confrontations and engagements. 
Therefore, the question is not whether ‘Islam’ is compatible with democracy or 
not. It is rather a question of whether, how and under what circumstances Muslim 
people and communities could be open to democracy, modernity, secularity and a 
host of other concepts which are supposed to be universal.  
 
The response to this latter category of questions provided a somewhat more 
conducive space to accommodate shifts and open a dialogue but there is still a 
persistent issue at the heart of the question: the very idea of compatibility. In 
effect, by replacing ‘Islam’ with Muslims, the question of agency is highlighted and 
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duly emphasised, but then a more pressing matter has remained central to the 
question: can Muslims be modern? The very presence of ‘Muslim’ as a category is a 
reproduction of the same position. The question is seldom asked if a Christian or a 
Jew can be modern. It is taken for granted that all other communities can be 
modern and indeed are modern. The sociology of the discussions which provides 
shades or modernity, even in European societies, remains peripheral to the debate. 
The core issue is that the Muslim and the Oriental – and ‘Islam’ – is irrelevant in 
the question. 
 
It is particularly important to highlight the fact that such articulations of the 
question is not simply an Orientalist invention. Nor is it specifically the product of 
the rise of Islamophobia in Western societies. It is also a dominant theme in 
Muslim societies and even among some Muslim intellectuals and reformers. The 
epistemological foundations of the question remains trapped in the legacy of the 
reason of Enlightenment (Arkoun 2002, pp. 224-225). Those who have been 
critical of such reproductions have managed to shed further light on the inner 
workings of this complicated situation. What I intended to do here is to set the 
scene for engaging with the question. The purpose is not to point fingers or the 
place the blame squarely on European or Orientalist scholarship, political forces or 
media depictions of Muslims. The purpose is to understand the philosophical, 
epistemological and historical contexts in which such debates emerge. 
The reality is that the same discourse with an Orientalist bent to it keeps being 
reproduced and recycled in different forms to insist on the same solution which 
has consistently failed over the past two centuries. The old narrative of Occidental 
vs. Oriental is once again reproduced in a lesser form of Good Muslim vs. Bad 
Muslim. Mahmood Mamdani captures the inherent theme of this categorisation as 
‘Culture-Talk’. The problem is seen as in the ‘culture’ of these people which turns 
them into ‘bad’ Muslims. Mamdani puts the question in a different context: 
 
Anybody who followed the public discussion in the US about good and bad 
Muslims soon realised that good and bad were not adjectives describing the 
attitude of Muslims to Islam. They were actually adjectives describing the 
attitudes of Muslims to the West. They were not cultural adjectives; they 
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were political adjectives. Simply put, a good Muslim was a pro-Western 
Muslim and a bad Muslim was an anti-Western Muslim (Mamdani in 
Goldewijk 2007, p. 154) 
 
There is virtually no area, no concept, which is not connected with this culturalism 
that shapes the discourse on Islam and Muslims. More specifically, gender issues 
are part of the same debate. Issues of gender and of dress code are represented 
and debated in the same vein. Therefore, when it comes to the purported 
subjugation of women in Oriental societies, including Muslim ones, a cultural 
explanation is provided which makes Islam and Muslims specific, peculiar and 
exceptional. The argument suffers from an essentialism which claims that there is 
an ‘essence’ to ‘Islam’ and this essence is considered to be known to the Occident 
and the scholars who see the problem through this lens. Therefore, the Western 
civilisation is charged with the responsibility to rescue these Orientals and the 
Muslims from oppression. This oppression is not merely in the case of political 
establishments and regimes but also in the form of ideas and concepts. It is not just 
the governance system which needs to be democratised – often by exporting 
democracy at gunpoint – but also the people and more specifically women who 
need emancipation. 
In a more specific context, in the aftermath of the 9/11, Abu-Lughod (2002) 
revisited the same question of cultural explanations and warned against the 
dangers of ‘reifying culture’. Quoting Laura Bush – a woman herself – Abu-Lughod 
drew attention to how this desire to liberate and emancipate Muslim women was 
part of this cultural move. Laura Bush was connecting the ‘military gains’ of the US 
in Afghanistan with the liberation of women as a result of which “they can listen to 
music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment” (Abu-Lughod 2002). 
It is here the ‘war on terror’ is connected with the ‘rights and dignity of women’. 
These words were reminiscent of not only an Orientalist approach but also of the 
colonial history which shapes the discourse on women’s rights. Abu-Lughod also 
highlighted the generality of the questions posed in this regard: ‘Do Muslim 
women believe X? Are Muslim women Y? Does Islam allow Z for women?’ and she 
asks the same question I posed earlier: what happens if you replace Islam and 
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Muslims with Christianity, Judaism or any other subject? Would anyone ask those 
questions? And why or why not?  
 
The answers to these questions are straightforward. Questions about those other 
than Muslims and Islam are rarely asked. The reasons are partly political and 
partly due to the dominant academic atmosphere that Edward Said had pointed 
out much earlier. It is interesting to see that even those critical of Edward Said who 
sometimes charged him for being too emotional and overzealous in attacking 
Orientalism, provided a similar diagnosis in a more benign language.  
Mohammed Arkoun (in Nanji 1997) provides a more detailed analysis of the major 
strands of what he calls colonial sciences. He categorises these studies under 
philological studies and ethnographic studies. The former dealt with a meticulous 
and cumulative study, edition and publication of texts while the latter was closely 
connected with going into the field, living with and among the ‘colonised’ people. 
Arkoun reflects that in the study of religion, they described “the superstitions, 
magical beliefs and practices among the peoples of North Africa rather than Islam” 
(Arkoun in Nanji 1997, p. 35). As one can see, the Weberian leitmotifs of the 
colonial studies are sharply present in this narrative. He also notes that these 
studies “were dominated by the positivist definition of progress, rationalism, 
science and civilization, all of which were contrasted with the primitive mentality” 
(Arkoun in Nanji 1997, p.36). He continues to point out the colonialist ideology 
behind a “scientific” legitimation to the domination and conquering of African and 
Asian societies. 
 
The background of this approach can be traced back to writers much earlier than 
Max Weber, though. As Massad (2015) points out, John Locke “excluded Islam, 
Judaism, Confucianism, among others, from reasonableness” when he was writing 
The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). The question is, however, broader than 
a mere arrogance or hubris of a Christian writer against Muslims. As Stanley Fish 
has pointed out in a meticulous and challenging discussion on the limits of 
freedom of speech (Fish 1994), John Milton surprisingly excludes Catholics from 
having the right to free speech (Fish 1994, p. 103) in his Areopagitica (1644). The 
point I wish to draw attention to here is not simply the prejudice of one religious 
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or non-religious author against another group. It is more fundamental in the sense 
that both Locke and Milton are among the founding figures of what Western 
civilisation represents in terms of its values. Rationality and freedom of speech 
which are meant to be universal did not have such clear pronouncements in their 
original articulations: even the fiercely defended values of the Occidental 
civilisation were subject to contingencies which would make even a European 
citizen shudder at the thought of it. Therefore, it is not just about Muslims being 
targeted, nor is it simply about Islamophobia. It is the agency of individuals and 
communities denied regardless of their background, belief, gender or race. I will 
further discuss this point when it comes to feminism and the rights of women in 
Muslim countries which have directly or indirectly experienced colonialism or its 
effects. 
Bearing in mind the background I discussed above, modernity has been defined in a 
variety of ways. Some commonly assumed characteristics are technological 
advancement, capitalism, secularization and disenchantment, consumerism, and the 
priority of individualism (Mitchell, 2000). Eurocentric approaches place the West at 
the centre of this universal notion of modernity. They posit that through colonialism 
modern ideas and institutions have spread to the rest of the world. This view has 
been challenged by scholars that advocate multiple modernities (Comaroff, 1993; 
Eisenstadt, 2003; Englund and Leach, 2000; Gaonkar, 1999), who argue that 
alternative modernities have emerged in other places, and who emphasise the 
different manifestations of modernity in different places (Hefner, 1998; Larkin, 
1997). Englund and Leach point out that “current anthropological sensibilities have 
little patience for a discourse on modernity in the singular. Instead, a notion of 
multiple modernities appears plausible” (2000, p. 226).  
The secularisation discourse links modernity with secularism. However, the 
increasing visibility of religion in the public sphere has challenged this view. From a 
Eurocentric perspective, Weber (1993 [first published in 1920]) believed that 
rationalisation is followed by secularisation 12 . Some events and developments 
during the last four decades, such as the occurrence of the 1979 revolution in Iran, 
                                                        
12 According to Weber, the ‘Protestant ethic’ enabled the rise of capitalism, whereas Catholicism did 
not. 
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the rise of New Religious Movements in different parts of the world in the last five 
decades, the growth in fundamentalist movements and religious parties in the 
Muslim world in the past four decades, the continued popularity of churchgoing in 
the United States in the 21st century, the unexpected appearance of New Age 
spirituality in Western Europe in the past five decades, the evangelical revival in 
Latin America in the last thirty years, and the upsurge of ethno-religious conflict in 
international affairs in the past three decades (especially in the Middle East), posed 
a serious threat to the universal validity of classical secularization theory (see e.g., 
Berger, 2001; Sherkat and Ellison, 1999). Some scholars, therefore, (e.g. Bruce, 
2002; Chaves, 1994; Norris and Inglehart, 2011) tried to defend revised versions of 
classical secularization theory that came to be known as ‘new secularization theory’, 
while others (e.g. Antoun and Hegland, 1987; Bowen, 1993; Brenner, 1996; 
Casanova, 1994; Dorraj, 1999; Eickelman, 2000; Eickelman et al., 2004; Hefner, 
1998; Meyer, 1999) have radically recanted this theory or substituted it with other 
ones. 
The secularization theory clearly had a European bias, as I have demonstrated 
above. Therefore revisions were made in order to account for ‘the American 
experience’ (Hadden, 1987; Warner, 1994). Nevertheless, the secularization debate 
still suffered from a strong European Christianity bias. This led to a broadening of 
the focus of anthropological and sociological studies. However, even then, the bulk 
of empirically informed literature revolved around the typical Westerner. My study 
will attempt to push these boundaries further by examining the changes in the 
religious dress code of women that live in the West but after being raised in Iran, a 
country that has been regarded as an exception in most debates about the 
contemporary role of religion in people’s lives.  
Secularization has multiple meanings each of which needs separating out in order 
to avoid confusion. Since secularisation has been by far the most influential social 
theory on religion, any study of religion has to clarify its position for, or against, 
different dimensions of secularization theory. A well-known statement of 
secularization's multidimensionality has been put forward by Dobbelaere (1989, 
1987, 1985, 1981). He suggests that secularization has three main dimensions that 
Chaves labels: laicization, internal secularization, and religious disinvolvement 
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(Chaves, 1994, p. 757). The first dimension, laicization, refers to the process of 
differentiation through which other institutions (e.g. political, educational, 
scientific, judicial, etc.) obtain autonomy from the religious institutions of a society. 
As a result of this process religion becomes one institutional sphere amongst others 
with no necessary authority over other institutional spheres. 
As noted by Chaves,  
The second dimension, internal secularization, is the process whereby 
religious organizations undergo internal development towards compatibility 
with the secular world. Religious disinvolvement, Dobbelaere's third 
dimension of secularization, is the decline of religious beliefs and practices 
amongst individuals. (Chaves, 1994: 757)  
This third dimension is the one that is most relevant to my ethnographic study of 
hijab amongst Iranian women in London. Secularization at this individual level 
refers to the necessary decrease in the extent to which individual actions (dress 
code in the case of this study) are subject to religious control. My thesis will explore 
the empirical evidence that challenges the third dimension of secularisation theory. 
My study, therefore, could be located under the umbrella of social theories that 
assume that, at least at the micro-level, religious authority will not necessarily 
decline in all cases and every society. My ethnographic study explores the evidence 
that show even amongst the educated professional Iranian women living in London, 
religious practices, including observing Islamic hijab, will not necessarily decline, 
even though ‘religious change’ is likely to happen, including in the manner in which 
women dress. My study, therefore, falls within the existing and growing literature 
in social sciences that look for ‘changes’ in religious beliefs and practices of citizens 
of modern societies (I will briefly mentioned citizenship in liberal societies when it 
comes to the discussion in diasporic communities), rather than necessarily a 
‘decline’ in their religiosity.   
A large body of literature on Islamism and modernity concerns the aforementioned 
alternative modernities, and criticises the idea that Islamism is a form of cultural 
resistance to Western modernity (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1998; Adelkhah 1999; Al-Azmeh 
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& ʻAẓmah 1993; Bowen 1993; Höfert & Salvatore 2000; Mitchell 2000; Peletz 2002; 
Salvatore 2001; Tibi 1995; Watts 1996). 
The concept of ‘alternative modernities’ has also been critiqued both for admitting 
that there is a single Western modernity for which other modernities are the 
alternative, and also for making the concept of modernity very particular, so that it 
neglects structural inequalities in the world (e.g. Gaonkar 2001; Knauft 2002; Rofel 
1999; Piot 1999).  
In discussing the relationship between Islam and modernity, and different 
approaches toward modernity, I found Deeb’s (2006) work the most consistent 
theoretical framework available to serve the description and explanation of the 
topic of my research. However I problematize her assumption of the linear progress 
of modernity, and the alleged association between irrationality and tradition. 
Deeb (2006) examines both the material and spiritual sides of modernity in her 
study of Shia women in Lebanon. By “material progress,” she refers to 
modernisation in areas such as education, economy, and development in 
infrastructure and technology such as roads and computers. By “spiritual progress,” 
she refers to increased public piety based on authenticated Islam. Authenticated 
Islam she defines as a modern interpretation of Islam founded on valid knowledge 
and understanding, as opposed to an Islam that is uncritical, unreflexive, and 
followed ‘irrationally’ by the older generation.  
Deeb’s understanding of modernity influences a part of the theoretical framework 
of my study. But I will incorporate in into a ‘multiple modernities’ framework’ and 
will critique the way in which she reproduces the Eurocentric discourse of 
modernity through her linear conception of modernity. Her understanding of 
irrationality can also be critiqued because she does not provide a clear basis for 
dividing the rational and irrational and establishing whether or not Islam is 
compatible with modernity. I also challenge Deeb’s delimitation of material 
modernity from spiritual modernity. The pious Shia women in Deeb’s study see 
spiritual progress as an essential aspect of any feasible alternative to the perceived 
emptiness of modernity as manifest in the West. This spiritual progress is seen as 
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an attempt to escape from tradition into a new kind of religiosity and related 
commitments. Deeb argues that religion and politics are inseparable, but this does 
not mean that Islam is only in service of politics or Islam solely determines politics. 
It means that we cannot put religion or politics into discrete categories. She also 
highlights that, although spiritual and material modernities draw on different 
discourses, they are also parallel. That is, rather than interpreting Islamism as 
inevitably involved in a struggle with modernity, we can instead see spiritual 
progress as one of the potentials of various modernities. 
In working on this concept, it is important to investigate not only local 
understandings of being modern, but also how these understandings are used in 
different temporal and spatial contexts, and how these uses relate to the global and 
transnational discourses about varieties of modernity. My aim is to investigate the 
different interpretations, experiences, and understandings people have about 
varieties of modernity in their daily life. Not much has been written about how 
Muslims themselves understand and think about being modern in a vernacular 
sense, separate from the theoretical links between modernity and the West. To 
investigate this theme, it is useful to ask the following questions: how are theoretical 
formulations of varieties of modernity related to personal and collective 
understandings of being modern? Without supposing that modernity has a single 
trajectory, how do individuals define being modern, and what do they desire for 
themselves and their community? 
Gender and Islam 
There is a wide range of literature available on gender and Islam. During the past 
two decades, concern has shifted from the topic of women in Islam to a broader 
Islamic framework of gender ideas, roles and relations (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1998; 
Kapchan 1996; Baron 1997; Najmabadi 1990; Najmabadi 2005; Haeri 1989; 
Moghadam 2003; Mahmood 2004; Afshar 1999; Al-Ali 2000; Mir-Hosseini 2000; 
Badran 1996). These studies challenge the assumption that Islam is the main 
influencing factor in gender constructs, and offer important insights how Muslim 
women define their religious and sexual identity. A growing number of studies have 
explored the tensions between Islam and feminism (Afshar, 1999; Badran, 1996; 
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Mahmood, 2004, 2001; Mir-Hosseini, 2000a; Moghissi, 1991; Poya, 1999). In what 
follows below, I have engaged more critically with some of the key aspects of these 
debates. 
Muslim Women as Free Agents 
One of the fundamental backbones of the current state of affairs is how ‘Islam’ is 
viewed through an essentialist, singular, monolithic and peculiaristic lens. Bayat 
(2007) argues that by referring to the ‘Islamic society’ or the ‘Islamic world’ in 
singular abstract forms, a generality is constructed which fails to see the nuances 
and also ignores the agency of Muslims. He proposes that the emphasis should not 
be on Islam but “on Muslims as agents of their societies and cultures, even if not of 
their own making” (Bayat 2007, p. 2). Bayat argues further, as I also proposed 
above, that “The question is not whether Islam is or is not compatible with 
democracy or, by extension, modernity, but rather under what conditions Muslims 
can make them compatible” (Bayat 2007, p. 4). This emphasis on the agency of 
Muslims is central to how I move forward with my research. 
 
Exercise of agency, or lack thereof, among Muslim women, particularly when it 
comes to the issue of hijab is central for making sense of the shifts which have 
taken place. During the course of my research, newer dimensions of the issue 
became apparent which I had not envisaged earlier given the history and the 
background from which I was engaging with the issue. At a descriptive level, what I 
had initially observed was a visible shift in the practice of hijab among Iranian 
women living in London. The more fundamental issue was how, under what 
circumstances and why the practice had changed. Problematising the shift and the 
transformation of attitudes is critical to this research.  
 
There are a number of interrelated themes which are at the heart of the problems 
identified and addressed here. The first is the issue of viewing hijab as either 
oppression or protection. The larger framework in which the issue has been and 
still continues to be addressed is aligned with this binary category (as we will 
clearly see in the way Shariati and Motahari engaged with the issue). The second 
theme is the issue of choice: have women adopted or relinquished the practice of 
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hijab by their own volition and as a result of conscious choice representing their 
agency? The third issue is how a Muslim woman in London can come to terms with 
and negotiate being a Muslim with being modern, without necessarily having to 
compromise what they deem as integral to their faith. 
 
I will briefly address some of the literature and theoretical aspects of each of the 
above here. In the forthcoming chapters, when it comes to interviews with the 
male figures and with the female interviewees, I will interrogate the discourse 
further to demonstrate how these issues have received little attention or have 
been poorly problematized. 
 
Abu-Lughod’s initial response to the dichotomy of rescuing women from 
oppression in her 2002 article was later fully developed in a book with the same 
title published in 2013. Haleh Afshar (2008) further summarised the tension in the 
context of European crises in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7. She brings into 
sharper focus the process of otherizing Muslims (and Muslim women) by referring 
to Edward Said’s analysis of Orientalism and then gives the perspective of 
Islamophobia by giving examples from the French context after the Paris riots in 
November 2005 and the strong reactions in the UK to Muslim women and 
association of terms such as terrorism and enslavement. She points out the irony 
that “despite the myth of white slavery, enslavement has been a very specific 
feature of North American economic development” (2008, p. 415). Even though 
she is rather mild in the way she goes about deconstructing such perceptions 
(compared with writer such as Said and Massad), she challenges the very 
foundation of Muslim women being seen as ‘oppressed’ or ‘enslaved’, which is 
what Abu-Lughod so vividly captures in the language of Laura Bush and Cherie 
Blair.  
 
Afshar also highlights the approaches of Muslim women to revisiting and 
reinterpreting the Muslim scriptures with regard to their rights. She refers to the 
active role of women in challenging the situation: 
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Muslim women have focused on several areas of contestation ranging from 
the well-known and for many as yet unresolved discussions about the veil… 
to practicalities of wrenching power and authority away from men in the 
domains of politics and law and claiming agency in the domestic sphere. 
(Afshar 2008, p. 423) 
 
In conclusion, she points out that branding Muslim women as “submissive, 
oppressed or subjugated” (p. 424) is uninformed and that women from ethnic 
minorities (referring to the British society) including veiled women “have more in 
common with their ‘white’ British-Muslim sisters than their male cradle-Muslim 
brethren” (ibid). In this article, Afshar addresses the first two of the categories I 
highlighted above, namely the idea of oppression and women’s choice and agency. 
She does not elaborate in further details issues of engaging with modernity and 
secularism except in her remarks about Orientalism which is very brief and does 
not provide too much detail about the theoretical aspects of it. 
 
Going back to the themes I have highlighted, there are few works which have 
managed to capture all of these points in detail. Sahar Amer’s work (2014) is 
among works which have a much wider historical and contextual dimension. She 
gives a rather detailed history of the practice of veil before the rise of Islam and 
outside Islamic communities before, during and after the lifetime of Prophet 
Muhammad. At the very beginning of her work, she draws attention to the fact that 
Islam actually ‘inherited’ the practice from “major empires and societies of the 
time along with many other customs and patriarchal traditions related to the 
status of women” (Amer 2014, p. 1). Thus, she demonstrates that the view of hijab 
having exclusively ‘Islamic’ provenance is simply a myth and based on 
misinformation. The corollary of her opening remark is that it deprives the 
practice of hijab of a divine and sacred aspect. If we accept that other communities 
and societies, including non-monotheistic ones, practiced hijab, as part of a wider 
patriarchal hierarchy, then the next step is to accept a more ‘secular’ aspect to the 
veil. 
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The questions she puts forward in framing the contents of her book paves the way 
for engaging with the problem which cuts across all the literature produced about 
Muslim women: 
 
Why do many people believe that veiled Muslim women are oppressed, 
ignorant, extremely pious, or politically militant? Why not view Muslim 
women in neutral terms, as women who choose or just happen to wear a 
headscarf? How did this piece of clothing become so emotionally and 
politically charged for both Muslims and non- Muslims? (Amer 2014, p. 2) 
 
Amer proceeds by demonstrating that veiling is not simply descriptive or neutral, 
in effect demanding that veiling should be seen in more neutral terms rather than 
in politically charged depictions. She reflects on the judgmental dimension of views 
about veil, and its connection with the war on terror, which is resonant with how 
Abu-Lughod challenges these notions: 
 
It is also a judgmental term, especially when associated with Islam. Muslim 
veiling is a notion that often evokes fear, anxiety, and a rising sense of 
threat, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, the onset of the war in 
Afghanistan, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. (Amer 2014, p. 2) 
 
This point reconnects both the role of colonial and imperialistic political 
campaigns with the issue, which is deeply rooted in the Orientalism that Said 
critiqued and the perception of rescuing women from subordination and 
subjugation. She proceeds to suggest that “the veil’s appearance in most public 
spaces has been taken as proof that Islam is quintessentially opposed to women’s 
rights. The veil has even come to stand in for the ultimate otherness and inferiority 
of Islam” (Amer 2014, p. 3). This is an issue which is, of course, not a product of 
recent developments and political shifts in the 21st century, but as I will shortly 
elaborate on, it is rooted in highly prejudiced and ill-informed view which was 
promoted by colonial officers and their native counterparts in Muslim countries (a 
case in point is Qasim Amin in Egypt to whom I will return). The inferiority and 
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otherness of ‘Islam’, which is also connected with the inferiority of Muslim women 
in cases, becomes part and parcel of the literature produced in the colonial mode. 
One of the interesting and most intriguing aspects of Amer’s work is her 
meticulous engagement with the text of the Quran. In the first chapter of her work 
(pp. 21-37), she digs much deeper into the primary literature on Quranic studies 
and the Islamic traditions. Through these reflections, she problematizes the 
dominant notions about hijab among Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 
Regarding the theme of choice, Amer’s reflections open up a path for further 
engaging the agency of Muslim women. She challenges the idea of choice is simply 
being depicted in individualistic and liberal terms of Western societies. She posits 
that: 
 
It can also imply allegiance to a larger community. In societies that 
emphasize group allegiance over individualism (and this is the case in many 
Muslim- majority societies), choice is not about doing what one wants, 
independently of the group, but about adopting what is best for the group. 
Affiliating oneself with the community is not considered a coercive 
imposition but rather a rational, voluntarily chosen act of morality. (Amer 
2014, p. 65) 
 
She describes choice in the sense that “some Muslim women choose to follow what 
their family, friends, or community do and that they would feel out of place if they 
acted differently” (Amer, 2014, p. 66). This approach challenges the idea of a 
woman wearing or not wearing the hijab by choice and moves away from a black 
and white attribution of choice to either. She puts the issue of choice in the context 
of a sense of belonging: “These women do not experience the adoption of their 
family’s traditions or wishes as coercion or compulsion, but rather as their way of 
asserting their sense of belonging and of claiming their place within the 
community” (ibid). 
 
Interrogating the contemporary setting and the case of Muslim women in Europe, 
Heidi Safia Mirza (in Gross et al 2013) addresses the issue of veil and 
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Islamophobia. Her article addressed the case of three professional Muslim women 
in Britain who are faced with challenges of the new conditions. Mirza places the 
banning of the veil in European settings under scrutiny and points out that: 
 
It is ironic that such ‘secular’ banning of the headscarf in the name of 
equality and non-discrimination in a democratic societies runs parallel to 
the actions of Islamic fundamentalist countries such as Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran which force women to wear religious clothing. (2013, p. 
304) 
 
Thus, she reflects how ‘secular’ societies and states indeed become mirror images 
of repressive ones they claim to be critical of. Through describing examples of 
gendered Islamophobia in Europe, she argues that “parallels can be drawn to 
colonial times where women’s bodies were part of the debate over the West’s 
civilising mission” (ibid), which is in resonance with the attitudes criticised by Said 
and others. 
 
Mirza reminds us of how the Muslim woman’s body has turned into a battleground 
for ideological forces on both ends of the spectrum but also how it has become 
integral to this confrontation with Islam in the policies of European states: “the 
Muslim woman’s vulnerable yet overdetermined body has become symbolic in the 
battle against Islam, the barbaric ‘other’ and the Muslim enemy ‘within’” (2013, p. 
305). She then reiterates the point that Amer (2014) has also highlighted 
differently by saying that a Muslim woman’s “complex dress has been given 
symbolic meaning greater than its religious and social status” (ibid). This 
overstretching of the meaning of a dress code and pushing it further away from 
what could be or should be viewed in a more neutral sense has indeed paved the 
ground for this ideological battle. 
 
She further elaborates on a point that Afshar (2008) has also pointed out with 
regard to European societies: 
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The Muslim women’s private faith-based reasons for wearing the niqab 
have become public property, a ‘weapon’ used by many different competing 
interests, from male politicians in France to white feminists in Belgium to 
argue their cases for and against assimilation, multiculturalism, secularism 
and human rights. (ibid) 
 
As we can see, here, the same notion of peculiarity, exceptionality and uniqueness 
is repeated all over again, this time with emphasis on Muslim women. A Muslim 
woman’s dress code becomes the subject of public interest and even public safety. 
Mirza then draws on the resistance of Muslim feminists against constructions 
which defy the agency of Muslim women: “Islamic feminists have taken issue with 
the cultural superiority of simplistic, sensationalised cultural constructions of 
Muslim women in the media, constructions that negate Muslim female identity and 
agency, and depoliticise their (embodied) struggles for self-determination” (ibid). 
It is noteworthy that when Mirza quotes from Haideh Moghisi in relation to “the 
control of women and the authority of the patriarchal family”, which she finds 
central to the “Islamic fundamentalist utopia”, she compares it with the ‘”rise of 
Western capitalism”, bringing Max Weber and his articulation of the rationality of 
Western civilisation, which I mentioned earlier on. Quoting from Saba Mahmood, 
she concurs with her that “we must move beyond Western imperialist notions of 
libratory emancipation, and the deterministic binaries of resistance/subordination 
by which Muslim female subjectivity and agency are so often judged in the ‘West’”. 
Thus, she is also challenging the binary or oppression vs. protection as viewed by 
the West. 
 
On the theme of choice and agency, Mirza refers to a study by Open Society 
Foundation (in 2011) which: 
 
…shows that contrary to the usual stereotype of Muslim women forced to 
wear the face veil, the adoption of the veil was in most cases about 
‘transforming the self’. It was the result of a personal and extremely 
individualistic spiritual journey in which most of the women were the first 
members of their family to adopt the veil and had no niqab-wearing peers, 
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and their attendance at their mosque or affiliation to any Islamic bodies was 
minimal. (p. 308) 
 
Her description of adoption of the veil as ‘transforming the self’ is in line with how 
Amer describes a different sense of choice with the only difference that attendance 
in mosques or Islamic bodies seems peripheral and irrelevant in this exercise of 
choice. She, thus, criticises the idea that Muslim women have been seen as “as a 
homogenous group, oppressed and lacking agency” (p. 313). She is critical of how 
the veil has become a signifier of Islam and an ‘identity site’ “where British and 
European societies feel free to openly contest the Muslim women’s religious 
identity” (ibid). She views the “negating discourse of multiculturalism and virulent 
discourses of Islamophobia” as the context in which “that the women search for 
multiple and shifting identities” (ibid). 
 
Mirza’s reflections are important in the way I look at Iranian Muslim women in 
London, as it covers the overall sociological and political ground in which the 
above-mentioned forces (Islamophobia, colonial legacy and Orientalist literature) 
operate and condition the exercise of agency for the women I have interviewed. 
Problematising Gender 
The categories of male and female are not self-evident, and involve other aspects of 
life beyond gender relations and roles (Butler, 1999; MacCormack and Strathern, 
1980; Moore, 1989; Torab, 2006). Marilyn Strathern (1990) shows that gender, in a 
metaphorical way, encompasses many aspects of life, including gender identity and 
its roles and relations. In this sense, gender is produced through people’s activities 
in everyday life: for example, in this case by wearing hijab. 
The status of women and gender relations have been treated as a measure of 
modernity in several academic works (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Ahmed, 1992; Gole, 
1997; Haddad and Esposito, 1997). Nadia Hijab (1988), for example, argues that 
Western notions of liberty and emancipation are a universal way to measure 
women’s status. However, this view derives from a specific (Eurocentric)  
understanding of modernity.  
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Mahmood (2001) critiques the assumption that women universally desire women’s 
liberation, and that this is a useful measure for modernity and female status. Abu-
Lughod (1998) argues that the pious modern (or a practicing spiritual modern 
religious) individual is not in complete opposition to the Western idea of the modern 
women. The status of women cannot simply be defined by Western ideas of 
emancipation. In my research I expand on the relation between being pious and 
modern, problematizing and questioning the possibility of distinguishing between 
Western women and Muslim hijabi women.  
Following Thomas Csordas’ (1990) argument, the paradigm of embodiment in 
studying hijab highlights the importance of the body. Embodiment is about how we 
study perception where the distinction between the subject and object is eroded. In 
Csordas’ view, it is not appropriate to differentiate between mind and body on the 
level of perception, because when we talk about the body in an experiential way as 
a subject and not an object, the mind-body distinction is eroded. Bodies are not 
objects to us. They are a part of the perceiving subject (Campbell, 2011 :15). 
Therefore, the body is a starting point for analysing culture and the self. Csordas 
argues that the dualities of mind-body, self-other, cognition-emotion, and 
subjectivity-objectivity should be treated in parallel to the dissolution of the subject-
object.  
Embodiment is a useful tool for understanding the practice of veiling. For many 
women, hijab becomes a part of their self-perception. The object becomes fused with 
the subject. To put it more simply, for some hijabis, hijab becomes an extension of 
the body and part of their self. This, however, is not always the case, and even when 
it is the case, it is not always the most important element of one’s body and self-
image and identity. In other words, hijab in not necessarily the most important 
component of what a hijabi woman is. By concentrating on women’s narratives, 
including my own interactions with them, I aim to break down the objectification of 
Muslim women’s bodies, which the dominant Western discourse reduces to the 
hijab. At the same time, I criticise Islamic jurisprudence that reduces all situations 
to one single interpretation and obliges women to follow a prescribed dress code at 
all times and in all places. This can also be seen as a way of objectifying women’s 
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bodies. The state and effect of Islamic Shia Jurisprudence will be explored in Chapter 
Three. 
A key question about gender relations is how the Shia women of my study 
understand and interpret the interconnection between the hijab, gender roles, and 
their own perceptions of gender. Concomitantly, I examine Shia Islamic 
jurisprudence and its rules about gender issues to see how it has influenced these 
issues. I investigate how these rules are translated, transformed, and reproduced in 
everyday lives, particularly through my focus on hijab and the way Shia women 
perceive and practice it. 
Hijab 
There is a wide range of literature on hijab and veiling from different perspectives. 
Hijab has been an important issue of struggle between traditionalists and 
modernists in the past centuries. It has been an index to gauge the emancipation or 
repression of women. On the one hand, early Iranian feminists, in line with 
modernist views, assumed that hijab was a form of female confinement (see Naghibi 
1999). On the other hand, a growing number of scholars argue that claims about the 
subjugation and repression of hijabi Muslim women have been overstated (see 
Ahmed 1993; Guindi 1999; Mahmood 2004; Sandikci & Ger 2005; Mir-Hosseini 
2007; Alvi et al. 2003; Bowen 2008; Shirazi 2003).  
Demystifying the veil 
 
I have briefly discussed above and referred to the literature which highlight how 
Muslims and Islam is seen as unique, peculiar or exceptional. Here, I would like to 
be more specific about how this notion is generalised and taken to a new level 
when it comes to dress code. Eirini-Chrysovalantou Zempi’s PhD thesis (2014) has 
provided some critical insights into this topic. In the first chapter of her work, she 
speaks about “the failure to acknowledge the possibility of the autonomy of veiled 
Muslim women” (Zempi 2014, p. 13) which paves the way for depicting Muslim 
women as ‘voiceless victims’ reinforcing the idea of emancipation and liberation. 
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Zempi further argues that “dominant perceptions about veiled Muslim women’s 
lack of agency further entrench dangerous notions of a ‘Muslim problem’ whereby 
Muslim men deny Muslim women the freedom to exercise their autonomy” (ibid). 
Therefore, it is not simply about denying the agency of the Muslim women, who is 
seen as the oppressed voiceless victim, but also about viewing it as a ‘problem’. 
Zempi draws our attention to the British context and how the policy of 
multiculturalism has contributed to aggravate the issue: 
 
In the British context, national identity and examples of Muslim ‘difference’ 
are cast as mutually exclusive. As such, the veil is rejected on the grounds 
that it is non-British in inception and adoption, thereby erasing the 
principle of integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation by 
all; rather, it is integration at the price of becoming less ‘Muslim’ (Zempi 
2014, p. 17) 
 
She continues to give us a narrative of how the dress code of Muslim women is 
singled out as peculiar and as something which cannot be compared with other 
forms of dress code, such as the turban or a yarmulke or even a baseball cap. Thus, 
the veil is seen as different from other forms of ‘religious’ dress code (ibid). She 
notes that: 
 
…the wearing of the veil signals a visibility that is ‘conspicuous’ in 
comparison to other religious signs, which themselves do not attract public 
attention and, though also visible, remain ‘normalised’. As such, the veil is 
‘unique’ on the basis that it prevents a basic form of human contact in a way 
that the Muslim headscarf, the Sikh turban, the Buddhist robe and the 
Christian Cross do not. (Zempi 2014, pp. 17-18) 
 
As we can see, the veil is thus singled out and it becomes a unique area of 
contention to which all Muslim women are drawn. In this sense, the rhetoric itself 
acts as a disempowering force which deprives Muslim women of any agency: the 
fate and the role of a dress code, which could for all intents and purposes be seen 
as neutral and on the same level as any other dress code – including those attached 
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to religions – is tied to a mystified and highly politicised notion. Therefore, Muslim 
women, their attire, their body, their sexuality and every aspect of their life is 
turned into an area of contention. Moreover, they are also victimised on the same 
grounds and as Zempi notes: “Muslim women are viewed as the main vehicles of 
integration but simultaneously they are the first victims of the failure of 
integration. Ironically, choosing to veil is a greater offence than being forced to 
veil” (2014, p. 19). 
 
Therefore, what happens here is that Muslim women are depicted as oppressed 
ones who need rescue. Then, they are deprived of agency and choice by how their 
dress code is politicised, not in repressive Muslim countries but in liberal and 
secular societies. And all of this happens in the name of modernity, secularism and 
values of a liberal society. The entire scenario reinforces a sharp separation and 
segregation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ which otherises Muslim women who happen to be 
subjects of male-dominated patriarchal forces in a different context. 
 
The literature I have covered so far provide a more coherent theoretical 
framework to engage with the issues of Iranian Muslim women in London and also 
interrogate the conditions which have led to transformations in their dress code. 
As I will discuss in the forthcoming chapters too, this is not to focus on either 
Islamophobia or victimisation of Muslim women who wear the veil. The diasporic 
conditions give a different perspective to the issue and the policies of the Islamic 
Republic with regard to hijab place the issue in a different context even though 
parallels may be drawn with the literature I have just discussed. 
 
On this note, I would like to touch upon Islamic feminism in this context and 
provide a background of how this new and emerging discourse has contributed 
directly or indirectly to the situation of Iranian women in general and that of 
Iranian women in London. 
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Islamic Feminism or Islam and Feminism? 
The struggle for women’s rights among Muslims has been influenced by the 
encounter of Muslims with modernity. Therefore, inevitably, all the debates about 
Islam and modernity, secularism, democracy are on one way or another part of this 
debate. Badran (2009) provides a narrative about how feminism in Islam was 
viewed in the West and also by Muslims themselves. In the case of the former, not 
Islamic feminism itself but also the very association of feminism and Islam, 
according to Badran, was presumed an oxymoron (Badran 2009, p. 1). On the 
other end of the spectrum, in “the East” it was viewed as an anathema. Badran 
immediately notes, however, that the concern for “oppressed Muslim woman” was 
used as an instrument for justifying colonial policies as part of an Orientalist 
discourse (ibid). She further reflects that denigrating Islam has also been part of 
the process: 
 
…We note that Westerners attack Muslims by belittling the very notion that 
they could generate a feminism of their own, and in so doing denigrate 
Islam as inherently gender-unjust, while many Muslims (playing into their 
hands) attack the West for foisting feminism upon their hapless 
coreligionists, wantonly discrediting Muslim women’s feminisms. (Badran 
2009, pp. 1-2) 
 
Thus, she reinforces the point about the deep-rooted antagonism which was often 
the product of ignorance about Islam and Muslim societies. According to Badran, 
what is called or viewed as feminism developed and constructed by Muslim 
women is not a derivation or an appropriation of a Western idea; religion has been 
part and parcel of the construction of the idea of feminism, whether it is secular 
feminism or Islamic feminism. She contrasts this point with how feminism in the 
West was developed as a “largely secular enterprise” articulated outside the 
domain of religion and its language (Badran 2009, p.2). 
 
Badran’s observation about secular and Islamic feminism in Muslim countries is 
valuable in the sense that she does not compartmentalise the two and establishes 
an organic connection between them: those working in either framework did not 
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operate in total seclusion and isolation from one another.  
 
Nonetheless, she clearly depicts their differences too. On secular feminism, she 
notes: “Secular feminism signified a model of feminism located within the context 
of a secular territorial nation-state composed of equal citizens, irrespective of 
religious affiliation and a state protective of religion while not officially organized 
around religion” (Badran 2009 p. 3). It is important to note how secular feminism 
is constructed or viewed in the context of territorial nation-state. It is reminiscent 
of Weberian concepts all along. If we remember how Weber is responsible for 
arguing about the uniqueness of Occidental civilisation and modernity, we cannot 
fail to notice the connection here. What is significant, however, is that these 
connections are not fully problematized in the way Badran engages with the issue. 
She gives a broader description in her other work (in Kynsilehto 2008): 
 
Feminism as a phenomenon engaging with issues of women’s rights, 
women’s liberation, and gender equality as part and parcel of the rights, 
liberation, and equality of all was constructed and shaped concurrently by 
Muslims and others in the East… and by westerners in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries (p. 25) 
 
In her 2009 work, she is more specific. She further provides her description of 
Islamic feminism in the following terms: “Islamic feminism, by contrast, burst on 
the global scene as a new discourse or interpretation of Islam and gender 
grounded in ijtihad, or independent intellectual investigation of the Qur’an and 
other religious texts” (ibid). The description captures the core elements of Islamic 
feminism in a succinct manner. The only area which remains vague in this 
description (and Badran explains it further in a different way) is the role of 
authority. It is implicit in Badran’s definition that women themselves have a role in 
interpretation and ijtihad but the greater bulk of knowledge production and 
interpretations in the Muslim world, including on women’s issues, have remained 
in the hands of male scholars or mujtahids. 
 
What becomes apparent in Badran’s engagement with the issue (and we have also 
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seen this in the more meticulous work of Amer in referencing Quranic verses and 
the hadiths) is that a space is being created and as Afshar noted (2008), 
“wrenching power and authority away from men” is inevitably part of this process. 
The key is, however, the education of women. It is this point which is critical in 
understanding how the issue of veil, in particular, was viewed regarding the 
education of women, in a range of discourses. 
 
Highlighting the role of Islamic feminists and women exegetes, Badran notes that 
they provide “compelling arguments that the patriarchal model of the family does 
not conform to the Qur’anic principles of human equality and gender justice” 
(Badran 2009, p. 4) and as a consequence, this engagement with the Qur’an, 
“brought them into the universe of holistic egalitarian Islam encompassing the 
intersection of family and society that constitutes the umma” (ibid). Badran 
captures a fundamental issue in the right tone, but what is missing here is the 
process through which this authority is shifted from its male guardians to women, 
as those who struggle for the rights of women. One of the areas of contention is 
this process. Many of the tensions which have occurred over the body of women 
and their dress code results from this sense of authority which is assumed to be a 
monopoly of men. I will return to this point shortly when it comes to the case of 
Egypt and Qasim Amin. 
 
Before proceeding further, I must explain why I have frequently noted the case of 
Egypt in this section while my own research focussed on Iran and Iranian women 
in London. The relevance is that of discourse and the methodological issues at 
stake. Egypt is a uniquely interesting case as it has the experience of colonisation – 
unlike Iran which was never directly colonised – and one can visibly see the role of 
Orientalism and colonial policies and their modes of knowledge production there. 
The themes and ideas related to women’s issues are vividly related to how we 
articulate the same questions for Iranian women inside and outside Iran. 
Badran correctly places the rise of secular feminist movements in various Muslim 
countries to national aspirations. Thus, moving away from the concept of the 
universal community of Muslims (umma) to a national setting, which is viewed in 
secular terms, is a critical reference point for secular feminists among Muslims. By 
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providing the above narrative, she indeed surpasses some of the limitations of 
separating secular and Islamic feminists. She argues that such categorisations are 
“rigid, reductive, or misleading, and frequently have been deliberately manipulated 
for political ends” (Badran 2009, p. 5).  
 
What Badran refers to as “religious women” (the mutadayyinat) broadly covers 
those who looked to the Qur’an to find answers of their own regarding the issues 
of women: 
 
They were impelled to critique the resurgence of a gender-reactionary 
Islam that threatened the gains women had made but recoiled from the 
word “feminism” because of the associations it held for them, seeing it as 
“Western”; yet they had difficulty in coming up with an alternative term. 
(Badran 2009, p. 9) 
 
In my research, the interviewees may broadly fall into this category with the only 
difference that the definition of a “religious woman” is broadened when it comes to 
the issue of veil. I will speak about this further when I come to the typologies that I 
identify, but here, it is important to note that Badran does not go into specific 
details of who would be a religious woman. Is it someone who refers to the Qur’an 
as a source of authority and then extracts and interprets verses to accommodate 
the life of women in their times? Is it about how the agency of these women can 
reflect itself in the entirety of their ritual practices? Is it about how the practice of 
religious rituals can be connected to the practice of the veil? These question fall 
beyond or outside the work of Badran but they are important and integral to my 
research and I will elaborate on them in later chapters. 
 
Referring to the case of Iran, Badran observes that in other countries, those who 
engaged with the Qura’n did not consider their work as feminist but the situation 
in Iran is different: 
 
A striking early exception were the new religious intellectuals - women and 
men -scholars, writers, and journalists in Iran who were explicit about the 
42 
 
feminist dimension of their work, and indeed played a seminal role in the 
development of the new Islamic feminism as their ideas circulated globally. 
It was Muslim secular feminists as writers and scholars in various locations 
who recognized, in the new ijtihad, the emergence among coreligionists of a 
“feminism in a new voice” and coined the term “Islamic feminism” (Badran 
2009, p. 9) 
 
In the context of Egypt, Badran points out the movement for the education of 
women by feminists activists but she also notes: 
 
They wanted women to gain more education and to reclaim public space 
before they unveiled, as a tactical move. While for progressive men 
unveiling had a key ideological and symbolic value, for women it was a 
practical matter that they themselves would have to undertake, with the 
attendant risks of taunts and assaults on their reputations (Badran 2009, p. 
22) 
 
The emphasis on women’s education by men had an entirely different background 
and ideological charge behind it which was closely connected with colonial policies 
in the late 19th century in Egypt. Nonetheless, as I noted earlier, the education of 
women as also connected with their dress code and how it was seen in the society. 
Giving the political context of the late 1970s in Egypt, a new element is now added 
to the engagement of Muslim feminists and that is the introduction of Islamic law 
into the law of the land: 
 
The year 1979 was highly charged for Egypt, abroad as well as at home. 
Egypt ratified the Camp David accord with Israel, isolating itself from the 
Arab world and alienating both leftists and conservatives at home. The 
decrees favorable to women within the family and in parliament provoked 
Muslim conservatives. Meanwhile, the revolution in Iran brought Khomeini 
to power, ushering in a new Islamic state and heartening fundamentalists in 
Egypt. As Islamist forces gathered momentum, the Egyptian state made an 
important placatory move to Islamists and religious conservative in 1980 
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when it amended the constitution to read: “Islamic jurisprudence is the 
principal source of legislation,” replacing the 1971 formulation that “the 
shari’ah is a principal source of law.” (Badran 2009, p. 43) 
 
While in Egypt the idea of Islamic feminism was not a totally new concept, the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran brought a new phase and dimension to feminism in Iran. 
The introduction of Islamic laws in the Iranian constitution did indeed intensify 
the momentum of Islamic feminism. It is important to note that Islamic feminism in 
Iran was not intended to be approving of the legal frameworks which were mainly 
man-made and male-driven. We must also note that even though female mujtahids 
do exist in Iran and they have their own circles, they are not – and have not been – 
so visible or influential in determining the course of policies for women’s rights 
when we view the situation from the lens of religious authority.  
 
In the second chapter of her book, Badran focusses on Qasim Amin and the rise of 
feminism in Egypt and in the very opening paragraphs, she addresses a question 
which is critical and interrelated to how she problematizes the issue of 
secular/Islamic feminism. She asks: “where do we situate the “woman question”? 
Within a secular or religious discourse? Or within a more inclusive discourse that 
renders such categories simplistic and misleading?” (Badran 2009, p. 55). The 
inclusive framework that she is referring to is one that can go beyond such 
binaries or categorisations to enable to end result of these struggles for working 
more collaboratively. This approach is in resonance with how Amer (2014) seeks a 
more neutral way of addressing the issue of veil rather than turning it into an area 
of contention where ideological forces can battle over. 
 
Badran notes the removal of the monopoly of religious institutions over education 
(in general): “Education had been moving away from the more exclusive control of 
the religious establishment, fanning out from al-Azhar to that of secular authorities 
(of both the state and civil society) (Badran 2009, p. 55). This “secularisation” of 
education did indeed provide space for all, including women, to empower 
themselves. At the centre of these struggles is Qasim Amin, who is depicted as the 
“father of Arab feminism”. Badran argues that “the evolving feminist discourse of 
44 
 
women and of Amin emerged in the context of Islamic reform and secular 
nationalism” (p. 56). While she may be correct about Amin and secular 
nationalism, her claim about Amin and Islamic reform needs to be seriously 
assessed. While throughout this work and in other places, Badran is more 
sympathetic to Amin and his project for the emancipation of women, others such 
as Leila Ahmed have severely criticised Amin for his writings (which I will describe 
here shortly after discussing Badran). More specifically, there is a risk of equating 
Amin with Islamic reformists such As Muhammad ‘Abduh who is assumed to have 
contributed to a part of Amin’s arguments. 
 
That being said, Badran does not ignore that harsh language of Amin when he 
spoke about Egyptian Muslim women. In contrast, she does notice the more gentle 
language of women when to spoke to each other: “In speaking to each other, 
women were gentle and compassionate. They had an agenda for change which 
they expressed in a forceful and confident voice. They also articulated what may be 
called a discourse of suffering” (p. 56) and she proceeds by saying that: 
 
Amin in his narrative style and modes of argumentation appeals to men, to 
what they- and the family and nation - will gain if women achieve their 
liberation. He describes women - women’s condition and practices - in often 
offensive and crude ways, as women would not do, and as some later took 
offense to. (Badran 2009, p. 57) 
 
What Badran describes as ‘”offensive and crude” lacks a more critical analysis, 
unlike the way Ahmed had done before her. While speaking about the background 
of Amin as a judge and comparing him with feminist women, Badran notes his 
education – which is deeply influenced by a French mentality: 
 
Amin had trained at the French School of Law and Administration in Cairo, 
and went on to study law in Montpellier for four years. Taimuriyya, 
Fawwaz, Naufal, and Sha’rawi were all schooled by private tutors at home. 
Amin was a judge when he wrote Tahrir al-mar’a, and as such an important 
public figure of the establishment, while the women were all leading 
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discreetly secluded lives (ibid). 
 
Here, Badran fails to make the connection between Amin’s harsh and disparaging 
language with a background of French Orientalist and colonial influence here, even 
though in a different work, she notes that “until today feminism remains in many 
ways a prisoner of colonialism” (Badran in Kynsilehto 2008, p. 25). Indeed, this 
point, as we can see in the work of Ahmed, is a central and important point in the 
reactions we see to Amin’s work. Nonetheless, Badran points out a different aspect 
about Amin and these feminists which has to do with their privileged status: 
 
Qasim Amin and the women mentioned here all had foreign ancestry: Amin 
came from a Kurdish family originating from Iraq; Taimuriyya was of 
Turco-Circassian lineage; Fawwaz and Naufal originated from Lebanon; 
Sha’rawi, the only one with an Egyptian parent (her father), had a 
Circassian mother. Their non-Egyptian origins and connections did not 
place them on the margins, but rather conferred status, while also providing 
more than one optic on life. (p. 57) 
 
The privileged status of these people based on ancestry – or at least partly based 
on that – does not precisely serve as a liberating background for their endeavours. 
Indeed, this aspect when viewed from a purely critical and intellectual perspective, 
should be peripheral, but it seems that indeed it does work. The fact that this 
status is important is not merely part of the description of the situation; it is also 
part of the problem. 
 
Badran’s assessment of Amin’s work is not just sympathetic but also positive at 
points. She ask questions about why they (including here) “celebrate” Qasim Amin: 
Why do we celebrate the centenary of Qasim Amin’s Tahrir al-mar’a when 
we have not celebrated the works of the women who wrote about women’s 
liberation before Amin brought out his book? Is it because women’s 
discourse was largely a “hidden discourse,” or one that did not circulate 
widely in the “larger world”? Is it because, although the “woman question” 
was important, women were not important in their own right, and were not 
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public figures? (p. 62) 
 
And her response to all of these questions is quite short: because Amin was a 
respected judge and because he wrote a book which became very controversial 
and provocative and later became part of the “national canon”. Perhaps a more 
critical appraisal of the work of Amin could have given her work more depth in 
addressing the kind of questions she repeatedly identifies in her work.  
 
Later on in the same work, Badran notes that “Muslim women’s feminisms in the 
Middle East have emerged in the context of encounters with modernity, and that 
Islam has been implicated in the construction of these feminisms, as have notions 
of transnationality” (p. 215). The case of Amin was no exception to this encounter 
with modernity with the only difference that Amin was so deeply concerned with a 
singular, Eurocentric and colonial perception of modernity that his work would 
otherwise be seen as none but a European project for colonised people: to civilise 
them. This key issue is at the heart of the problem of the myth of emancipating the 
Muslim women, the other, and rescuing them. It is astonishing and alarming that 
the same kind of approach you see in Laura Bush’s statements when it came to the 
invasion of Afghanistan is embedded in the language of Amin more than a century 
ago. 
 
As much as Badran’s assessment of the legacy of Amin may require further 
scrutiny, she provides a rather different narrative when it comes to Islamic 
feminism. She speculates that the new radical feminism in Muslim countries would 
be “Islamic feminism”. I reproduced Badran’s arguments here verbatim as they are 
important in my own research too. She argues for her claim in the following terms: 
 
1. Islam is becoming a paramount cultural and political paradigm. 2. Muslim 
women, who are more highly educated in greater numbers than ever 
before, have begun gender-progressive readings of Islamic sacred scripture 
that will achieve - and indeed have already achieved- significant “feminist” 
breakthroughs. 3. Only the language of an “Islamic feminism” can 
potentially reach women of all classes and across urban-rural divides - or, 
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to put it slightly differently, the majority of Muslims can associate only with 
a “feminism” that is explicitly “Islamic.” 4. Because of increasing 
globalization and growing Muslim diaspora communities, Muslim women 
who practice Islam and want to embrace feminism need an Islamic 
feminism. 5. The globalized media and technology revolution produces a 
de-centered and denationalized feminism, and connects Muslim women 
both inside and outside predominantly Muslim nations or communities 
with each other. (p. 219) 
 
I find her arguments reasonable but I am wondering if she were capable of 
traveling back in time to present these arguments to Qasim Amin, how he would 
have reacted to these statements. I am not sure Amin’s modernist penchants 
aligned with the colonial language would easily tolerate such bold statements. 
Reflecting on Iran and Islamic feminism, Badran mentions the Zanan magazine and 
its radical work as part of the discourse of Islamic feminism. Her note on the 
political contingencies in Iran deserve special attention: 
 
The bold new interpretive work Iranian women are performing and 
disseminating through Zanan is being done inside the Middle East - and, 
moreover, inside an Islamic state. These women have experienced political 
and intellectual repression in the name of Islam inside the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Only in the post-Khomeini era have they been able to carry on a 
public debate on gender questions based on their own rereadings of the 
Qur’an. (p. 235) 
 
She further speaks about these women “enacting their own ijtihad” in articulating 
gender equality. While I am comfortable about this enactment, I am not so sure 
about how this enactment can indeed gain traction with the seemingly solid 
structure of religious authority which is now infused with political authority of the 
state – or rather with political power of the state. My sense is that this assessment 
– while it can give a promising prospect – is not quite cognisant of the intricacies of 
the relations of power and shifts in religious authority. I have noted this point 
earlier and I will continue to raise it in later chapters and with reference to my 
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interviews too. Badran does indeed note one area which is promising, even though 
it cannot powerfully articulate the issue I have raised: 
 
These Iranian Islamic feminists are publicly and explicitly taking 
independent and risky positions on gender as they reinterpret the religion. 
They are not adjuncts to masculinist political projects. Quite to the contrary, 
they are finding a separate space between secular feminism and masculinist 
Islamism. It is what I call the middle ground, in the sense of “in-between 
space” (p. 236) 
 
She is correct in pointing out that this is a “risky” approach; the patriarchal 
religious authority now married to the state does not respond well to such brave 
actions, but the very fact that this “in-between space” is nurtured is critical for the 
prospects of Islamic feminism in Iran. To be fair, in her other work (in Kynsilehto 
2008), Badran seems to be aware of this limitation but even then her concern is 
about feminism not authority: “Although writers in Zanan publically identified 
with feminism, along with some others, those revered as creators of seminal texts 
of Islamic feminism firmly rejected the term” (p. 31) 
 
I have spent a lot of time going into details of what Badran says on Islamic 
feminism. It would be pertinent to return to Iranian feminists who have voiced 
similar concerned but I believe are much more aware of the contingencies of the 
issue. A case in point is Ziba Mir-Hosseini. She captures the key questions which 
concern Muslim feminists, in an article (2006) immediately when she begins her 
piece: 
 
Muslim jurists claim, and all Muslims believe, that justice and equality are 
intrinsic values and cardinal principles in Islam and the sharia. If this is the 
case, in a state that claims to be guided by the sharia, why are justice and 
equality not reflected in the laws that regulate gender relations and the 
rights of men and women? Why do Islamic jurisprudential texts—which 
define the terms of the sharia—treat women as second-class citizens and 
place them under men’s domination? (Mir-Hosseini 2006, p. 629) 
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She continues to highlight a point that Badran fails to notice in her assessment of 
Islamic feminism in Iran: “one paradoxical and unintended consequence of the 
Islamists’ reintroduction of sharia in Iran and their attempt to enforce its 
premodern mandates has been to open a new dialogue between Islamic law and 
feminism.” (p. 631). And I would like to particularly focus on this aspect of 
“unintended consequences” because it also plays a critical role in how Iranian 
women (and those in London) revisit their dress code and veil. The more 
restrictive and repressive policies have been on the veil in Iran, the more creative 
and more flexible women have become with their dress code. Yet, it does not seem 
that they have easily relinquished their connection with religion. 
 
Before I bring this section to an end, it is important to briefly look at one of the 
arguments against Islamic feminism that Moghisi (1991) provides. Moghisi finds 
feminism in total contradiction with ‘Islam’ as she believes ‘Islam’ is essentially 
about the subjugation of women (more specifically dwelling on the Qur’an and 
political manifestations of Islam in contemporary times). In response to Moghisi’s 
objections, Miriam Cooke (2001) argues that: 
 
She confounds Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, as though the two were 
the same. This slippage leads her to assert that there is a general pressure 
today to affirm Islam, regardless of whether or not one believes in it, so as 
to gain credibility. This affirmation, she dramatically asserts, “relies on 
twisting facts or distorting realities, ignoring or hiding that which should be 
clear” (135). Her very real fear is that to celebrate Islamic feminism is “to 
highlight only one of the many forms of identity available to Middle Eastern 
women, obscuring ways that identity is asserted or reclaimed, 
overshadowing forms of struggle outside religious practices and silencing 
the secular voices which are still raised against the region's stifling 
Islamification policies” (Cooke 2001, p. 58) 
The assumption that there is an inherent and organic link between ‘Islam’ – which 
is itself a problematic construct – and Islamism is a common thread in the 
arguments of secular feminists such as Moghisi and others who address other 
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aspects of Islam when it comes to any concept related to modernity and 
secularism. Therefore, it is always important to be mindful of such sloppy 
oversimplifications that only serve to corroborate an already firm position about 
Islam and Muslims. 
 
 
Even though few Iranian feminists are discussed at this stage, since the 
overarching theme of this section was about Islamic feminism (and not just its 
Iranian version), I have tried to keep within the boundaries of the arguments and 
the theoretical aspects of it rather than focussing or comparing different case 
studies as such. The case of Egypt as I mentioned earlier provides ample evidence 
for the working of Orientalism, Eurocentric modernity and secularism with regard 
to Muslim women. 
The veil: to abolish or to adopt? 
 
As I will elaborate further in the section about my informants and their 
engagement with the issue of veil, Muslim women have had multiple and varied 
reasons for their engagement with the veil. One way of framing the question is 
through seeing motives and backgrounds through and from which different 
women tend to relinquish the practice of veil or adopt it, either within an ‘Islamic’ 
reading of either act or through a revisiting or rejection of it. It is also about 
negotiating the terms of the practice: on what grounds and what terms does a 
woman either adopt or relinquish the veil? 
 
In this vein, it is interesting to look at the assessment of Leila Ahmed of the case of 
Egypt. In looking at Qasim Amin’s work and his legacy, Ahmed points out the one 
of the key points about Amin’s thesis was a concern about “changing customs 
regarding women and changing their costume, abolishing the veil in particular” in 
order to bring about “the desired general social transformation” (Ahmed 1992, p. 
145). In evaluating the reactions and challenges that Amin’s work from what was 
viewed by some as simply the conservative segments of Egyptian society, Ahmed 
traces the provenance of Amin’s work to the discourse of European societies. 
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As I have covered earlier, a view of ‘Islam’ – which was as unproblematised then as 
it, probably to a lesser extent, today – formed an integral part of the discourse: it 
was “part of the Western narrative of the quintessential otherness and inferiority 
of Islam” (p. 149). What Ahmed pointed out in this regard is more or less what 
remains in force until our times even among certain academics. Ahmed argues that 
the Western narrative of women in Islam: 
 
(1) often garbled and misconstrued the specific content and meaning of the 
customs described and (2) assumed and represented the Islam practiced in 
Muslim societies in the periods in which the Europeans encountered and 
then in some degree or other dominated those societies to be the only 
possible interpretation of the religion. (p. 149) 
 
Ahmed traces back the history of viewing Muslim women as oppressed to earlier 
centuries but notes that “the issue of women only emerged as the centerpiece of 
the Western narrative of Islam in the nineteenth century, and in particular the 
later nineteenth century, as Europeans established themselves as colonial powers 
in Muslim countries” (p. 150). Thus, the connection of the emergence of this 
narrative to colonial policies is critical here. The narrative formed a coherent 
approach on the side of colonialists with a new focus on women and it emerged out 
of: 
 
A coalescence between the old narrative of Islam just referred to (and 
which Edward Said’s Orientalism details) and the broad, all-purpose 
narrative of colonial domination regarding the inferiority, in relation to the 
European culture, of all Other cultures and societies, a narrative that saw 
vigorous development over the course of the nineteenth century (p. 150). 
 
One of the prominent aspects of the European discourse of feminism produced and 
enacted in Muslim countries was how it was at odds with the view of feminism in 
the Victorian society of the time. Victorian theories argued about “the biological 
inferiority of women and the naturalness of the Victorian ideal of the female role of 
domesticity. Such theories were politically useful to the Victorian establishment as 
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it confronted, internally, an increasingly vocal feminism” (p. 151). Yet, when the 
same theories went to colonised Muslim countries, it was only about rescuing 
Muslim women from oppression. What was seen alien and desirable at home was 
now to be pursued forcefully as a symbol of modernity. And as Ahmed points out, 
native Muslim writers, from among the male members of the Egyptian society, 
were complicit in promoting this language. It is in this context that the language of 
colonialism and feminism merge to make a connection between issues of culture 
and those of women (and this is noted in contemporary times in the work of Abu-
Lughod and Mamdani, as I discussed earlier). 
 
The lines of argument are strikingly straightforward and familiar as if we are 
reading a modern account of this narrative in the 21st century:  
 
The thesis of the discourse on Islam blending a colonialism committed to 
male dominance with feminism— the thesis of the new colonial discourse 
of Islam centered on women— was that Islam was innately and immutably 
oppressive to women, that the veil and segregation epitomized that 
oppression, and that these customs were the fundamental reasons for the 
general and comprehensive backwardness of Islamic societies. (pp. 151-
152) 
 
As we can see, the idea that there is something essential and intrinsic to ‘Islam’ 
which is not present in other cultures or religions forms an important part of the 
discourse. This view is peculiarly persistent in narratives about diasporic 
communities too. I will expand this further in later chapters and argue that this 
connection is vital to deconstructing the prevalent image of Muslim women. 
In her discussion of the connection between Qasim Amin’s thesis in his 
controversial book and those of Lord Cromer, the British colonial officer in Egypt, 
Ahmed quotes a passage which is peculiarly reminiscent of Max Weber: 
 
The inferiority of the men was evident in numerous ways, which Cromer 
lists at length. For instance: “The European is a close reasoner; his 
statements of fact are devoid of ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he 
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may not have studied logic; he loves symmetry in all things… his trained 
intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental on 
the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in 
symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description.” (p. 152) 
 
This is not only a Weberian idea about what a (modern) European man could be 
but also follows the same logic that John Locke was suggesting about the 
reasonableness or Christianity. It is ironic that Cromer, who was seen as the 
“champion of the unveiling of Egyptian women” was the “founding member and 
sometime president of the Men’s League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage” in 
England (p. 153). 
 
Ahmed quotes passages from Amin’s work and draws parallels between his work 
and the words and policies of Cromer in Egypt: 
 
Amin said that to make Muslim society abandon its backward ways and 
follow the Western path to success and civilization required changing the 
women. “The grown man is none other than his mother shaped him in 
childhood” and “this is the essence of this book… It is impossible to breed 
successful men if they do not have mothers capable of raising them to be 
successful. This is the noble duty that advanced civilisation has given to 
women in our age and which she fulfills in advanced societies”. (p. 156) 
 
Amin’s knowledge about women in Egypt is questioned by Ahmed who argues 
that: 
 
Amin must have drawn on conceptions of the character and conduct of 
women based on his own and other European or Egyptian men’s self-
representations on the subject, rather than on any extensive observation of 
a broad-enough segment of female society to justify his tone of 
knowledgeable generalization. (p. 157) 
 
Hence, she concludes that Amin’s assault on the veil was not seen as a reasonable 
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analysis but a product of internalising and reproducing colonialist ideas. Ahmed 
argues that this was the primary and the most potent force behind fierce reactions 
to Amin’s work. However, in sections of Amin’s work where a rational argument is 
provide against veil, Ahmed suggests that the role of Muhammad ‘Abdu has 
probably been a reason behind it. 
 
In assessing the responses to Amin’s work, Ahmed notes that the rebuttals turned 
out to be an affirmation of customs of veiling and segregation. It became a voice 
and instrument of opposition (p. 162). Therefore, the very discourse itself got 
trapped into political narratives of resistance and opposition. The veil and the 
body of women thus turned into a battleground for male members of society to flex 
muscles over political contentions. It is in this context that feminism was also 
depicted in terms produced by Amin’s narrative (and that of colonialists) by those 
who opposed it: “They accept at face value the equation made by Amin and the 
originating Western narrative: that the veil signified oppression, therefore those 
who called for its abandonment were feminists and those opposing its 
abandonment were antifeminists.” (p. 162). 
 
Quite unlike Badran’s later and much more empathetic assessment of Amin’s work, 
Ahmed believes that “Far from being the father of Arab feminism, then, Amin might 
more aptly be described as the son of Cromer and colonialism” (pp. 162-163). 
In supporting her claim that the entire disputed did not rest on issues of women 
themselves, Ahmed gives the example of the arguments between Qasim Amin and 
Talʿat Harb and believes that the exchange “centered not on feminism versus 
antifeminism but on Western versus indigenous ways. For neither side was male 
dominance ever in question” (p. 163). 
 
The issue of a male-dominated, patriarchal society in all its spheres including in 
the area of engaging with religious scriptures seems totally absent. What is vividly 
missed here is the agency of women themselves. The game is played on terms set 
by the patriarchal setting rather than those generated by women themselves. 
Reiterating this point, Ahmed continues to say that: 
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The idea… that improving the status of women entails abandoning native 
customs was the product of a particular historical moment and was 
constructed by an androcentric colonial establishment committed to male 
dominance in the service of particular political ends. (p. 165) 
 
She proceeds by identifying a striking resemblance in the arguments provided by 
the other side: 
 
The peculiar resemblance to be found between the colonial and still-
commonplace Western view that an innate connection exists between the 
issues of culture and women in Muslim societies and the similar 
presumption underlying the Islamist resistance position, that such a 
fundamental connection does indeed exist. The resemblance between the 
two positions is not coincidental: they are mirror images of each other. (p. 
166) 
 
These arguments or positions are viewed as mirror images of one another. One 
side argues for the liberation of Muslim women from oppression and the other side 
later develops a language to cast veil as ‘protection’ only in response and reaction 
to the colonial view. This dichotomy is part of a long-lasting problem which flares 
up in almost every discussion about women today. And we will see it in a different 
context, but with similar genealogies in the arguments of Shariat and Motahari in 
later chapters. 
 
Towards the end of her assessment of Qasim Amin’s legacy, Ahmed proposes that: 
It was incorrect in its broad assumptions that Muslim women needed to 
abandon native ways and adopt those of the West to improve their status; 
obviously, Arab and Muslim women need to reject (just as Western women 
have been trying to do) the androcentrism and misogyny of whatever 
culture and tradition they find themselves in, but that is not at all the same 
as saying they have to adopt Western culture or reject Arab culture and 
Islam comprehensively (p. 166) 
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What Ahmed does not cover or scrutinise here is how the term ‘Islam’ is used in a 
singular and unitary manner. She correctly points to one of the fundamental 
bedrocks of the problem but articulating a more coherent analysis requires 
decoding this ‘Islam’. Sami Zubaida (2011), among others have further pushed 
forward the boundaries of this debate. In the introductory chapter of his book 
(2011), Zubaida provides a broad narrative of how this conception of Islam as a 
unit, self-contained and comprehensive idea, with immutable and detailed norms 
are problematic. I will come back to Zubaida’s arguments once again when I 
discuss issues of the diasporic communities in London. 
 
To summarise the points I have discussed above, the question of abolishing or 
adopting the veil is mainly articulated in the language of a confrontation between 
colonialism, Orientalism and its legacy and that of its fierce opponents among 
Islamist and other male (or male-dominated) Muslim political and religious 
figures. The question is not that to abolish or to adopt the veil is inherently false; it 
is rather the question of the role of women themselves in articulating answers and 
responses to the question. It is not the male members of a society who should 
eventually confer agency upon women. It is how women can exercise the agency 
that they potentially have but must negotiate its exercise through various avenues. 
 
Variations of dress code, its contingencies and complexities 
In the early twentieth century, European styles of clothing spread into Muslim 
countries that aspired to modernise their socio- political lives. In the middle decades 
of the twentieth century these European styles of clothing gradually became the 
dominant form of clothing amongst men and modern urban women. This was 
especially true in Iran and Turkey, where the governments imposed Western 
clothing. In reaction, in the early 1970’s the Islamic revivalist movement resulted in 
many women started wearing the hijab. But the hijab that they adopted was 
different from that worn by the older generation, and it was therefore called “new 
veiling” (Macleod, 1991). The new veiling was a different style of covering, worn by 
young middle class and educated women who had previously worn Western-style 
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clothes (Guindi, 1981). In her detailed work about the lower-middle-class women in 
Cairo, Macleod (1991) interrogates the implications of moderning the Egyptian 
society. Women from the poorer segments of society have to adjust their dress code 
in order to gain a higher economic status. Without necessarily downplaying the role 
of religion in the choices these women make to adopt the veil, she highlights the 
tension for these women of Cairo who wish to have an income in their precarious 
economic situation and at the same time be mindful not to be considered morally 
lax among the conservative society around them. Contrary to the settings of the 
earlier century, the driving force for these women for the adoption of the veil is not 
reaction to modernity or colonial policies. Motivations are primarily about 
improving their quality if life and having reasonable means to make their ends meet. 
As such, the veil turns into an important tool for economic dignity. 
The anthropology of clothing is central to the study of hijab. (For further see Barnes, 
1993; Hendrickson, 1996; Tarlo, 1996). Shared dress reflects shared cultural values 
with the people in our social group. Clothing is therefore a means for creating 
community and defining the wearer’s individual characteristics such as religious 
orientation, gender, ethnicity, class orientation, and lifestyle (Abu-Lughod, 2000; 
Rugh, 1986a). Different forms of hijab and women’s dress code, too, are central in 
creating different communities and social networks.   
Ethnographic research on hijab practice has been instrumental in facilitating the 
understanding of the empowerment of women in different parts of the world and 
helped to elucidate their subjective experiences. Some of this work has been done 
in Islamic countries and some in the diasporic Muslim communities in the West13. 
In Iran, the ‘Islamic feminist’ discourse views hijab as a right and not a duty, and it 
offers juristic reasons to support this argument. Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2007) traces the 
lineage of the emerging juristic positions on hijab in Islamic jurisprudence, and 
argues that in Iran, the notion of hijab has evolved in response to socio-political 
                                                        
13 A selected list of ethnographies follows, divided by region. 1) For Egypt, see: Abu-Lughod 2000; 
Guindi 1981; Hoodfar 1991; Williams 1979; Rugh 1986a; Macleod 1991; Zuhur 1992; Watson 1994; 
Mahmood 2004. 2) India: Sharma 1978; Osella & Osella 2007. 3) Morocco: Hessini 1994. 4) 
Indonesia: Brenner 1996; Smith-Hefner 2007. 5) Pakistan: Alvi 2013. 6) Saudi Arabia: Ramazani 
1983; AlMunajjed 1997. 7) Yemen: Makhlouf & Obermeyer 1979; Moors 2007. 8) Oman: Wikan 1991; 
Haddad 1984. 9) UK: Tarlo 2009; Kariapper 2009. 10) Canada: Hoodfar 1991; Sheila McDonough 
2003; Bullock 2002. 11) Netherland: A. Moors 2009. 
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factors. She shows that the new juristic positions on hijab allow a common ground 
to be established between secular and Islamic feminist. For instance, Reza Shah’s 
unveiling order in 1936 led to hijab being used as a sign of protest in the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. The banning of hijab was legislated in 1936 in the period of the 
Reza Shah’s reign. According to this law, women were not allowed to wear chador14, 
headscarf, and piche15. After the 1979 revolution, Morteza Motahari’s (2010) and Ali 
Shariati’s (1994) works on hijab shaped a new Islamic discourse on hijab. The new 
juristic positions saw hijab as a means of protection rather than, in the classic 
jurisprudential perspective, a means of confinement. This idea of viewing hijab as 
protection not restriction has become one of the dominant themes for articulating 
various approaches to the enforcement of hijab, specifically the state-centred, top 
down compulsions that dominate the policies of the Islamic Republic in Iran. The 
view is shared in certain segments of society and among certain groups of women. 
The view is, however, strongly contested when it comes to either challenging the 
authority of the state to delineate policies or dress code or when it pertains to 
challenging dominant norms among religious authorities. 
                                                        
14 Chador is a long, round-shaped, black piece of cloth that covers from head to toe. The exact nature 
of the chador varies by countries. 
15 Piche was a piece of fabric that women used to cover their face and was tied to the head with a 
ribbon. It is not used in Iran today.  
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Figure 1: An Example of Piche (The White Face Covering) Worn by Iranian Women During Pahlavi Dynasty 
Hoodfar (2003) has studied veiled Muslim women in Canada. On the basis of her 
interviews, she argues that although the veil was developed in a patriarchal 
framework as a way of controlling women, some women have used veiling to fight 
against patriarchy. Therefore, veiling has different meanings in different contexts. 
Hoodfar argues against perceiving veiling as a necessarily oppressive practice in 
Muslim societies. She suggests that veiling should be examined in a wider 
framework in order to situate “the veil within the history of clothing as a vehicle for 
political and social expression and action” (2003, p. 37).  
Hoodfar shows that women have used veiling to empower themselves and make 
structural changes in their society, and that veiling has helped many women to 
challenge those patriarchal traditions that deny women’s rights to mobility, access 
to education, and ability to have a proper job in society. On the basis of her 
interviews, she demonstrates that there are many different reasons for veiling. 
Beyond religious and personal reasons, she finds still other overlapping reasons for 
adopting the veil. For example, some women enjoy more freedom after adopting the 
veil because their restrictive parents give them more space due to the consent and 
trust that comes with the hijab.  
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Hoodfar (2003) states that clothing is an important symbol and an influential tool 
for non-verbal communication. In contrast to the pervasive view amongst the 
general public in the West that the veil and its meaning are static, the function of 
hijab in Muslim cultures has varied greatly, especially during periods of rapid social 
change. Hoodfar (2003) believes that wearing hijab is an experience that is full of 
contradictions and conflicting meanings for the women who practice it. For 
example, it has been a means to control women’s lives, and it has also been a tool for 
women to empower themselves and make structural changes in their societies. 
Following Hoodfar’s narrative, it is clear that the constructed binary of 
restriction/oppression vs. empowerment is problematic and there is no clear-cut 
distinction between the two. What is sometimes viewed as oppression or restriction 
for some, may indeed open up some space for exercising one’s agency and 
negotiating some terms of social interaction. However, this does not necessarily 
enhance the state-centred narrative dominant in the Islamic Republic. 
In her fieldwork in Canada, Hoodfar found that women practiced veiling as a way to 
challenge patriarchal practices that denied women’s rights. Although she argues 
that hijab has empowered women in some contexts, this does not mean that the rule 
mandating hijab in conventional Islamic jurisprudence is validly justifiable, because 
these women have been afforded no other choice. 
In line with Hoodfar, Sheila McDonough (2003) shows that in Canada, Muslim 
women who wear hijab have different interpretations of their use, and different 
degrees of agency in determining what suits them. This results in diverse 
perspectives on hijab. For some of her interviewees, hijab was a source of dignity 
and empowerment. For others, removing the veil was empowering. Both choices are 
understandable, and both can be beneficial for individuals depending on contextual 
variables.  
Bullock (2002) has researched Muslim women in order to understand their hijab 
practice and to understand the public image of veiled women in Canada. Her 
arguments challenge both the popular cultural view of veiling and the liberal 
feminist view that hijab is innately oppressive. She has studied the re-veiling 
movement in Canada (that had grown up amongst Muslims in the previous decade) 
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by interviewing veiled women to see how and why they veil. She offers a positive 
account of the veil, arguing that if anything is oppressing women, it is ‘Islamic law’ 
and not Islam, and that those Islamic laws should be removed or changed. 
Bullock argues that any oppression comes from ‘Islamic law’ and not Islam itself, 
and that those Islamic laws should be abolished or changed. As Asef Bayat lucidly 
explains in his outstanding work, Making Islam Democratic (2007a), there is no such 
thing as Islam as we understand out there and the conventional Islam is what is seen 
and observed. Building on what Bayat argues here, when we shift the focus from 
‘Islam’ to Muslims, the next stage of the argument, when it comes to issues of women 
and the veil, is that the terms of dress code are determined by male jurist: it is the 
jurisprudential apparatus which is socially, politically and intellectually dominant 
that define these limits. Women do indeed have a role in negotiation and resisting 
these terms, but the role of patriarchal hierarchies here is critical here. Even when 
we speak about legislation, education of women, class differences, what cuts across 
all these is the domination of male members of society in influencing these terms 
and norms. 
Muslim feminists, amongst others, argue that all women should have the power to 
choose whether or not to wear the headscarf. According to the conventional Shia 
fiqh and social norms, however, a hijabi woman is expected and even coerced to 
cover all parts of her body except her hands and face in front of all men, apart from 
her mahrams (her husband and all male relatives with whom marriage is 
forbidden—her father, son, brother, uncle, father-in-law, nephew, grandfather, and 
maternal and paternal uncles). Amongst Shia Iranians, it is always expected from a 
woman to wear the headscarf in front of any man apart from her mahrams in private 
spaces. This only relates to the more conservative Muslims amongst whom women 
usually observe hijab due to socio- religious obligation. These hijabi women do not 
have the choice not to wear a scarf in their house in front of close non-mahram 
friends and family. Therefore, we must be careful not to generalise that hijab is 
empowering or oppressive across all contexts; it can be either. 
In line with Tarlo (2009), I do not want to argue for or against a particular type of 
dress code. There is a vast literature expressing approval or disapproval of the hijab 
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that condemns or defends veiling on moral, religious and political grounds. In Visibly 
Muslim, Tarlo shows that the dress code of Muslim women in Britain is undergoing 
major transformations, “shaped both by local and global social religious and political 
forces and by issues of personal aesthetics, ethics, fashion, identity and faith.” (2009, 
p. 2).  
She suggests that changes in the visual and material landscape are better 
understood: 
Not in terms of some mythical opposition between Islam and the 
West, religion and secularism, or tradition and modernity but rather 
in terms of complex debates about identity, faith, politics, ethics, 
aesthetics, and belonging. What is highlighted is the diversity of 
modern Muslim perspectives on these issues and the different 
sartorial possibilities they are generating (ibid). 
 Tarlo’s book is different from other works on hijab because she moves beyond the 
debates about hijab being oppressive or liberating, and instead focuses on the form 
of hijab, the diversity of meanings behind it, and the activities that surround it. 
The idea of fashion is central to Tarlo’s work. She demonstrates that the headscarf 
actually makes women more visible in Britain. She argues that Muslim fashions and 
anti-fashions are reduced to a binary opposition between veiled and un-veiled, and 
that this results in conceptual blindness. She believes that we should move beyond 
seeing veiled women as oppressed and submissive, and un-veiled women as 
liberated, free, and progressive. This reduction has led to the sanctioning of cultural 
stereotypes by the state and has had a direct affect in shaping policy. Tarlo (2007) 
demonstrates that however personal a woman’s decision to adopt hijab, this 
decision is always influenced by social interactions and discourses which both form 
and are formed by it. 
Tarlo (2009) discusses different features of hijab practice amongst Muslim women 
in London without engaging with the hijabi’s personal reasons behind their hijab 
practice. In addition, she has studied Muslim women in general, and not those from 
a specific country or community. My work differs from hers in that I can give a more 
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in-depth description and explanation of the topic since I focus exclusively on the 
relatively small groups of Iranian Muslim diaspora in London, their different dress 
codes, and transformations in their dress code. Specific historical, cultural and 
individual reasons for this transformation are central to my work. My work explains 
the current state of hijab practice amongst Iranians, the different motives behind it, 
the way it has been shaped, and the way it is changing. 
Walking a Tightrope by Ayesha Salma Kariapper (2009) is based on research on the 
hijab of Muslim women in the UK, and especially in London. The majority of her 
interviewees are second and third generation Pakistanis who have adopted the veil 
themselves, unlike their mothers or grandmothers. She tries to understand the 
increasing number of Muslim women who adopt ‘Islamic’ forms of attire. Separate 
from issues of dress, Kariapper also considers issues that are intertwined with 
veiling such as “racism, gender discrimination, identity politics, Muslim youth 
activism and government policy” (2009, p. 2). She argues that hijab is a passport to 
engaging in society for many Muslim women, and that it is wrong to deny the agency 
of these Muslim women in their daily life. In her own words, “Britain’s case 
illustrates that it is time to re-evaluate our framework of assessing women’s 
empowerment in Muslim contexts including in the diaspora and to use alternative 
frameworks of power and agency to understand the lives of women from Muslim 
communities and the challenges they confront” (2009, p. 103).  
Annelies Moors (2009; 2007) has examined the relation between Islamic dress code 
and fashion in different parts of the world, particularly the Netherlands (for 
discussions of hijab and fashion, see also Abaza 2007; Sandikci & Ger 2005; Kılıçbay 
& Binark 2002; Balasescu 2003; Balasescu 2007; Tarlo 2009). Moors (2009) 
investigated how Muslim women in the Netherlands have combined the (assumed) 
two worlds of religion and fashion. On the basis of her observations and her subjects’ 
narratives, she identified two developments that led Muslim women to wear 
fashionable yet Islamic dress: Islamic dress as an outcome of the Islamic revival 
movement, and the turn to fashionable styles of dress as a part of consumer culture. 
She concluded: 
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By wearing fashionable styles of Islamic dress, many young Muslim 
women simultaneously engage in a religious practice and take into 
account that they do so in an environment that has become 
increasingly hostile to the presence of Islam. In the Netherlands, 
young, well-educated Muslim women employ a politics of (visual) 
presence that brings together their religious convictions with styles 
of dress that are highly fashionable and hence bear the sign of 
modernity (2009, p. 197). 
Andrea Rugh’s (1986b) work on Cairo shows that the common notion that Islamic 
styles of clothing are more restrictive than Western ones is false. For many women, 
Islamic dresses are cooler because they are loose and made of cotton. Western 
clothes are made of hotter fabrics. Rugh also found that in the past, Western-style 
clothes had been a sign of being middle class, but by the time of her research this 
had changed, and hijab was also a sign of the middle class. She argues that the 
meaning of the hijab depends on the spatio- temporal contexts in which it is worn, 
like any other piece of clothing. In line with Rugh, Arlene Elowe Macleod (1991) also 
argues that Western dress is hotter than Islamic dress. However, in Iran, and for the 
Iranian women in London, this is not the case. The clothes they wear are not cooler, 
and can even be hotter, especially because of the scarf. In the summer it is even 
worse. 
Mir-Hosseini (2011) outlines five notions of hijab in Iran. The first is hijab as 
“seclusion”. This mainly refers to pre-modern Iran, in which hijab was a means of 
preventing women from entering the social sphere. Hijab was a kind of 
confinement.  
The second notion is hijab as “protection”. This was introduced by Morteza 
Motahari (2010 [first published in 1985]), and became the ideology of the Islamic 
Republic after the 1979 Revolution. This treats hijab as a tool to bring women into 
society while protecting them from any sexual harm. The burden and 
responsibility therefore rests on women not to be provocative.  
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The third notion is hijab as “protest”, introduced by Shariati (1994). Unlike 
Motahari, Shariati does not engage with fiqh16 on the issue of hijab. He articulates 
a new meaning for hijab: hijab as a symbol of protest against the Shah’s regime, 
rather than a symbol of tradition. Shariati differentiates between two groups of 
women. Women in the first group wear hijab because of tradition, imitating their 
mothers. Women in the second group chose to wear hijab as a personal response 
to Westernised consumerism.  
The fourth notion is hijab as “imposition”, which also appeared after the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979. Due to the imposition of hijab, all women are obliged to wear 
a specified dress code. In cases of disobedience they will be arrested and 
punished. 
The final notion presented by Mir-Hosseini is hijab as “choice”. She argues that, 
although debates on the notion of hijab in Muslim countries are between feminists 
who see hijab as oppression and Islamists who see it as women’s liberty, some 
hijabi women have chosen this dress code by their own volition and with clear 
reasons. The term ‘choice’ Mir-Hosseini uses is problematic because one has to 
determine under what circumstances these women have chosen to observe hijab. 
According to Foucault (1987) there are many power structures that compel 
people to act in a certain way. 
The five-part dress categories 17 , which have been generated, based on 
ethnographic observation and analysis that I describe in Chapter Five cannot be 
directly linked to any one of these five notions that Mir-Hosseini has depicted, 
because not all of the women of my study practice hijab (in a strict sense) in 
London. Nonetheless, there is a degree of overlap as these notions were useful for 
some of the women whom I interviewed. 
                                                        
16 According to Mir-Hosseini (2000b), there is a distinction between fiqh and sharia regarding the 
concept of law in Islam. Muslims do not usually distinguish between these two terms. Sharia refers 
to the revealed law about the blueprints of mankind for both this world and the next. Fiqh refers to 
jurisprudence, meaning ‘understanding and knowledge’. Fiqh is the intellectual activity that tries to 
discover divine blueprints, extracts rules and legal systems from them, and enforces duties upon 
believers. 
17 As I detail later, this consists of: 1) The “full traditional hijab”; 2. The “full progressive hijab”; 3. The 
“partial-hijab”; 4. The “conservative scarf-less”; and 5. The “radical hijab-less”. 
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As I have already explained on Chapter One, discourse is central to this research. 
In light of theories of discourse, the meanings of the veil and of veiling can also be 
seen as discursive constructs. Amongst the most influential of the cultural 
elements forming the meaning of the veil are the teachings and rhetoric of 
religious leaders who consider veiling an inevitable part of religious life, and who 
therefore exclude un-veiled women from organised religious rituals and 
institutions. 
Theories of discourse also stress the contestation of different groups with 
different heritages over the interpretation of cultural symbols (Bartkowski, 1997; 
Todd and Fisher, 1988; Wodak, 1997). In the case of veiling, various factions of 
Muslim scholars—from the most traditional to the liberal modernists—offer 
extremely different interpretations of the meaning and implications of the related 
Quranic verses and Hadiths18. Discourse thus highlights the multidimensionality 
of religious norms and forms like hijab. Theorists of discourse view it not as mere 
ideologies but as culturally constructed ways of acting in and understanding the 
world (Bartkowski, 1997; Todd and Fisher, 1988; Wodak, 1997). A devout Muslim 
woman living in London encounters not only her fellow Muslim women but also 
non-believers, and her gender identity, standpoint, subjectivity, and bodily 
practice are constituted under the influence of both ‘non-Muslim’ and ‘Muslim’ 
discourses. Indeed, these discourses are often firmly defined in terms of 
negotiation with or opposition to each other.  
These theoretical perspectives show how discursive regimes provide social 
agents with symbolic resources for identity negotiation and for the legitimation 
of daily social and bodily practices. Ambiguity, contradiction, and struggle are 
inseparable parts of the process of identity negotiation. The decision to veil can 
be legitimated on a variety of grounds, and using discourses that are anti-feminist 
or explicitly feminist or something in between. A feminist discourse might be 
occidental feminism, which sees hijab as a form of oppression, or Islamic 
feminism, which sees hijab as a form of empowerment that Western feminists 
cannot fully appreciate. Feminist theorists (notably Judith Butler) consider 
                                                        
18 Hadith refers to sayings that have been attributed to the Prophet Mohammad and his family. It is 
one of the sources of Islamic law. 
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discourse as a medium through which gender is constructed (Butler, 1999; Todd 
and Fisher, 1988; Wodak, 1997). I will therefore show how Muslim women use 
their everyday experiences to re-shape their understanding of the veil (Read and 
Bartkowski, 2000), focusing on diasporic Iranian Shia women. 
As I have shown above, there is a vast body of literature on issues related to my 
research. My theoretical framework is a contingent and processual framework that 
I divide into five schemas (see Chapter Five). Each of the five schemas is based on 
different theories. The Islam and modernity debate is linked to all five forms of hijab 
practice that I have identifies except for “full traditional hijab”. The relationship 
between Islam and modernity is key to this research, and my interviews with 
Iranian women centre on this problematic. Butler’s (1999) performativity, and Mir-
Hosseini’s (2011) five notions of hijab are all important tools to develop my analysis 
of hijab practice amongst Iranian women. Individualism, too, is a central conceptual 
tool in this research since in some ways, hijab is a response to the demands of 
individual subjectivities, and one can answer the question of Islam and modernity 
through exploring the requirements of the expansion of individualism amongst 
Muslim women in the contemporary world. 
I investigate hijab as discourse as well as practice. Hijab is both a form of clothing 
and an institution with a particular history and politics. Foucault addresses “the 
styling of the self” (1987), and in this work, he moves away from the view that 
discourse produces docile bodies or docile subjects to one where subjects have a 
degree of agency and creativity. This can be applied to my five-part schema, and to 
how women create their own style of hijab (See Chapter Five). Through Foucauldian 
techniques of the self, the relation between the structure and the subject is 
problematized, because in the techniques of the self, the moral self is both the 
subject of and is subject to knowledge and power (Aly, 2011). 
I have therefore set out to identify the discursive forces that shape the concept and 
practice of hijab in the local and globally connected contexts of London. I am 
interested in the way that hijab has been imagined and discursively represented by 
Iranian women in London. In addition I seek the roots of these beliefs and practices 
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in history and in jurisprudence (Islamic law) of their implications for diasporic 
Iranian women today. 
Methodology 
In this section, I address the primary methods used in my fieldwork, and the 
methodological issues that I faced. Methods include participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, focus groups, life histories, netnography, and auto-
ethnography. 
Although no method is neutral, to fail to discuss the methodology of the study may 
lead the reader to think that there have not been any objective criteria for the 
selection of methods of research. As a methodological pluralist, my main criterion 
for the selection of methods in this study has been their practicality and suitability 
for my research questions.  
The participants 
I conducted 40 in-depth interviews with Iranian women in London, and interviewed 
four prominent male Muslim intellectuals, scholars and clerics who have worked on 
and talked about hijab in Iran (Kadivar, Eshkevari, Fanaei, and Torkashvand). All of 
the women interviewed were born and raised in Iran. They came to London because 
they or their family members held a job in the UK or a place in higher education. 
None of them were political-refugees, as happened earlier (see Chapter Four) but 
like the majority of Iranians, most of them were supporting political reform in Iran.  
I am of course aware of the inherent limitations of my interview database amongst 
Iranian women in London. To compensate for this shortcoming, I made special 
efforts to interview a wide spectrum of women with diverse opinions. I benefited 
from my personal contacts to locate and persuade informed interviewees that 
otherwise will not agree to be questioned for such a research convened by a non-
Iranian and non-Muslim researcher. The vast majority of Iranian women will not 
open up to a stranger on a topic related to dress code without personal introduction. 
My personal ties, thus, significantly assisted me in this study since keeping body-
related matters secret from strangers is seen as essential to preserving modesty and 
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without personal trust it is extremely difficult to penetrate into the deeper layers of 
women’s experience with regards to hijab.  
I tried to ask more professional and specific questions on hijab and dress code that 
encouraged the interviewee to give a detailed empirical account of her own personal 
experience rather than asking general politically or ideologically sensitive questions 
that given the political and cultural sensibility of most Iranians may lead to wild 
improbable interpretations. 
My research differs from other works on hijab practice in the diasporic 
communities, because most other works is done on second or third generations who 
have been born and grown up in the West, while I was interested in the transitions 
in hijab practice amongst Iranian women who have come to London. The age range 
is 22 to 57, but most are between 25 and 35. They are all educated and regard 
themselves belonging to the middle class. Many are students who came to England 
for higher education, and some of them have top jobs in the city. 
Before starting my fieldwork, I planned to interview five to ten women from each of 
four pre-specified groups derived from my own experience. These four groups were: 
1) Women who observed hijab in Iran and continued to observe it in London. 2) 
Women who observed hijab in Iran but gave up wearing hijab after living in London. 
3) Women who did not observe hijab in Iran (except in public places where they are 
required by law to wear it) but began doing so in London. 4) Women who did not 
observe hijab in Iran, and still do not do so. After my first interview, I found that 
individuals did not fit only in one category, and therefore I discarded the four 
groups, determining that I would have to change the way I chose my interviewees. 
The above-mentioned way of seeing the hijab practice proved to be superficial, 
because many of the women did not fit into it and had undergone multiple 
transitions in their life, both before and after coming to London. 
I continued interviewing the women I chose on the basis of the four groups, but the 
outcome of these interviews led to my new five-part categories, which I will explain 
in detail in Chapter Five. I interviewed around 10 women from each of the four 
groups I mentioned above. 
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All my interviewees are from a sub-group of the Iranian diaspora who have living 
experience of both the Iranian and UK contexts. This ‘transnational nexus’ 19is about 
encounters and experiences with various kinds of state-related policies and 
structures, everyday practices and encounters with different kinds of hijabi and 
non-hijabi women, personal histories and transformations through knowledge and 
experiences acquired in Iran and UK. 
This transnational nexus is a very precarious one since most of my subjects were 
unsure of whether they are staying in UK or returning to Iran, a large part of it 
dependent on Iranian political and economic changes. This leads to a unique way of 
considering hijab, which is not yet evident in the literature that currently focuses on 
hijab as an ossified entity representing something quite explicit, whether it be from 
traditional/conservative or Eurocentric views to do with containment and 
oppression. Literature on hijab and agency has missed out on the nuances of what 
hijab may mean and how it could have reverse meanings to expectations – that is 
where appearance/image does not match with an individuals’ motivations.  
My work is different from research on second or third generation Muslim migrants 
who, unlike most of my interviewees, are permanently based in the Western 
societies. My subjects of study have a more continual, reflexive and geographically 
contingent approach to how they dress in this transnational nexus. The processual, 
temporal and geographic spaces in UK and Iran lead to various views and practices 
of hijab amongst my interviewees and have led me to developing the categories 
explained in Chapter Five.  
Why I chose this sub-group of diaspora in London is partly due to the difficulties and 
possible political costs of doing research in Iran and amongst other sub-groups of 
the Iranian diaspora. These possible political costs are partly borne from the 
sensitivity of the topic in Iran and partly caused by my own positionality (coming 
from a well-know reformist political family).  
                                                        
19 For literature on ‘transnational nexus’ see (Al-Ali and Koser, 2004; Al-Ali et al., 2001; Basch et al., 
2005, 2005; Grillo, 2007; Hannerz, 2002; Rogers, 1986; Vertovec and Cohen, 1999) 
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I have many Iranian friends and there are many Iranian women with different types 
of dress code who I know in London. Consequently, some of my interviewees are my 
friends, but I also tried my best to interview individuals who I did not know closely. 
I attended events such as Iranian concerts and cultural and religious talks to observe 
and find my interviewees. There are both advantages and disadvantages to 
interviewing people who you already know, and to being an insider and studying 
one’s own social group. I found that some of my interviewees who already knew me 
were more comfortable sharing their experiences, were more eager and happy to 
allocate time for me, and explained things in more detail compared to the women 
who did not know me. 
All of the interviews took place in London. I asked the interviewees to suggest the 
best place to have a chat. Some of the women came to my home. For others, I went 
to their home, university, or workplace, or we met at a coffee shop. The length of the 
interviews ranged from thirty minutes to five hours, with an average time of one to 
two hours. I interviewed some of the interviewees twice because we did not have 
enough time in one session. 
Being a ‘hijabi’ (that is someone who wears a hijab) myself introduced its own 
complexities. The first impression I presented might have not been positive for some 
of the women who did not observe hijab. This was not a problem for those 
interviewees who knew me or who were my friends, but for some of the women who 
were hijab-less and did not know me, it was a challenge to open a discussion and 
show them that I do not have any prejudices on the subject of the hijab and was open 
to explore other possibilities. The way I opened up the discussion and told them my 
own story was important.  
As I show in the following chapters, because hijab has been compulsory in Iran, in 
most cases, there exists an invisible tension between hijabi and non-hijabi women. 
People (and especially women) judge each other very quickly on the basis of 
appearance. For Iranians in the diaspora, this judgement can become more 
excessive because many non-hijabi women associate hijabi women with the 
government in Iran. Non-hijabi women may assume that others only observe hijab 
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because they or their families are Iranian government employees and that they are 
obliged to wear it.  
It was a challenge for me to show that I was a researcher, that my hijab was due to 
personal choice, and that I was not related to the Iranian government 
administration. The style of full-hijab I practice is very similar to that worn by 
women who work for or are supporters of the government. Women’s dress code in 
the Iranian context means a lot more than what clothing usually means (Hoodfar, 
2003). It conveys a huge amount of information, because women’s dress has been 
regulated and politicised for so long. It was important to convince my interviewees 
not to think that I was judging them and to stop them from judging me. Interviews 
with hijabi women were easier because they felt at first glance that they had more 
in common with me, although in terms of my politics and philosophy, there were 
many differences. In practice, a number of factors proved to be helpful in gaining the 
trust of hijab-less Iranians in London and made my interviewees more comfortable 
and willing to open up during the interviews. One factor was the fact that my father 
and brother are well-known Iranian public figures pushing for political reform in 
Iran. Furthermore, amongst my interviewees, I am known to be visibly critical of 
Iranian government administration and to be respectful of life-styles and beliefs 
different than of mine.  
Positionality 
As a progressive Muslim woman shaped by the education I have received in Iran and 
the UK, I interpret the meaning of different forms of hijab differently from a Western 
scholar or a traditionalist Muslim. I am aware that there is a range of views among 
both Western scholars and traditional Muslims and the diversity also shows that my 
own perception may fall somewhere in between these categories. However, the fact 
that my own being comes into play in this knowledge does not harm the limitations 
of objectivity and method, but, quite the opposite, it makes my universe of discourse 
apparent and conscious (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 225). Every researcher – including 
myself – conditions his/her interpretation of a given reality/text by pre-
understandings arising from his/her background and conditions. By pre-
understandings, I mean a set of attitudes and assumptions that one consciously or 
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unconsciously brings to the interpretation and perception of reality. Although it is 
impossible to totally separate oneself from these pre-understandings, one can 
minimize the effect of them on perception of reality by certain measures. Motivation 
arising from some degree of self-criticism and alienation is amongst the measures 
that can contribute to a more objective analysis of the topic of my research. 
While benefiting from the advantages of having an Iranian and Shia background – 
that made the very conduct of this research amongst religious Iranian women 
possible – I hope to have minimized the effects of my pre-understandings by 
cultivating a comparative eye by reading about and exploring other forms of dress 
code and systems of beliefs. It goes without saying that my aim with this thesis is 
not so much to expose the genuine and true form or articulation of hijab in Shia Islam 
as to critically and empirically examine how Iranian women encounter modernity’s 
implacable demands for change in their hijab and dress code.  
Most Anthropological methods presume being an outsider to the culture that is 
being studied. James Spradley believes that: 
The more you know about a situation as an ordinary participant, the 
more difficult it is to study it as an ethnographer. It is no coincidence 
that ethnography was born and developed in the study of non-
Western cultures. The less familiar you are with a social situation the 
more you are able to see the tacit cultural rules at work (1980, p. 2) 
From the first moment that I decided to work on this subject, I had to 
overcome this burden of challenges. Nonetheless, one must also take into 
account the political and ideological backdrop of such approaches. The way 
Spradley views ethnography and non-Western cultures clearly warrants 
critical reflection too. Prejudices which have been part of the study of non-
Western cultures and oriental societies have placed not only limitations on 
the study of these societies but have at times (as I will demonstrate shortly 
afterwards and also discussed in the section on modernity) skewed and 
distorted the image. This is particularly more visible in the case of women 
and veil in Muslim societies. 
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Hennigh (1981) argues that studying one’s own culture is a completely different 
experience from studying a culture that you are not familiar with. He suggests that 
the outcome of these two perspectives equally differ, and should be considered by 
their own standards. Therefore, familiarity with or the exoticism of the culture we 
are studying has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Many scholars have started working on their own ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’. This is 
supported by some anthropologists, and criticised by others (Alexander, 2006; 
Ratcliffe, 2001). The merits of being an insider or an outsider to the subject of study 
have been vigorously debated. Nancy Naples (2003) believes that being an outsider 
or an insider is a matter of construction. Even when we are working in a familiar 
setting, we are still reconstructing meanings. Every individual reconstructs meaning 
differently, and an insider will encounter many unanticipated meanings in the 
practices of others (Aly, 2011). 
John Aguilar (1981) argues that anthropologists who research their own people 
should not think that their belonging is unconstructed. He discusses advantages and 
disadvantages of research at home. The positive side of being an insider is that it is 
easier to blend into the culture. Insiders know the language better and also have a 
better understanding of non-verbal and subjective data. Being an insider will make 
the researcher less likely to attach misrepresentative labels. The negative side to 
being an insider is that interviewees might not reveal sensitive information or may 
not give complete information, expecting the researcher to already know 
everything. Also, because the context is familiar to the researcher, they may accept 
things without question instead of analysing them.  
In line with Aly (2011), I believe that my position as an insider has both advantages 
and disadvantages. There is a burden to representing those who I consider as my 
own people. Being a hijabi myself while representing multiple perspectives makes 
it difficult to ascertain how the reader will react, because as I mentioned before, the 
topic of hijab has become very sensitive. Most of the women I interviewed asked me 
to recount how other women answered the questions and told me that they looked 
forward to reading my thesis. Many of the interviewees asked me about my own 
reasons and motives for wearing hijab. Since what I am has impacted the nature of 
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the research and its results, for the sake of clarity and transparency, I need to 
provide the reader with some background information about myself.  
I was born into a liberal religious family in Iran, and lived in Tehran until the age of 
22. My father is a progressive Muslim and a well-known Iranian intellectual, and I 
grew up in an environment where I frequently encountered many religious 
intellectuals who have had considerable influence on my beliefs. My mother is a 
hijabi with a more traditional style of religiosity from that of my father’s. This has 
exposed me, from an early age, to different interpretations of Islam and different 
family and friendship networks. Before starting this research, my views about hijab 
were very different from what they are now. Having a network of friends and family 
that included many different types of dress code further attuned me to the topic, and 
helped me to know and appreciate different people. Unlike most of my friends who 
have the same dress code, I had the opportunity to have close friendships with a 
wide range of non-hijabi women with completely different lifestyle from mine. 
Anthropology at home 
To clarify the somewhat unspecific term ‘anthropology at home’, Donald 
Messerschmidt (1981) divides it into three types. The first is insider anthropology, 
which applies to anthropologists who are from a dominant ethnic group and do 
research on a dominated ethnic group. The second is native anthropology, in which 
those from minority/dominated ethnic groups do research on their own people. The 
third is indigenous anthropology, where anthropologists from the ‘Global South’20 
do research on their own society.  
Based on this categorisation, I am considered a native anthropologist because the 
Shia Iranian community is my own community (Eriksen, 2002). But this is only one 
facet of my identity, and there are several differences in life experience between the 
Iranian community in general and myself. 
                                                        
 
20 The global South or less developed countries (LDCs) are considered to be “peripheral” nations 
because they are not in the centre of trade, industry, or high level services and therefore do not hold 
the necessary amount of wealth that a country needs in order to exert political leverage. 
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As I mentioned earlier, insider/native/local anthropology has both positive and 
negative sides. Many anthropologists have written about the restrictions of native 
anthropology (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Stephenson and Greer, 1981). Stephenson 
and Greer (1981) believe that local researches may not see relevant cultural 
patterns because they take them for granted. They argue that local/insider/native 
anthropologists should include all details in their ethnography to avoid missing 
important aspects. John Stephenson (1981) also states that seeing what she calls 
local anthropology as positive or negative depends on the researcher’s prior 
relationship with the subject and prior knowledge of the community. John Gwaltney 
(1987) argues that in local/insider/native anthropology, interviewees might not say 
certain things because they assume that the researcher knows that information 
already.  
Overall, local/insider/native anthropology—in my case, the Iranian diaspora of 
which I am a member—has both positive and negative consequences. I tried my best 
to minimise the negative aspects, such as failing to see things an outsider would 
notice. At the same time, I was able to connect with and access women’s experiences 
and open up with people much easier than someone from outside this group It could 
be argued that a large part of the information/meanings/insights that I gathered 
from my interviewees could not have been gathered by outsider anthropologists. To 
minimize the risk that I omit important details that an outsider would notice, 
following Stephenson and Greer (1981), when practical I report unbroken excerpts 
from interviews to record the subjects’ own words.   
Auto-ethnography 
I used auto-ethnography in this research because I am part of the Iranian diaspora 
and I wear hijab. Auto-ethnography involves the researcher analysing personal 
experience in order to understand cultural practices. Auto-ethnography accepts and 
welcomes subjectivity, emotionality and the researcher’s impact on the research, 
instead of pretending that the researcher does not exist (Ellis et al., 2010). 
This research has been both interesting and painful for me because it addresses my 
own story. I realized the pain I took wearing full-hijab in the previous 26 years was 
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unnecessary since the conventional hijab does not have sound religious justification. 
In my interviews I also heard painful stories regarding oppression and the sexual 
assault on my informants. Through this journey, the way I feel and think about hijab 
has changed, as have my views. This is both positive and difficult. On the one hand, 
it has been an illuminating and emancipating personal journey, and on the other, it 
has been hard because due to social and emotional costs, I have chosen to continue 
wearing the same form of hijab as before, even though I do not value it anymore. 
Here, there is a point which requires further qualification and explanation. The fact 
that I am convinced I adopted hijab by my own volition and choice does not conflict 
with they way I have reviewed and revised this position. The limitations which lead 
to this situation whereby you no longer attach the same significance to an earlier 
practice and yet you continue to maintain all or some aspects of it are a product of 
contexts and issues which may sometimes be beyond one’s control. This is a shared 
experience. It is both a personal narrative and also a reflection of the stories of my 
interviewees. 
Through auto-ethnography and insider anthropology, I intend to produce evocative 
thick descriptions (Geertz, 1994) of personal and interpersonal experiences, 
understanding patterns of culture that can be seen through field notes, storytelling, 
and interviews. As an auto-ethnographer, I will make personal experience 
meaningful and cultural experiences engaging, while also reaching wider and more 
diverse audiences by producing accessible texts that may have an impact on other 
people (Ellis et al., 2010; Goodall, 2006). 
Doing ethnography in people’s homes gives a sense of connection with participants. 
The researcher’s position as an ‘insider’ provides the opportunity to use the self as 
a key resource and our own experience as a source of information (Voloder, 2008).  
Many anthropologists have talked and written about auto-ethnography and many 
have criticised it. In this research I see auto-ethnography as Strathern (1987, p. 17) 
describes it: where anthropology is conducted in the context that has produced it. 
The authenticity of constructs of the self and other in auto-ethnography has been 
the subject of much scrutiny in anthropology (Reed-Danahay, 1997). 
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Auto-ethnography welcomes stories and experiences, but this does not mean that I 
only write what I hear. I also hold the context in mind: in interactions between the 
interviewees and me, we affect each other through our respective narratives. The 
approach that auto-ethnography has toward emotion is positive: it encourages 
researchers to include their own and the interviewee’s emotions in the overall 
presentation. 
Although in writing an auto-ethnography I foreground the role of the self in the 
research, I emphasise that this research is about the stories of others as told through 
interviews and focus groups on the Internet. Nonetheless, all of this has been in 
interaction with the researcher. Judith Okely argues that in the academic context 
‘the personal is theoretical’ in the same way that feminists argue that ‘the personal 
is political’ (1992, p. 9). 
Participant observation 
Participant observation (PO) distinguishes anthropology from other social sciences. 
I used this method from the beginning of my fieldwork. I did the interviews and life 
histories in later stages, because as Charlotte Davies (1999) points out, they are 
most effective when relationships with interviewees have already been developed. 
PO cannot be made unless the observer has a viewpoint and theoretical interest that 
directs the observation. Kaplan points out: 
We do not observe ‘everything that is there to be seen’. An 
observation is made; it is the product of an active choice, not of a 
passive exposure. Observing is a goal-directed behaviour; an 
observational report is significant on the basis of a presumed 
relation to the goal… Data are always data for some hypothesis or 
other; if, as the etymology suggest, they are what is given, the 
observer must have hypotheses to be eligible to receive them (Kaplan, 
1998, p. 133).  
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Even when fieldwork is directed by a theoretical interest, there is still information 
that is undirected. In other words, what is observed is not only shaped by the 
interest and theory that is used, but also surrounds it like a penumbra (Holy, 1984). 
The larger frame of my methodology is indebted to the interpretive paradigm. With 
the interpretive paradigm the social scientist does not simply observe things but 
seeks to understand the meaning of social behaviour for social agents. It means that 
the social world is not objective, external to people, like other objective existing 
realities: it is the meaning that constitutes the social world. The social world is not 
separate from the social meaning that constitutes the social world. Therefore, social 
facts are not things that can be simply observed (Geertz, 1994).  
Holy (1984) highlights the importance of the anthropologist’s own experience. He 
argues that prior to the 1980s, the anthropologist’s own experience was absent in 
monographs of ‘native life’. In other words, what the anthropologist understands of 
his or her own world is taken for granted. Although this experience is absent from 
the text, it plays a key role in analysing the ethnographic material. Along with the 
field notes, the experience of the researcher is very important. It allows the 
anthropologist to explain their data with a different theoretical framework than the 
one they started their fieldwork with. They can fill in the gaps with their memory 
because not everything is written down. 
I used PO in all the interviews and focus groups I conducted. I also attended many 
events where Iranians gather and observed how women from different groups 
practice different schemas of dress code. 
I have tried to be self-reflexive, exploring my own interactions and experiences of 
hijab in relation to the women I have acquainted myself with. I reflect on my own 
background as an Iranian Shia living in a diasporic context: how, for instance, my 
own belief on hijab has changed over the last five years while living in London, and 
how my different background and professional interests influences my choice of 
hijab. In order to have a productive, processual and multi-perspectival account 
when analysing the changes of hijab, I have taken into account the tensions between 
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the similarities and differences that I have with the interviewees in background, 
class, and so forth.  
Interviews 
I conducted 40 in-depth semi-structured interviews with women, the process of 
which I described above. Some of the interviews became closer to a life history, 
especially in cases where the women experienced a major transition in their dress 
code. I have also done four interviews with prominent Iranian male clerics and 
Muslim intellectuals since I noticed in my 40 interviews that the views of these 
scholars have had a profound impact on many of the hijab transitions experienced 
in my interviewees. Accessing these prominent public intellectuals was not easy but 
fortunately, with the recommendation of my father who is their friend, I was able to 
talk with them via Skype. I have changed all the names of my interviewees for 
confidentiality except for the four male intellectuals. All interviews were performed 
in Persian, and I have translated them to English myself. 
In semi-structured interviews it is more likely that interviewees will express their 
views than in standardised interviews and questionnaires (Flick, 2009). This 
approach allows the interviewer to include a wider variety of questions in order to 
address more clearly the presuppositions they bring to the interview. Many have 
often misinterpreted the principle of openness in qualitative research as inspiring 
an attitude of diffuseness. Generally, in a semi-structured interview, existing 
knowledge can be disclosed by being stated in the form of answers, and so it is 
available for interpretation. One problem presented by semi-structured interviews 
when using subjective theories is in interpreting the data that the researcher has 
collected, because there are no precise suggestions for how to proceed (Flick, 2009). 
Narratives and life histories 
In my research, most of the interviews take the form of life histories. The 
complexities, challenges and dilemmas of women who experience transitions in 
their dress code are central to this research. Life histories help to interpret their 
own understandings of their lives and their personal trajectories, especially as these 
relate to their experiences in London and how they got there.  
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Life histories are not only about subjective attitudes toward the area being studied. 
They are also linked to larger tales influenced by global dynamics, historical context, 
and views about their future (Osella and Osella, 2006). Ellen argues: 
The reflective sensibility of individuals about their past and their 
present actually comprises their culture, since it is the individuals in 
a society which receive, recreate and transmit the culture over time, 
and it is their evidence on which the anthropologist, to a greater or 
lesser extent, relies (1987, p. 248). 
I have used this method from the beginning of my fieldwork. I was very open to 
hearing the life stories of those women who were happy to share them. As many of 
my interviewees mentioned, the story of hijab is life-changing for Iranians, and has 
significant complexities and issues around it. 
Netnography 
Netnography is an online research method coined by Robert Kozinets (2010, 2002). 
This method is based on ethnography and extends ethnography to the Internet and 
to online communities. This method is mostly used in marketing research to 
discover consumer insights. Anthropologists like Miller (2000) have also used this 
method. 
I have used this method in Chapter Three for a newly created Facebook page (less 
than two years old) called ‘no to compulsory hijab’ (na be hejabe ejbari). More than 
43,000 people have liked this page. On this page, Iranians from all over the world, 
both men and women, send a picture of themselves with a sentence saying that they 
are against compulsory hijab in Iran. More than 2,000 people have sent pictures, and 
under each picture there are hundreds of likes and comments that mirror different 
views about hijab.   
During my fieldwork period I followed this page and read all the comments. I saved 
many of them, and I will use and analyse these data in Chapter Three. 
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Netnography also involves following the news and reading interviews about hijab 
that are published on different websites. I have used many of these in different parts 
of my thesis, especially in Chapter Three, which discusses hijab policies in different 
periods in Iran and jurisprudential positions on the issue of hijab. Many intellectuals 
and politicians have made statements and arguments about hijab, and I have 
accessed these through the Internet. 
Focus groups 
I held both women-only and mixed-gender group discussions about the issues 
addressed in my thesis. Because the topic of hijab is something people find very 
interesting and have strong views about, it was very easy to start group discussions, 
including informally at events and parties. Both women and men made their points 
of view known, and with their permission I benefited from many of their insights. 
However, my research was primarily about the experiences of women themselves 
and therefore, throughout this thesis, references are only made to the main body of 
informants who were only women and formed the most important body of this 
research. 
Ethical considerations 
In order to respect the privacy of the interviewees, I have changed all their names 
except the four male mujtahids. For confidentiality, I have also blurred some 
people’s faces in the pictures I have used. Those people whose faces are recognisable 
in the pictures have given their consent for me to leave their photographs 
untouched. With regards to online data, I have only used information that was 
available on public pages. The ethical issues around Netnography are different from 
those of fieldwork. Langer & Beckman (2005) argue that “if access is not restricted, 
this can be defined as a public communication”, thus making it ethically less 
demanding. The combination of the afore-mentioned methods provided me with the 
required methodological toolkit for this anthropological research.   
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Chapter Three: The History and Transformations of Hijab Policies 
and Hijab Jurisprudence in Iran 
Introduction 
In this research my central focus is hijab practice in the Iranian diaspora in London. 
I concentrate on individual hijab practice rather than the macro-level politics of 
hijab. However, because all of my informants were born in and grew up in Iran, 
describing the wider history of hijab in modern Iran is essential. This wider context 
is a part of Iran’s general encounter with and experience of a variety of modernity, 
secularism, and socio-political equality of ‘citizens’ as a ‘universal’ phenomenon. In 
this broader context, one can better understand the dynamics of 
modernisation/Westernisation and resistance in the case of hijab policies. My 
research is distinct from other works on hijab because I have worked with women 
who have lived in both Iran and London. Therefore, I dedicate chapter Three and Four 
to exploring this wider context, and demonstrating how it has influenced and 
shaped hijab practice amongst Iranian women. 
In what follows I provide a narrative history of hijab policies in Iran since the 
Constitutional Revolution21. Two significant events are milestones of the history of 
hijab in 20th century Iran: the first is the unveiling order of Reza Shah in 1936 and 
the second the compulsory wearing of hijab in 1980 after the Islamic Revolution. 
Both events politicised the practice of hijab and had major effects on the practice 
and discourse of hijab. The most important implications of these events will be 
discussed below.  
The unveiling order of Reza Shah and the compulsory wearing of hijab in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran were not necessarily responses to women’s demands: they 
constituted different forms of state- led domination, and were meant to give more 
power to the powerful (Sadeghi, 2013). After both events, women’s situations 
                                                        
21  The Constitutional Revolution (enghelabe mashroote) happened in 1906 and led to the 
establishment of Parliament in Iran. This revolution was born out of the tension between the old-
fashioned Qajar monarchy and new democratic principles. The constitutional revolution was the 
turning point for the formation of modern Iran (Chehabi and Martin, 2010). 
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significantly changed, but not in the way the majority desired. Women at the time of 
Reza Shah only wanted to remove the face veil, but the government forced all 
women to wear Western clothes and go out into public without headscarves. 
The second part of this chapter covers the evolution of the jurisprudence, or fiqh, of 
hijab. I will explain how it has changed, and also highlight new interpretations of 
hijab through interviews I conducted with prominent scholars who have written 
opinions about hijab that differ from mainstream Islamic Shia jurisprudence. These 
new jurisprudential interpretations, which allow women to wear less and remain 
devout Muslims, have been an important contributing factor to the increasing 
transformation of hijab schemas amongst Iranian Shia Muslims in London.  
The history of hijab policies in Iran 
Hijab has been state-regulated twice in the history of modern Iran. Narratives and 
interpretations differ according to whether one takes the government’s or 
opposition parties’ point of view. In the following sections I will briefly recount the 
story of hijab from the Constitutional Revolution until today. In understanding the 
contemporary developments of hijab amongst Iranian women in London, it is 
important to understand what hijab/veiling and unveiling means in each of these 
periods. 
Hijab prior to the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1925) 
The predominant forms of hijab, its meaning, and its socio-cultural significance have 
been constantly changing in the post-19th century Iran. I therefore clarify what I 
mean by hijab in each period considered. Houchang Chehabi (2003, p. 203) argues 
that hijab is not only about using cloth to block the gaze of men: it is also a mode of 
interaction with a set of rules segregating men and women in visual and behavioural 
dimensions. The act of covering is called veiling, but the separation between 
women’s and men’s spaces is called ‘purdah’. There is no automatic link between 
veiling and purdah, and there are examples of both occurring independently.  
Under the Qajars, and prior to the Pahlavi dynasty, hijab for women entailed both 
veiling and purdah between the sexes (in her book (1991), Mernissi challenges this 
85 
 
perception about a universal, all-encompassing ruling on the veil at the time of the 
Prophet). Women were confined to home, homework and to reproduction. Their 
hijab consisted of three pieces: chador,22 picheh23 and chaqchur24 (Sedghi, 2007). 
Men and women were clearly segregated in most social and religious gatherings and 
rituals. Women, effectively the dominated gender, were called zaife25 (Rice, 1923). 
Even inside houses, the women’s quarters were separate and were kept behind 
curtains so no stranger could see them (Farmaian and Munker, 1992). 
In discussing the early contact of Iranian intelligentsia with the West and the issues 
of women rights and hijab raised by these contacts, one should not overlook the 
reform period during the Qajar dynasty before the Constitutional Revolution. After 
Iran’s defeat during the Russo-Iranian wars of the early 19th century, a number of 
military, administrative, and educational reforms were launched, culminating in the 
establishment of Dar al-Fonun, which involved sending Iranian students abroad for 
study. A number of ‘secular’ schools with ‘modern’ curricula were also established 
in Iranian cities including Tabriz and Tehran prior to the Constitutional Revolution, 
preparing the soil for later developments in hijab policies in twentieth century Iran 
(Afary, 1996; Chehabi, 1993). 
Before and after the Constitutional Revolution some Iranians went to Europe for 
higher education, and on their return home they struggled for women’s 
emancipation from patriarchal power. For example, women started establishing 
schools and newspapers that published articles opposed to veiling and child 
marriage. These women were criticised by the traditionalists for being morally 
corrupt because they endeavoured to emancipate women (Bamdad 2013; Paidar 
1997). 
                                                        
 
22 Chador is a long round black fabric that covers from the head to toe. There are different types of 
chadors used by Muslim women in different parts of the world. Illustrations of the Iranian style of 
chador are provided in Chapter 5.  
23 Piche was a piece of fabric that women used to cover their face, tied to head with a ribbon. It is not 
used in Iran today.  
24 Chaqchur were very loose trousers that women wore to cover from their waist to their toes. 
25 Zaife derives from the word zaif, which means ‘weak’. At that time, men used it to address their 
women. 
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Pahlavi Dynasty 1925-1979  
The Pahlavi Dynasty, which began with Reza Shah, was the first modern state in Iran. 
The unveiling order (or hijab ban) at this time produced many significant long-term 
consequences. According to Sadeghi (2013), the most important far-reaching 
outcome of the unveiling order was the subsequent mandate of compulsory hijab 
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The other important outcome of the unveiling 
order was that it made women the subjects of social class differences. Before the 
unveiling order, men were the figures who determined the different social classes. 
There is a very wide literature available on the unveiling order both in English and 
Persian (Dibaji et al., 2002; Jafari, 1994; Jafarian, 2004; Salah, 2005; Shojaei, 2007).  
At the time of Reza Shah, unveiling referred to the abandonment of chador and 
picheh. From 1920 onwards, elite women started to unveil in private gatherings, and 
the use of picheh became rare (Ingham, 1977) except in the southern part of Iran 
where picheh is still common (Anjamruz, 1992). In 1927 Sediqe Dowlatabadi, a 
prominent member of the women’s movement, returned from Paris to Tehran and 
went into the streets of Tehran unveiled, wearing European-style clothing (Paidar, 
1997). 
In 1928, the Iranian New Year coincided with the anniversary of the murder of Imam 
Ali (the first Imam of Shia Muslims). Reza Shah’s female relatives decided to 
celebrate both occasions at the shrine of Hazrati Masume in Qom. In the shrine, Reza 
Shah’s female relatives wore transparent chadors, which led to anger and protest 
from clerics in Qom. In response, Reza Shah himself drove to Qom and entered the 
shrine wearing his boots26 as a sign of his anger. He removed the opposing clerics 
from their positions in the shrine (Qazi, 1993).  
In 1932, the journal Alame Nesvan published articles and arguments about hijab 
(Chehabi, 2003). During that same year, the first hints about unveiling began. In the 
cabinet meeting, unveiling was mentioned as one of the cultural elements that 
should be imported from the West (Hedayat, 1950).  
                                                        
26 It is customary for people to take off their shoes when they enter shrines and mosques as a sign of 
respect. 
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Delshad (1931) discusses unveiling and the experience she had when she started 
going out and interacting with people without hijab. She felt very good about herself: 
on one occasion, a shopkeeper called her ‘madam’, demonstrating his respect. She 
also describes an event she attended with 200 other women: they buried the chador 
and picheh, and then all of the women buried their chadors, after which they 
celebrated their freedom and wore Western clothes. Drawing upon this story, 
Rostam-Kolayi suggests that “the veil was not only a detested symbol of 
backwardness, but also a barrier to women’s self-respect and self-knowledge” 
(2003, p. 177).  
Reports show that even before the official unveiling order in 1936, there were some 
elite women who appeared in public without chador. Prior to 1927, unveiled women 
in the streets were detained, but in 1927 the government ordered the police not to 
interfere with unveiled women (Bamdad, 2013). As a result of unveiling, there was 
increased interaction between women and men in public spaces such as streets, 
parks, restaurants, and cafes. After the 1936 unveiling order, the government asked 
employees to bring their wives unveiled and wearing European-style fashions to 
official gatherings (Chehabi, 1993).  
In 1935, the education ministry announced a new regulation that banned veiled 
students from receiving prizes. Furthermore, teachers could only claim their 
salaries if they did not wear hijab (Woodsmall, 1936). People’s reactions to the 
official banning of hijab varied in different parts of Iran. Some accepted it easily, 
while others resisted. 
After the events at the Gowharshad Mosque27, Reza Shah came to believe it was time 
to apply compulsory unveiling to all women in the country, although this policy 
might significantly damage his popularity. His minster suggested that it was better 
to start by ordering women to put away their chador and wear manto28 instead, but 
                                                        
27  One of the most tragic incidents during protests against unveiling policies happened in the 
Gowharshad Mosque in Mashhad. Clerics began talking about unveiling, and meetings were held 
opposing unveiling in schools. On 13th July 1935, security forces surrounded Imam Reza’s shrine and 
the Gowharshad mosque and shot all the protesters. They put an end to the refuge, and exiled all the 
clerics who were involved in the protest (Vahed, 1987). 
28 Manto is a type of clothing similar to a dress or long tunic that covers the body, has long sleeves, 
and is loose enough to hide the shape of the body. 
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Reza Shah did not agree. He wanted Iranian women to dress like women in Turkey, 
and to work shoulder to shoulder with men in public, just as he had witnessed in 
person in his recent summer visit to Ataturk’s Turkey. Finally, on March 8th 1936, 
Reza Shah attended a ceremony for the opening of a teacher training college. His 
wife and two daughters accompanied him unveiled, and all the teachers attending 
the ceremony were told to come unveiled. Reza Shah’s sister and daughter discussed 
the king’s feelings about his wife and family being unveiled in public: it was very 
hard for him, but he chose to do it because he thought it was an essential part of 
modernising Iran. In that ceremony, Reza Shah said: 
I am exceedingly pleased to see that as a result of knowledge and 
learning, women have come alive to their condition, rights, and 
privileges. Being outside of society, the women of this country could 
not develop their native talents. They could not repay their debt to 
their dear country nor serve it and sacrifice for it as they should.... We 
should not forget that [up to this time] one-half of the population of 
the country was not taken into account... I expect you learned women 
who are now becoming aware of your rights, privileges and duties to 
serve your homeland, to be content and economical, and to become 
accustomed to saving and to avoid luxuries and extravagance 
(Chehabi, 2003, p. 211). 
In order to enforce this unveiling policy, Reza Shah ordered local authorities to 
monitor women and make sure they were not veiled in public places. For instance, 
police were stationed at the entrances of bathhouses to prevent veiled women from 
entering. Prostitutes were not allowed to unveil, so that veiling could no longer be a 
symbol of virtue (Chehabi, 2003). This is a critical point to consider here. Prior to 
the ban on veil, it was considered synonymous with modesty and chastity. It seems 
like an attempt to reverse this by associating the practice of veil with immodesty 
and depravation. Veiling was seen as the most important factor in the subjugation 
of women and their seclusion or lack of participation in social life; hence, unveiling 
was seen as a step towards promoting the social participation of women. It is 
interesting to note that there is a European ring to this policy which had its parallels 
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in other Muslim countries (for example, in Egypt). It was not just the state but also 
the majority of male intellectuals who were seen as flag bearers of progress. 
It could be argued that the key factor that convinced Reza Shah to enforce unveiling 
was his summer visit to Turkey in 1934 (Chehabi, 1993; Jafarian, 2004). In Turkey, 
Reza Shah was very impressed by women’s participation in social life, and the social 
and economic progress that Turkey was going through under the reign of Kamal 
Ataturk (Bamdad, 2013). 
Reza Shah’s unveiling order was supported by a number of prominent male 
intellectuals, including Kasravi and Taghizade, who were from religious 
backgrounds themselves and who wrote articles criticising hijab. Although they 
criticised Reza Shah’s dictatorship, they supported his anti-clerical stance on 
women’s rights (Kasravi, 1974; Taqizadeh, 1972). The story of the role of these 
intellectuals is peculiarly familiar when one compares it with the case of Egypt and 
the role played by Qasim Amin (Ahmed, 1993), as I have discussed earlier. The only 
difference is that the ruling power in Egypt was in no way behaving on the same 
lines as Reza Shah in Iran. Nonetheless, the ideological forces behind such moves are 
surprisingly aligned, even though there may be differences in details here and there. 
The key underlying theme in all these policies is that it is a male-dominated, male-
driven project heavily under the influence of a Eurocentric mode of viewing Oriental 
societies. Perceptions about ‘Islam’ and its presumed role in the degradation of 
women was part and parcel of this project and they remain in force until our time 
but with new overtones which are deeply shaped by the geopolitics of our world in 
contemporary times. It is out of this context and background that the responses and 
reactions of Shariati and Motahari formed the basis of a rebuttal for asserting an 
‘Islamic’ identity which they believed was not about degradation of women but 
about their protection and emancipation.  
In Iran, two groups primarily opposed the unveiling order. The first group 
comprised conservative members of the religious sector of society as well as clerics 
(ulama). The second group comprised the majority of women, including educated 
women, who had accepted covering for centuries. Before the unveiling order, few 
women went without hijab in public (Jafari, 1994). This was not necessarily due to 
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religiosity: it was also cultural, and women were not safe in the streets without the 
chador. 
Unveiling was perceived as offensive to religious women, because they believed 
hijab was a sign of virtue, protection, and pride (Moghissi, 1994). It was difficult for 
hijabi women to unveil because they felt naked without their hijab (Milani, 1992). 
They therefore stayed at home during the Shah’s reign (Reeves, 1989). At that time, 
houses did not have bathrooms, so hijabi women had to bathe in the middle of night, 
and travel to bathhouses from neighbours’ roofs (Haeri, 1993). 
During the Second World War in 1941, allied troops invaded Iran from the north 
and south, and forced Reza Shah to abdicate. After Reza Shah left Iran, those 
opposing the unveiling order became vocal. In 1943, Ayatollah Qomi, previously 
exiled to Najaf after the incident at Gowharshad Mosque, returned to Tehran and 
offered recommendations to the government. He recommended allowing veiled 
women to wear whatever they wanted, ceasing building mixed schools, and 
including Islamic studies in school curricula. After two years, the government 
accepted the recommendations, and in 1943 the veil officially became a matter of 
choice (Chehabi, 2003). 
Critics of Reza Shah’s Unveiling Order  
Many academic scholars, including women concerned with gender issues, have 
criticised Reza Shah for his unveiling order (see Paidar 1997; Nashat 1983; Moghissi 
1994; Afary 1996; Sanasarian 1982). They believe that compulsory unveiling was 
against the will of the majority of women, the most visible sign of which was that 
after Reza Shah abdicated the unveiling order, many women started wearing hijab 
again. Scholars argue that it should have been the women’s choice to put away the 
chador, not the government, and that Reza Shah did not give women the chance to 
fight for their rights themselves.  
Reza Shah’s unveiling policy did not distinguish between veiling (the practice of 
covering) and purdah (the separation of men and women’s spaces). He wanted to 
bring women into the public sphere, and thought this was only obtainable by 
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unveiling women. One important consequence of the unveiling order was that young 
girls in religious families were deprived of an education (Najmabadi, 2005). 
The unveiling order of that time was not about women’s choice and control over 
their bodies; it was about dismantling the distinction between andaruni and biruni 
(inside and outside). The unveiling order was intended to create a different social 
order; it was not about women’s freedom of choice over what to wear (Ahmadi 
Khorasani, 2011). 
After Reza Shah’s son Mohammad Reza Shah came to power, many women 
voluntarily returned to veiling (Sanasarian, 1982). This was partly because religious 
leaders encouraged women to veil in order to reclaim their previous strength from 
the state (Paidar, 1997).  
The Islamic Republic 
After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, there were a series of speeches from the 
leaders about the Islamic dress code and protests in response. On 7th March 1979, 
Ayatollah Khomeini announced that women should take part in society and work 
next to men, but should wear hijab. On 8th March, thousands of women protested 
against these new policies (Afshar, 1999). Protesters argued that hijab was not 
necessarily a sign of purity.  
The forced marginalisation of this ‘secularist’ group of women was not non-violent. 
The secular opposition to the Islamic Republic and their associated women’s 
organisations, who partly organised the demonstration on the 8th of March, were 
systematically destroyed both politically and physically in a sustained campaign of 
state violence involving execution and imprisonment (Afary, 1996; Afshar, 1999). 
This marginalisation of secular women, both at individual and organisational levels, 
did not stop Iranian secular women and feminists from being highly active in, and 
occasionally leading, a number of important campaigns for women’s rights in post-
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revolutionary Iran, including those relating to dress code (e.g. the One Million 
Signature Campaign29). 
From 1979 to 1983, there were several unofficial regulations enforcing the Islamic 
dress code, especially for women who were government employees. In 1983, an 
amendment to the constitution made it officially illegal for women to appear in 
public without hijab. Article 638 of the Iranian penal code, ratified in 1996, 
stipulated appropriate punishment for improper veiling, including seventy-four 
lashes, a jail sentence of up to two months, or a fine of 500,000 Rials30.  
1982–1998: War and Construction: legal and social consolidation of the compulsion of 
hijab in public spaces 
In the second decade following the 1979 Revolution, women expressed an 
increasing desire to wear their own style of clothing in public. They were tired of 
simple and dark-coloured clothing, and wanted to abide by a less strict dress code. 
They were tired of not being able to express their sexuality. After the Iran-Iraq war, 
the basij31 controlled women’s dress, and in 1990 protests against bad hijabi (bad 
hijab) spanned multiple cities.  
In post-War Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani’s32 daughter made one of the first attempts to 
liberalise women’s dress. She began wearing colourful scarves with a shirt and 
trousers beneath her chador, and advertised women’s cycling and sports in the 
streets of Tehran winning her the second highest votes in Tehran in the 1995 
Parliamentary elections.  
                                                        
29 One Million Signatures for the Repeal of Discriminatory Laws is a campaign launched in June 2006 
by Iranian feminist activists to collect one million signatures in support of changing discriminatory 
laws against women in Iran. A number of the leaders and activists of the movement have been jailed 
by the government, and the campaign has had to extend its two-year target to collect the full one 
million signatures 
30 Today equivalent to 15 US Dollars.  
31 Basij is a paramilitary establishment founded after the Islamic Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
It consisted of volunteer civilians who initially joined to take part in the Iran-Iraq war.  
32 Hashemi Rafsanjani is one of the most significant political figures of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
He was the president of Iran from 1989 to 1997. He is now the chairman of the Expediency 
Discernment Council of Iran, and a close ally of Hassan Rouhani.  
93 
 
1998–2006: Reformation in hijab style and the emergence of bad hijabi 
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran, and the 
government’s policy regarding hijab became less strict. Prior to Mohammad 
Khatami, the government used violence and cultural propaganda in the struggle 
against hijab issues. Soon after Khatami’s election, governmental hijab policy 
changed smoothly. A number of high-ranking authorities publicly stated that the 
younger generation had different demands, and that their needs should be 
recognised. For example, the basij commander announced that the younger 
generation could not be guided with force and violence. Fateme Rake’ei, a member 
of the Mosharekat political party, 33  stressed that the government was to blame 
because the function of hijab was not evident to young people (Rake’ei, 2001). 
In Khatami’s first term (1998-2002), Elahe Kula’ei became a member of parliament. 
She was the first woman to attain a high governmental position without wearing 
chador. The conservatives who supported stricter and more traditional dress codes 
for women responded angrily. Elahe Kula’ei’s move was seen as controversial 
because she successfully refused to wear the symbol of Islamic Republic inside 
parliament itself.  
In 1998, Khatami decreed that the government should use polite, legal, and friendly 
means of dealing with women who do not dress according to Islamic and legal codes, 
and that the government cannot force everyone to wear the same colour and style 
of clothing. 
In the same year, Faeze Hashemi launched Zan (Woman), a newspaper featuring 
several debates about hijab on topics that included Shariati’s and Motahari’s 
interpretation of hijab. In 1999, Ayatollah Janati34  spoke against using black for 
women’s clothing. The President of the ‘women’s committee and expediency’ 
asserted that Islamic hijab need not only be black chador. In 2000, the education 
ministry announced that girls in primary schools were allowed to wear bright 
                                                        
33 The largest and most prominent reformist political party in Iran. 
34 The chairman of Guardian Council of Iran.  
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colours for their school uniform, when previously only black, grey, brown, dark blue, 
or dark green were permitted (Ahmadi Khorasani, 2011). 
In 2000, Yousefi Eshkevari35, Elahe Kula’ei and Shahla Lahiji36 criticised compulsory 
hijab in Iran at the Berlin conference. 37  Upon their return to Iran, they were 
arrested. Yousefi Eshkevari was condemned to 7 years of jail because of his stance 
against compulsory hijab. In the conference he stated that dress is a customary and 
cultural issue, that it justifiably varies in different times and places, and that the 
government has no right to enforce hijab on those who do not choose to wear it 
(Zakariaei, 2000). 
Overall, during the first four years of Khatami’s presidency, conservatives did not 
effectively oppose new policies on hijab. However, they gradually challenged 
reformists, and used hijab as a means to defeat them. In 2001, previous policies on 
bad hijab were gradually put back into practice, and a new official moral police 
formed (gashte vije mobaraze ba mafasede ejtemayi) 38 . This police unit was 
exclusively mandated to enforce traditional and conservative hijab in public spaces 
using detainment and force.  
Conservatives increased pressure against what they deemed as bad hijab. They 
believed that it was Khatami’s fault that society favoured bad hijab and that Western 
culture had infiltrated Iranian culture. 
2006–2013: Ahmadinejad, neoconservatives, and the ‘no to compulsory hijab’ 
campaign 
In the middle of the third decade of the Islamic Republic, a new political group of 
neoconservatives came to power under the leadership of President Mahmoud 
                                                        
35 A reformist cleric in Iran who I will introduce in detail later in this chapter 
36 An Iranian writer, publisher and activist. 
37 ‘Iran after the election conference’, also known as the ‘Berlin conference’, was a consequential 
three-day conference on the subject of reform in Iran. Some of the participants were imprisoned 
upon their return to Iran. During the conference, anti-regime Iranian exiles interrupted the 
proceedings by dancing naked in the middle of the conference chamber.  
38 To implement strict control over women’s clothing, the moral police placed large vans in crowded 
squares and social hubs in the public spaces of major cities. Other vans drove around the streets and 
monitored dress and behavior. Officers would order women with bad hijab to cover properly and 
detain them if they refused to comply.  
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Ahmadinejad and his closest partner, Esfandiar Rahim Masha’ei. This new populist 
conservative group portrayed a new image of the ideal woman—the ‘adductive 
revolutionary woman’—that was more out-spoken and self-governing than the 
ideal woman traditional conservatives promoted. Traditional conservatives initially 
supported the new populist and nationalist conservatives, recognising that without 
them it would be impossible to push reformists aside in the elections. Ahmadinejad, 
speaking on state TV during his first presidential campaign, declared that the 
problems with Iran’s youth were unrelated to their clothing, or to whether they 
reveal their hair. As soon as he became president, however, moral police became 
increasingly strict in controlling women’s dress codes in public spaces. 
During the first four years of his presidency, Ahmadinejad did not personally take 
effective action against bad hijab. After the rise of the green movement following the 
disputed presidential election of 2009, Ahmadinejad and other governmental 
authorities relaxed control over what women wore. Traditional conservatives 
pushed for stricter policies and were not at all happy with Ahmadinejad’s handling 
of the matter.  
The Arab Spring also softened Ahmadinejad’s policies. In the summer of 2011, a 
special edition of the state-run newspaper (called khatoon), published by 
Ahmadinejad’s media advisors, infuriated traditional conservatives to the extent 
that it was banned. It contained several articles on hijab that explicitly criticised 
chador and the pressure placed on women by the moral police. The edition editor 
was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison, although his sentence was later 
commuted to six months. 
In the heated dispute on hijab between traditional conservatives and 
neoconservatives, traditional conservatives accused Ahmadinejad of being lax 
toward hijab policy as liberals and reformists. Amongst many notable public debates 
over hijab, Mostafa Tajzade’s 2010 letter to Ali Motahari merits mention. Tajzade, 
jailed after the 2009 presidential election and a member of the Mosharekat reformist 
political party, argued against compulsory hijab. Ali Motahari, a conservative 
member of parliament, and the son of Ayatollah Motahari responded. The exchange 
of their open letters attracted a wide readership. Tajzade (2012) criticised 
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Motahari’s assertion that Ahmadinejad’s hijab policies resembled the reformists’. In 
his letter, Tajzade listed the disadvantages of compulsory hijab. The aforementioned 
discussions and opinions have led to a vigorous debate in the public culture as 
evidenced in a Facebook campaign. 
The ‘no to compulsory hijab’ Facebook campaign  
‘No to compulsory hijab’ (na be hejabe ejbari) is a Facebook page created on 10th July 
2012. As of autumn 2013, more than 63,000 Facebook users have liked this page. 
The aim of this page is to make an effective stand against compulsory hijab in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Many Iranians who live in the London diaspora and other 
Western diasporic communities are members of this page. The campaign’s most 
effective tool has been asking Iranian men and women to send a photograph of 
themselves along with a statement opposing compulsory hijab in Iran. These images 
are posted on the campaign’s Facebook page, along with relevant news and 
interviews. 
 
Figure 2: An Iranian women joining the "No to Compulsory Hijab" campaign Facebook page; 2012. 
To date, more than 2000 Iranians have contributed images and statements. I have 
been monitoring this page since the beginning, and have read all posts, comments, 
interviews, and news published. The contributed images depict men and women 
from different age groups following different dress codes, and include many political 
and social activists inside and outside Iran. Prominent religious intellectuals and 
Islamic scholars including Mohsen Kadivar (discussed below) are amongst the 
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supporters, and their images have received the highest number of comments on the 
page.  
It is notable that many women with chador have submitted images to the page, along 
with a significant number of women with hijab. Their pictures receive relatively 
more comments and ‘likes’. This signifies that the demand to lift state restrictions 
on hijab transcends the religious-secular divide.  
Although the hosts of the page and leaders of the campaign have secular and liberal 
orientations, pictures of women with hijab or that include a religious symbol or the 
flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran receive more comments and likes, and are the 
most controversial. Another controversial image that triggered heated debate 
shows a woman in a bikini saying that she is against all compulsion in dress. The 
comments clearly demonstrate that there are many ways of perceiving hijab and its 
limits amongst Iranians both within and outside of Iran. 
While every image on this page is interesting and has its own character, I have 
selected a few examples for discussion.  
Posts and comments make it evident that compulsory hijab in Iran is closely 
associated with Islam in the eyes of members spanning different religious positions. 
This opinion exists despite historical evidence suggesting that hijab has never been 
compulsory for all women prior to recent decades( see Mernissi (1991)). Even the 
Islamic state of the Prophet Mohammad did not enforce hijab for all women. The 
verses in the Quran on hijab only address practicing believers, and not all women.  
The image below shows a man in front of the Kaba 39  saying that he opposes 
compulsory hijab in Iran, although he may or may not personally believe in hijab. 
Many people have reacted by claiming his beliefs are incoherent. 
                                                        
39 The holiest place in Islam, a large cuboid-shaped building inside the al-Masjid al-Haram mosque in 
Mecca that Muslims make pilgrimage to. 
98 
 
 
Figure 3: An Iranian religious man standing in front of the Kaba, the most famous symbol of Islam, joining the 
"No to Compulsory Hijab" campaign Facebook page; 2012. 
Arman commented: 
Should I believe the picture or the statement mentioned in it? Islam 
has explicitly deprived women of their right to choose their dress 
code. I don’t understand this image and slogan. It’s all 
contradiction… 
Emad stated: 
There is no evidence that compulsory hijab has its roots in Islamic 
tradition, and it is not right that you relate what the Iranian 
government is doing with hijab to Islam. 
Another user, Mohammad, accused some of the commenters of behaving exactly like 
the Iranian government, but from the opposite side. He criticised people who believe 
that everyone should be secular and opposed to hijab or Islam. In his view, this is 
incompatible with democracy. Arman replied to Mohammad’s concern: 
Beliefs can only be respected if they are confined to one’s personal 
life. For those beliefs that interfere with other people’s lives and affect 
others’ comfort, I have no respect. For example, it is your right to 
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decide to wear chador, but you are not entitled to oblige others to 
wear certain clothes or to eat and behave as you wish them to. Most 
Islamic rules have an impact on other people’s lives, and this is 
unacceptable. I personally do not support beliefs that directly affect 
nonbelievers’ lives. 
The picture in Figure 4, below, also triggered a heated debate. It shows that the 
government has compared women with chocolate in a state-sponsored 
advertisement on a billboard in Tehran. The sentence below the picture says that 
hijab is protection. The image treats women as sweets which, without proper cover, 
will attract flies and contamination. This image exemplifies the typical reasoning 
behind the government’s enforcement of hijab in women. They assume that men are 
animals who have no control over their desires. If women do not have hijab, men 
will necessarily transgress and harm women. A number of comments under this 
image regard it as an insult to both women and men. Here, a Review of the 
developments of the jurisprudence of Hijab is central in understanding the context 
and pre-text of these public debates over hijab.  
 
Figure 4: An advertising billboard in Tehran comparing a clean wrapped chocolate with an open one 
surrounded by insects. "No to Compulsory Hijab" campaign Facebook page, 2012. 
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History of jurisprudence of hijab in Iran 
In this section I survey historical changes of jurisprudence (fiqh) in Iran and Shia 
fiqh that relate to hijab. Jurisprudence refers to the study of religious law, and fiqh 
the science of Islamic law. A jurist or faqih is a specialist in Islamic law and is eligible 
to issue Islamic rulings (fatwas). 
Islamic jurisprudence has had an immense influence on the practice of hijab, 
especially amongst Shia Iranian women. It is therefore very important to portray the 
changes that hijab fiqh has gone through. In this section I will first give a brief history 
of ulama’s ijtihad40 on hijab and explain its changes. I will also explicate new juristic 
positions on hijab based on my interviews with a number of the prominent scholars 
and mujtahids41 including Kadivar, Eshkevari, Torkashvand, and Fanaei. 
Before delving into the history of the jurisprudence of hijab, I need to define a key 
term: Marja (pl. maraji’). Marja‘-e taqlid42 (model of emulation) is the most senior 
position in the contemporary hierarchy of Shia ulama. Since maraji‘ are supposed to 
combine the qualities of learning and reason with those of exemplary devotion and 
piety, they enjoy the dual role of chief legal authority and spiritual leader/model for 
the Shia. Marja’s office and institutions (bayt) are based within a howza43. 
Marja‘iyya in its current form is a relatively recent phenomenon that can be traced 
back to the nineteenth century. The victory of the Usuli School over the Akhbari 
School, new forms of communication, and the print industry are widely seen as the 
defining factors in the formation of the institution of marja‘iyya (Kazemi Moussavi, 
1994).  
                                                        
40 Ijtihad is an Islamic term that refers to making religious decisions based on rational deduction from 
the traditional sources of religious law. Ijtihad requires a full knowledge of theology, revealed texts, 
and legal theory, as well as competence in legal reasoning and a complete knowledge of Arabic. 
41 Mujtahid is an Islamic scholar who exercises ijtihad and is an expert in interpreting Islamic law. 
Mujtahid exercises ijtihad on the basis of Quran, Sunna, consensus (ijma) and reason (aql). The 
muqallids—that is, lay people who lack specialised religious knowledge—are expected to submit to 
the judgment of a mujtahid in religious disputes. In due course, a hierarchy of mujtahids has formed, 
at the top of which are the maraji‘. The muqallids decide which marja‘ to follow using relatively 
unclear criteria.  
42 The Arabic equivalent of the Persian term ‘marja‘-e taqlid’ is ‘al-marja‘ al-dini’. 
43 A Howze is an Islamic Shia centre of learning that educates students in Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence). 
Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran are the two leading howzes in the Shia world.   
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All Marjas have a Resale (A manual of practical rulings on Islamic law) and followers 
of their own. There are several Marjas in Shia Islam, and all have a section in their 
manuals (Resale) on hijab. For many hijabi women, their Marja’s religious ruling 
(fatwa) on hijab is the main justification for their personal practice. 
Hijab jurisprudence of the Shia Ulama of the early twentieth century 
According to Jafarian (2004), before the Constitutional Revolution there was no 
separate section about women’s hijab in the Resale of the Marjas. As soon as the 
modernists and Reza Shah began their attempts to fight against hijab, many religious 
authorities began writing about hijab as a compulsory and essential rule of Islam. It 
is important to take into account this shift as it clearly reflects the contingency of 
such rulings. The fact that the ruling was not proactively pursued before the policies 
of the first Pahlavi ruler is indeed in line with the findings of other scholars such as 
Mernissi (1991) who deconstruct the argumentations behind the ruling in a more 
historical context. Previously, all women in Iran had hijab for primarily socio-
cultural reasons. Many women spent most of their time inside their homes and did 
not work with men in public spaces. Hijab, therefore, was not a matter of debate or 
question. Unlike in Resales today, the only rules about hijab in the Resales of Marjas 
were in sections devoted to prayer clothes and marriage. This shows that hijab was 
not an important issue for most Muslims in those days. According to Mir-Hosseini 
(2011), hijab was predominantly seen as a means of seclusion. One of the often 
neglected issues about hijab is the issue of class; the connection between observing 
a special dress code to cover a woman’s body and the social class of women deserves 
attention and as Mernissi (1991), initially the verses about hijab were about the 
wives of the Prophet. More specifically, it was connected with how aristocratic 
women were identified in society, rather than being a general rule or condition for 
religiosity (see, for example, Mernissi 1991, p. 94), nor was it peculiar to Muslim 
women. The shift from this historically rooted understanding of hijab to a more 
politically-oriented approach connecting it with piety and religiosity seems quite a 
later construction as such, as we see in the case of Pahlavi era Iran. 
After Reza Shah banned hijab in public, this secondary and much less strict emphasis 
on hijab gradually changed. Many religious authorities argued that hijab is a 
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requirement for devout Muslim women. Before the Constitutional Revolution, the 
dominant discourse on hijab amongst the Marjas regarded the whole body of a 
woman as awrah44. All the Shia Marjas believed that women should cover all parts 
of the body except the hands and face, and wear clothing loose enough not to show 
their shape. According to Kadivar, without exception, all traditional Shia jurists saw 
these as the boundaries of hijab. 
The point about a woman’s body being considered totally as awrah which has very 
strong sexual connotations in the sense that a woman’s totality was viewed in the 
service of sexual desires warrants further critical assessment. As it appears from the 
position of the traditional Shia jurists, one might assume that this approach is 
something integral to the thinking of the jurists. It is indeed far more complicated 
and much more contextual. The wider social contexts of such rulings is that of a 
highly male-dominated society in which Shia jurists were only a small part of the 
larger picture of viewing women as objects of sex and even the property of men. 
Positions of philosophers such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, a medieval Muslim 
philosopher, is a case in point (see Nasirean Ethics, 1964, pp. 161-163). 
What is imperative is not to remove Shia jurists from their broader social context as 
it runs the risk of providing an essentialist view of what Shia jurisprudence is 
supposed to represent. 
Progressive hijab jurisprudence of Motahari  
New ideas of hijab formulated by public intellectuals and Muslim scholars like Ali 
Shariati and Morteza Motahari were amongst the Shia responses to the challenges 
of modernity in a society that experienced a modern Islamic revolution. After the 
Islamic Revolution and consequent politicisation of hijab, many Iranian women 
started to voluntarily wear hijab. Many were influenced by Shariati’s discourse on 
hijab. Shariati claimed that hijab empowers women and helps them to fight against 
American imperialism. As Mir-Hosseini (2011) states, in Shariati’s discourse hijab 
                                                        
44 Awrah (pudendum) in Islamic fiqh refers to the parts of the body that need to be covered in prayer 
and in front of men who are namahram. 
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became a sign of protest. At the same time, a section of practical rules on hijab was 
added to all Resale of the Marjas.  
One of the most important milestones in the debate on hijab was Motahari’s writing. 
He composed a book on hijab that became very popular amongst religious women. 
In his book, Motahari made a big shift in interpreting and defining hijab: unlike his 
teachers, he did not see hijab as a means of secluding women and excluding women 
from the social arena, but as a means of protection to allow women to come out and 
work in society, next to men, protected from any harassment. 
Motahari’s reformulation of hijab as protection was clearly made to increase 
women’s ‘participation’ in the social and economic life of the country. In other 
words, he sought to defend his project of political Islam against secular rivals’ 
charges that Islam confines women to home. Motahari was trying to show that 
rather than limiting women’s participation in public life, hijab facilitates precisely 
such participation. In other words, Motahari’s approach was much more 
instrumentalist than ideological. 
Motahari created a philosophy of hijab that defined hijab as a means of piety and not 
an end in itself. He created a new stance in the howze institutions, and was harshly 
criticised by his colleagues and teachers. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
Muslim women found public spaces much safer and the presence of women in civil 
society increased. The government’s policy, following Motahari, was to welcome 
women into public roles but also to encourage and eventually oblige women to wear 
Islamic clothing. Many clerics and religious authorities advocated Motahari’s views 
in their talks and writing. Motahari’s book on hijab is one the most significant and 
widely read books on the subject, it is referred to by many scholars who have 
written about hijab in Iran (see Behzadpour 2003; Eshtehardi 1991; Fathi 1991; 
Jafari Sirizi 2003; Mehdizadeh 2003; Nudyavi & Mofti 2001; Qazi 1993; Saeidi 2002; 
Shahshahani 1995; Shojaei 2007; Alipour Baghban-Nezhad & Rezaei 2002).  
In the approaches of both Shariati and Motahari, the dominant theme is the 
dichotomy of empowerment vs. protection. Viewing hijab as one or the other in this 
manner emerged out of a political context to which both Shariati and Motahari 
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contributed significantly. There was a political ideology to be developed and women 
were also equally a part of this movement. Both of them, in different ways managed 
to provide some space and rationale for women to accept their dress code and not 
to allow it become a barrier for their social and political participation. It must be, 
however, noted that the broader backdrop of these approaches were not much 
different from what we saw in Egypt with the radical approaches of people like 
Qasim Amin Even though Shariat’s position and Motahari’s views have critical 
differences, they both form a mirror image of what people like Taghizade (an in 
Egypt Qasim Amin, in a radical form) argued. All of these male scholars, jurists or 
intellectuals provided an argument for or against hijab in the broader contexts of 
political and social movements which were essentially a product of the colonial 
legacies. 
What needs to be highlighted here is the role of women in the revolution which 
radically changed the social and political order in Iran. By the time the revolution 
takes place, education for women was no longer a serious problem. Earlier 
resistance to modernisation of education at the time of Reza Shah (even though it 
was not just about women) does not seem to be the major driving factor here. 
Elements such as class are also secondary to these debates. Women were now part 
of the movement and often at the forefront of it. A case in point is the role of women 
in the hostage crisis after the revolution. Masoumeh Ebtekar, who is now among 
Iranian reformists, was the speaker of the hostage takers then. She was educated in 
the West and she also represented the revolutionary mode among the women who 
had contributed to the revolution. People like her were not constrained in their 
social and political roles either because of lack of access to education or because of 
class difference. It took women such as Ebtekar years to be in the fold of reformists, 
as many revolutionaries, from among men and women, during Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
era later joined hands with the reformists. In short, wearing the veil by these 
revolutionary women (whether they were closes to the state or among the followers 
of Mujahedin), never seemed a barrier. It was indeed a sign of their identity and also 
contributed to their assertive presence in every sphere of social and political life. 
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Reformist jurisprudence of hijab: Ghabel, Kadivar, Fanaei, Eshkevari, and Torkashvand 
I was very fortunate to be able to interview a number of the most prominent reformist 
scholars and mujtahids. They have worked and published on hijab and have developed 
new perspectives that differ from those held by the rest of the mujtahids in howze. These 
scholars are widely known as religious intellectuals (roshanfekrane dini) or religious 
modernist thinkers (no-andishane dini) in Iran.  
 
Most of my informants in London were influenced in their hijab practice by these 
mujtahids, either directly or indirectly. In order to understand my informants, it is 
therefore essential to discuss this increasingly influential new jurisprudence of hijab. 
 
In this section I will outline each mujtahid’s views and indicate how they differ from the 
hegemonic discourse on hijab in Islamic jurisprudence. I asked these scholars to articulate 
the limits of hijab according to Shia fiqh; whether it is flexible and changeable in different 
times and places; and about their criticism of hijab in conventional fiqh.  
 
Before going into discussion about the views of these scholars, it is necessary to note that 
the context in which religious intellectuals and the new generation of scholars emerged 
is deeply political. The aftermath of the succession crisis in the Islamic Republic brought 
about gradual but significant shifts in the centres of power. In the early years of the 
leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, the very concept of the governance of the jurists which 
was invented by Ayatollah Khomeini became the focal point of intense debates. The very 
succession was on shaky grounds with the removal of Ayatollah Montazeri as the deputy 
of Ayatollah Khomeini. What was traditionally known as the Muslim left – followers of 
the line of Imam – was now in the shadows with little influence in the political domain. 
The conservatives who were not favourable during the lifetime of Ayatollah Khomeini 
had now found a powerful supporter in the new leader. The shift in power witnessed the 
continued marginalisation of figures close to Ayatollah Khomeini until Khatami’s victory 
following eight years of Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency. 
 
It is during this period when the intelligence and security apparatus begins an intense 
confrontation with all intellectuals including secular ones to suppress critical and 
dissenting voices. The crackdown was widespread. It included all secular groups, with all 
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their differences, groups close to Ayatollah Montazeri (Ghabel and Kadivar were close 
disciples of Montazeri), feminists of all sorts, and in short any political and social group 
who challenged the ideological foundations of the newly established order in the second 
generation of the Islamic Republic’s leadership. 
 
The development of the new intellectual discourse happens in this context and it is not 
simply about issues of women. The new leadership’s grip on power included every sphere 
of the social and political life of Iranians. Intellectual and political responses, reflections 
and revisiting of the direction of the revolution takes place in this context. A recent and 
thorough evaluation of various economic, political and intellectual contexts and 
contingencies of these changes are briefly and meticulously covered in a chapter by Ali 
Paya (et al) in Estes and Tiliouine (2016, pp. 211-235). 
Ahmad Ghabel 
In contemporary Shia Islam, several Shia Marjas have their own followers. As 
Kadivar mentioned, apart from Ahmad Ghabel, all other Mujtahids and Marjas in 
Shia Islam believe that women should cover all parts of their body except their 
hands and face. Ghabel, who lived in Qom, was the first contemporary mujtahid to 
announce that covering one’s head and neck is only mustahab45 (recommended) 
and not vajeb (compulsory). He supported his view using evidence from within 
traditional fiqh to demonstrate that women are permitted to show their neck and 
hair but are still obliged to cover the rest of their bodies. I planned to interview 
Ahmad Ghabel, but unfortunately he died from a brain tumour during my fieldwork 
in 2012, so I was unable to talk to him in person. However, several of his publicly 
available interviews and articles on the topic of my research allow me to include him 
in this discussion.  
Ghabel was the first and only contemporary prominent mujtahid to state publicly 
that covering the hair and neck is not compulsory (vajeb) for women in Islam. All 
                                                        
45 In Islamic law there are a number of key essential terms, which the jurists use to explain the 
permissibility of a certain action by Muslims. Mustahab is one, which means recommended or 
favored but not obligatory or compulsory. Haraam refers to those acts that are completely forbidden 
(like lying or drinking alcohol). Vajeb is an act that is compulsory for Muslims (like praying five times 
a day and fasting during Ramadan).  
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my interviewees amongst the Qom-educated scholars confirmed that there have 
been other clerics and religious experts who hold similar views, but they have not 
declared it publicly.  
What is quite pertinent to note here is that Ghabel was a disciple of Ayatollah 
Montezeri and after the 2009 disputed presidential elections, he was among the 
most vocal supporters of the Green Movement and spent a long time in prison. Even 
though his views about women’s dress code had emerged before the Green 
Movement, the political context which gave rise to the Green Movement was still 
there. People like Ghabel were operating and producing their work in that context. 
Amir Torkashvand 
Amir Torkashvand is a cleric in Qom who has conducted in-depth research on the 
limits of hijab at the time of the Prophet Mohammad, although he does not use this 
research to generate normative prescriptions for contemporary society. In his 
thousand-page monograph (hijabe shari dar asre payambar) he shows that at the 
time of the Prophet Mohammad it was compulsory for women to cover from their 
collarbone to their knees. The rest of their body, including their arms, were not 
necessary to cover. Though Torkashvand does not personally draw conclusions 
from his investigation for Muslim women today, he still has affected how women—
including a number of my educated interviewees and I—perceive hijab. For most 
Muslims, the Prophet Mohammad’s acts are the source of right action (hence the 
issue of authority and who is to be obeyed). Therefore, after being convinced by 
Torkashvand’s argument, women conclude that if the Prophet did not want women 
to cover their hair in a much more traditional society, Muslim women in 
contemporary societies that have become much more egalitarian are also allowed 
to uncover their hair, in accordance with progressive Islamic Shia jurisprudence.  
The difference between Torkashvand and Ghabel is that Torkashvand is not visibly 
aligned with reformists. Even though, there is not any indication which to show his 
explicit sympathies with the reformist political and intellectual direction, his views 
about the veil are fully in line with the same approach as promoted by reformists. 
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Torkashvand’s book, Hijab in the time of Prophet Mohammad (hijabe shar’ei dar asre 
payambar) has become very controversial in Iran’s public sphere, and amongst 
religious scholars within and outside of Iran. It is the first book in Persian that has 
exclusively talked about hijab practice and its features at the time of Prophet 
Mohammad, and it draws conclusions that are totally different from the mainstream 
jurisprudence of hijab in Shia Islam.  
According to Torkashvand, there are three different views on the meaning of the 
word awrah (see footnote 45) in Shia fiqh. The first view is the most popular and 
dominant, and is approved by the majority of the ulama. In this view, awrah in men 
is the part between their knee and navel, and for women it refers to all parts of the 
body except for the face and hands. A number of marjas believe the foot can also be 
shown.  
The second view, which Torkashvand called the ‘original view’, is in his opinion the 
correct view about the limits of awrah for both men and women. In this view, awrah 
for men refers only to the middle part (the genitals), and for women it refers to the 
part of the body between the shoulders and the knees. According to this view, 
covering the rest of the body—the head, neck, arms, and knee to foot—is not 
compulsory. The third view that Torkashvand mentioned is that awrah for both men 
and women is the same and refers only to the genitals. This view is not very well 
known, and there is very little evidence for it. 
Torkashvand emphasised that what he has discussed in his book only relates to the 
time of the Prophet Mohammad, and he does not want to prescribe anything for how 
women should practice hijab today. At the same time, he said: 
Although I do not claim that I am giving a prescription for women 
today on how they should cover, we should keep in mind that all the 
ulama and marjas think that the sharia law is based on what Prophet 
Mohammad did in his time, and that the Islamic laws of our time are 
the same as those of the Prophet’s time. One cannot make any 
conclusions based solely on this book that I have written, and there 
are many other views available. It is the responsibility of a marja to 
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take all these views into account and give guidance to his followers. 
I hope my research can pave the way for them.46 
Anyone familiar with Islamic jurisprudence will know that it is meaningless to 
believe that Prophet Mohammad did not ask women to cover their hair and head, 
and at the same time to believe that covering head and hair is compulsory for 
Muslims in contemporary societies. I suggest that Torkashvand’s hesitation to state 
clearly that Islamic hijab did not and should not include covering the head and the 
hair stems from conservative pragmatic concerns. Publicly taking such a stance in 
Iran could turn out to be very costly for him, as it did in the case of Eshkevari and 
Ghabel (who were both sentenced to prison and banned from wearing the official 
dress of Shia clerics in public).  
Since most Muslim women wear a scarf, one might assume that the statements about 
hijab in the Quran or the hadith refer to the type of hijab we see amongst women 
today. But according to Torkashvand, this is not always the case. The words that the 
jurists use to refer to head-coverings had different meanings at that time. It is the 
researcher’s responsibility to find out what those words meant at the time of 
Prophet Mohammad. For example, Torkashvand states that the headscarf, which is 
used to cover all hair today, did not have the same function at the time of Prophet 
Mohammad. At that time, the function of headscarf was to provide protection from 
the sunshine: it covered the head but some hair was exposed. Torkashvand (2010) 
argues that at the time of the Prophet Mohammad, the scarf was a sign of social class, 
prestige, and privilege, rather than an act of religious devotion.  
In Torkashvand’s view, we cannot conclude that today’s conventional hijab is vajeb 
(compulsory) based on the Quran and hadith. He provides historical evidence for all 
the claims he makes. His outstanding book is a turning point for views on hijab, and 
it is different from all other works that have been published by someone coming 
from howze. Because the writer has lived all his life in Iran and is from a religious 
background, his novel work has become more influential amongst religious and 
pious Iranians. The book did not receive permission to be published in Iran. The PDF 
                                                        
46 Interview with Amir Hossein Torkashvand 16/1/2013 
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file, however, was distributed widely on the Internet, and it has received many 
comments and both positive and negative feedback. Personally, reading this book 
was a turning point for my own view on hijab, and it was one of the main inspirations 
for this research.  
Interestingly, all the mujtahids I interviewed that hold different views about hijab 
compared to the rest of the jurists have experienced living in a Western country. In 
my view, this has allowed them to see the issue of hijab from the perspective of lived 
experience and multiple contingent perspectives. In the case of Ahmad Ghabel, he 
spent a long time outside Iran in Tajkistan. Tajikistan is a country with a majority of 
Muslim population where ‘Islamic’ laws do not define the dress code of women. In 
this sense, Ghabel was also exposed to how religiosity of women could be related to 
their dress code. 
 
Abul-Ghasem Fanaei 
Fanaei is a prominent and influential Iranian Muslim intellectual who is both a Qom 
educated mujtahid and a moral philosopher. He graduated from the University of 
Sheffield in the United Kingdom. He has been a close friend, and during the past five 
years we have discussed many hijab-related issues in detail. I interviewed him twice 
specifically for this thesis.  
As I mentioned earlier, religious authorities give their fatwa47 on hijab on the basis 
of the Quran and the Sunnah (tradition). Fanaei argues that one cannot conclude that 
hijab meant covering the whole body except for the hands and face in all places and 
times on the basis of two verses in the Quran. According to Fanaei, the hijab verses 
in the Quran have two connotations. Firstly, they ask practicing Muslim believers 
not to show off (tabarroj) to attract the sexual attention of men other than their 
                                                        
47  Fatwa is a technical term meaning the jurist’s legal judgment on specific topics in Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
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mahrams.48 Secondly, they articulate that hijab’s main function is to protect women 
from men’s harassment and to keep them safe when they go outside.  
Both connotations lead to the conclusion that hijab cannot mean the same thing in 
different times and places. For example, if you are in Spain, wearing a bikini by the 
sea might not be seen as showing off or be a danger to women’s safety. In other 
places, not wearing a scarf could make women stand out and also make them unsafe. 
Therefore, unlike most Shia jurists, Fanaei believes that hijab does not have a fixed 
and inflexible limitation, and that people who live in different parts of the world can 
have different ways of practicing hijab. He asserts that we cannot label hijab as one 
predefined mode of covering. 
Another important hijab-related idea Fanaei mentioned was on the topic of 
Motahari’s discourse on hijab. Fanaei believes that Motahari’s discourse on hijab 
was very different from that of his predecessors in howze. Before Motahari, jurists 
saw hijab practice as a devotional act that should not be questioned but only obeyed. 
Motahari, in contrast, introduced a new interpretation of hijab in which, instead of 
a devotional practice, hijab was seen as a rational practice serving positive moral 
and social goals. Fanaei regards Motahari’s discourse on hijab as an essential 
springboard for a new understanding of hijab with important consequences: 
The first consequence of seeing hijab practice as a rational act and 
talking about the philosophy of hijab, as protection is that Motahari 
indirectly says that hijab is not an end itself. It is a mean to an end. 
Therefore if we see hijab practice as covering the whole body except 
hands and face as a mean to the end of having protection, this could 
change in a different context. The second consequence of Motahari’s 
discourse of hijab as protection and not limitation is that in other 
parts of the world it could be the other way around. For example, it 
might not bring protection for women in the United States, and even 
this form of hijab could be a limitation for them. Thirdly, if we accept 
Motahari’s philosophy of hijab, the form of hijab should vary in 
                                                        
48 Mahrams include a woman’s husband and all male relatives with whom marriage is forbidden i.e. 
father, son, brother, uncle, father-in-law, nephew, grandfather, etc. 
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different times and places, and it should be a woman’s own decision 
what to cover and how to cover in order to be comfortable and 
protected. For example, in London if you wear something which is not 
called Islamic, you still are protected.  
Another consequence of seeing hijab, as protection is that wearing it 
is a right for women and not a duty, unlike what we have in Shia fiqh, 
which says that hijab is a duty compulsory for all Muslim women. 
According to the points I raised, seeing hijab as protection can have 
many consequences that can transform the actual shape of hijab 
practice in Shia fiqh.49 
A number of scholars have argued that hijab practice is empowering for women, as 
they are not then seen as sex objects (Bullock, 2002; Kariapper, 2009; Mahmood, 
2004). Viewing the lack of veil as being directly related to the sexual objectification 
of women presents a problem here. What is very critical to note here (and as we 
shall see, traces of it can also be found in Fanaei’s approach) is the male-dominated 
mentality. Therefore, correlation of empowerment with veiling is yet again 
problematic here if it fails to take into account the mode of knowledge production 
which gives life and direction to this debate. 
 
According to Fanaei, hijab practice in Shia fiqh and Hadith does not mean that they 
have promoted women from sex objects to individuals with equal rights. Fanaei 
believes that what is in the Hadith makes women available only for their husbands, 
and the status of women remains the same. The Quran and Hadith are 1400 years 
old. According to him, by pre-modern standards, they could even be seen as feminist 
approaches in that context. However, he believes that ulama have still remained the 
same, and that one cannot claim that the hijab rule in fiqh is empowering for women 
in the modern world. Fanaei further mentioned that hijab verses in the Quran only 
                                                        
49 Interview with Abul-Ghasem Fanaei 8/4/2013 
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address practicing believers (momenun) and not all women in Islamic countries. 
Obviously, not all members of a society are practicing and pious believers.  
There are two points to be made here, in the context of what Fanaei suggests. The 
first one is the issue of ‘availability’ of women. This idea is closely connected to a 
woman’s body and the sexual aspect of her life. The perception beneath this 
approach is that a veiled woman is indeed restricting her sexual availability by way 
of wearing the veil. If indeed any woman can set her bodily and sexual boundaries 
in different forms not only through the veil, the point about availability becomes 
moot and the veil itself would then be nothing more than an element to assert an 
identity. The next point is yet again about connecting this dress code with faith: a 
woman who is addressed in such a manner is categorised among ‘practicing 
believers’. There is a very strong assumption here that being a believer and being a 
‘practicing’ one is closed tied to dress code. The male mentality of the jurists cannot 
yet envisage a woman who can assertively choose to veil or unveil (in various 
degrees) but keep her modesty and ethical integrity. Being practising seems to be 
interrelated to wearing the veil for a woman while it does not ever seem a factor for 
the assessment of a man’s faith. This subtle point reflects how even in progressive 
forms of jurisprudence traces of the same mentality, albeit in much less aggressive 
forms, persist. 
Nonetheless, we must bear in mind that compared to more restrictive approaches, 
Fanaei’s views provide more space for Iranian women. These ideas distance Fanaei 
from mainstream Shia jurists. Fanaei’s discourse has already influenced many 
Iranian women in London. The growing readership of works by Fanaei and related 
scholars promises to spread these ideas on hijab amongst hijabi women in Iran. 
Fanaei lives in the UK and gives regular lectures at Mahfel Vali, a centre for Muslim 
Iranians in London, which I described in detail in Chapter Four. 
Mohsen Kadivar 
Kadivar is one of the most prominent and influential Muslim intellectuals of Iran. As 
a Mujtahid educated in Qom, he wears the traditional clerical clothing (aba va 
ammame). He has conducted extensive research on hijab and has published articles 
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on this subject. A number of my interviewees in London asserted that their practice 
of hijab had been influenced by his writings, so I arranged to interview him. 
In his articles on hijab, Kadivar talks about the various sources of the hijab rule in 
fiqh, and explores each of them in detail (Kadivar, 2012). According to Kadivar, there 
are two types of ijtihad. The first type is ‘traditional ijtihad’ upon which the current 
howze system of education and Marjas ijtihad is based. The second type, which 
Kadivar supports, is ‘ijtihad in principles and fundamentals’. Both types of ijtihad 
have been used to issue fatwas on hijab. According to traditional ijtihad, dominant 
in Shia fiqh today, hijab means covering all parts of the body except for the hands 
and face. Kadivar asserted that all contemporary senior Marjas have issued this 
fatwa on the basis of traditional ijtihad. They believe that the Quran functions 
exactly like a book of law, and that whatever it says applies in the same way at all 
times and places.  
On the other hand, those (like Kadivar himself) who believe in ijtihad in principles 
and fundamentals do not see the Quran as a book of law, but as a source or reference 
for jurisprudential reasoning. According to this type of ijtihad, what is written in the 
Quran is not necessarily applicable at all times and places. A “cultural transition” 
that remains loyal to the spiritual objectives and teachings of the Quran is needed. 
For example, the verse allowing men to have more than one wife might not be 
applicable to contemporary Muslims. At the time of the Prophet Mohammad, this 
rule actually limited men, compared to the sexual freedom they enjoyed before 
becoming Muslim. It was a step forward, making sexual relationships more moral 
and just. This does not, however, mean that today men should still be allowed to 
have more than one wife. Today, moral jurisprudence of relationships and marriage 
requires men not to have more than one wife. The status of women at the time of the 
Prophet Mohammad was enhanced by these rules, but the religious authorities have 
still remained in the same place as they were 1400 years ago (as Kadivar says), and 
they present an Islam that is criticised for being incompatible with women’s rights. 
I would like to add one more qualification to this claim. Indeed, religious authorities 
may have moved away from 1400 years. If we look at Mernissi (1991) and Amer 
(2014), we can visibly see that, religious authorities have actually added further 
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restrictions that really did not exist in the tribal and patriarchal community of the 
time of the Prophet. This shift is primarily due to socio-political shifts.  
According to Kadivar, there is a specific minimum limit of covering for all Muslim 
women in all places and times, be that today, 100 years ago, or in the future. 
Torkashvand argued that at the Prophet Mohammad’s time it was compulsory 
(vajeb) to cover from the neck to the knees, and on the basis of this argument, 
Kadivar believes that the minimum boundaries of hijab remain the same. Women 
must cover from the neck to the knees. Depending on context, the rest of the body 
should also be covered to the degree necessary to remain protected and modest. It 
is not always necessary to cover one’s head. For example, he mentioned that it might 
not be necessary for Muslim women who live in Western countries to cover their 
heads, because wearing a scarf is not common. The argument revolved around the 
point of making women stand out in a society whose norms are different. By 
standing out as a result of a difference in dress code, following the line of Kadivar’s 
argument, they would attract more attention to them which would compromise 
their ‘protection’ as such. 
Kadivar believes that traditional ijtihad cannot lead to any fatwa on hijab other than 
what we have in our mainstream fiqh today. He even criticised Ahmad Ghabel’s 
ijtihad on hijab practice because, according to him, Ghabel had issued this fatwa 
within the framework of ‘traditional ijtihad’. Kadivar does not consider Ghabel’s 
argument (which is based on hadiths on hijab for praying [setre salati]) to be strong. 
Kadivar argues that in order to present new interpretations of hijab in fiqh, one 
should work within the realm of ‘ijtihad in principles and fundamentals’. He 
asserted: 
I agree with the outcome of Ghabel and Torkashvand’s view on hijab, 
but I do not approve of their process and reasoning because it is 
based on traditional ijtihad. In this case, one should start by 
introducing a new discourse on the equality of women and men, 
based on which new fatwas can be issued on hijab.50 
                                                        
50 Interview with Mohsen Kadivar 9/5/2013. 
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In general, Kadivar believes that the limit of covering for hijab varies from time to 
time and place to place. At the time of the Prophet Mohammad, hijab was a privilege 
for Muslim women, to protect them from men’s harassment. Today, women 
everywhere might not need it to be protected (through placing limitations on their 
dress code). He stated that women could cover only the essential parts (from neck 
to knee) in places where it is neither uncommon nor unchaste to uncover the head 
and hair. Otherwise, it is better for women to cover their head when the norm of the 
society is to cover. 
As we can see even in the case of Kadivar, hijab is not seen as neutral issue. It forms 
the centre of all debates about women. Jusrists such as Kadivar and Ghable keep 
debating about the limits of it. It is about making it more flexible and more conducive 
to the new contexts in which these women are living. The fact that this concern 
about women’s dress code is inherently related to modesty and ethical values poses 
a challenge that even though people like Kadivar and Ghable have taken significant 
steps to surpass, they still seem reluctant to confront the problem head on. 
Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari 
Eshkevari is also a prominent reformist Iranian cleric, intellectual and mujtahid. 
Eshkevari was the first cleric to publicly critique compulsory hijab at the Berlin 
conference (2000). This led to his imprisonment after returning to Iran. He has also 
published several articles on topics related to the hermeneutics of Islam and 
differing interpretations of Islamic law, including on hijab. 
His view on hijab51 can be summarised in three main separate but interconnected 
points. First, he believes that we should determine whether hijab is justified on the 
basis of the Quran. After scrutinising all words in the Quran that relate to hijab and 
evaluating their meaning at the time, he found that the common use of hijab in Shia 
fiqh was not based on Quranic evidence. Eshkevari believes that we cannot attest 
that covering the head is vajeb (compulsory) based on the Quran. 
                                                        
51 By hijab, Eshkevari means covering everywhere except for hands and face, and he uses the term 
particularly when referring to covering the hair and neck. 
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Secondly, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that the common 
interpretation of hijab is based on the Quran, it would nonetheless not be a fixed and 
unchangeable law. In order to elaborate this point, Eshkevari said that Islamic law 
has two different types of laws. The first are ‘devotional laws’, like daily prayers, 
fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca. The second are ‘social laws’, like laws about 
inheritance, slavery, marriage, war, hijab, and many others. Social laws have 
changed in different times and are not fixed in the same way that devotional laws 
are. He believes that hijab law is a ‘social law’ and not a ‘devotional law’, meaning 
that it can change from period to period and place to place, regardless of how it was 
described in the Quran.  
Thirdly, even were hijab both based on Quran and a devotional or unchangeable 
Islamic law, there is absolutely no Islamic basis to believe that one has the right to 
compel others to observe the law by force, as the current Iranian government does. 
Eshkevari states that he is committed to the principles of Islam, and at the same time 
he believes that many Islamic laws like hijab are changeable. He mentions six 
reasons in his human rights article (Eshkevari, 2010) to argue that the social laws 
of Islam can change.  
Eshkevari emphasised that we should justify hijab rationally. In his view, there are 
at least two important reasons for hijab: firstly, the requirements of the virtue of 
modesty, and secondly, requirements of identity. According to him, the issue of 
identity falls outside the realm of religion, and modesty does not necessarily require 
covering the head and neck. It can be achieved differently in contemporary 
societies—especially in places like Europe, where the headscarf is not common. 
Unlike many jurists, he believes that a woman can be modest and at the same time 
not cover her hair. As we can see here, Eshkevari engages with the issue not simply 
in jurisprudential terms but also in more rational terms. The issue of the veil in and 
by itself does not seem to signify anything integral to a woman’s religious practice 
or faith here. 
Eshkevari also mentioned that the work Torkashvand and Ghabel have done on 
hijab is very valuable and novel. He said: 
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While I was in prison because of the Berlin Conference, Ahmad 
Ghabel spoke out about his view on hijab. Ghabel believed that 
covering the head and neck is not vajeb (compulsory) for Muslim 
women: it is only mustahab 52 . I told him: “I only criticised the 
compulsion of hijab by the government, and not the rule of hijab 
itself, and they wanted to execute me for it, so imagine what they will 
do to you!” Ahmad Ghabel laughed and said, “People like you have 
paved the way for us.”53 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the broader historical context of hijab in Iran, in order to 
understand how the concept and practice of hijab has changed over time. The two 
most significant turning points—Reza Shah’s unveiling order and the compulsory 
hijab after the 1979 revolution—have had the most profound implications on 
women’s hijab in Iran. A number of scholars (including Sadeghi, 2013) have gone so 
far as to claim that the second transformation was an unintended consequence of 
the first. 
Neither the unveiling order of Reza Shah nor the compulsory hijab after the 1979 
Revolution responded to the demands of the majority of Iranian women. Both 
developments significantly changed the situation for women, but not as chosen by 
women themselves. These policies were, in practice, imposing male domination and 
structuring power relations.  
A noteworthy unintended consequence of the second transformation (compulsory 
hijab in post-1980 Iran) has been the rise of a new stream of Shia scholars who have 
re-interpreted and re-examined the jurisprudential evidence for the limits of hijab. 
But as I noted earlier, these new responses were not only with regard to hijab; there 
were more complex socio-political factors at stake which were closely contected 
with shifts in the power structure of Iran’s politics. It is in this context that some 
                                                        
52 See note 44 
53 Interview with Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari 29/4/2013 
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clerics now argue that covering the head and hear is not vajeb (compulsory) in the 
Islamic law. 
Mohsen Kadivar, Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, Abul-Ghasem Fanaei, and Amir 
Torkashvand, all of whom I interviewed for this thesis, are the most prominent 
figures in this new stream of revisionism in Shia hijab jurisprudence. What remains 
to be noted here is that none of these scholars actively or explicitly identified with 
feminism or even Islamic feminism, but as we can note in the works of Iranian 
feminists, there is an overlap between the arguments and position of these scholars 
and those of Muslim feminists. The overlap has not resulted in an explicit alliance or 
convergence in the public and social space of Muslim reformist jurists and scholars 
and Muslim feminists as such. One of the reasons is probably due to the climate in 
which secular Iranian feminists monopolise some of the avenues identified for 
women’s rights. But, be that as it may, the fact remain that this convergence is not 
explicit and clear. Not yet. 
 The new wave of Islamic feminism in the jurisprudence of hijab has had a major 
effect on the choice of hijab for many of the interviewees in this research, and 
understanding it is an essential part of understanding their motivations and 
experiences. But I have not been able to identify women among them. What is 
viewed by a version of ‘Islamic feminism’ seems to be referring to the different views 
of these scholars and jurists rather than an emerging repertoire of Muslim women’s 
voices themselves. 
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Chapter Four: The Iranian Diaspora in London 
The phrase ‘Iranian diaspora in London’ describes a wide variety of people who have 
migrated to London at different times and for different reasons. In this chapter, after 
examining the use of the term ‘diaspora’, I describe the Iranian community centres 
that I engaged with and that my informants attended most frequently. I explore the 
implications of this discussion for my ethnographic fieldwork as well as the common 
features that the diaspora communities share in their treatment of hijab and their 
opinions on its compulsory use in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution. 
The meaning of the word diaspora varies strikingly depending on historical context. 
According to Helly (2007, p. 3), the term ‘diaspora’ originally meant loss, or being 
cut off, and it had a negative connotation. After Jews settled in Palestine, the meaning 
of the word changed to encompass the gathering of all Jews in one place. In the 
nineteenth century, with the establishment of the nation state, the term ‘diaspora’ 
again took on a negative connotation, signifying exile and displacement 
(Marienstras, 1989), because a nation state implied the superiority of an ethnic 
group (Helly, 2007). According to Tololyan (1996), after 1970 the term ‘diaspora’ 
referred to a population living outside their homeland. After 1980, diaspora had a 
positive implication, and it was used to define all forms of migration of different 
communities.  
Regarding the definition of diaspora, Helly argues that: 
The term diaspora seems to embody the fate of a number of non-
European individuals who have emigrated to or been displaced to the 
Western world, as it overlooks national borders and evokes an 
experience of victimization, the will to endure, and a strong sense of 
solidarity. (Helly, 2007, p. 5) 
Early uses of the term ‘diaspora’ conveyed a mix of forced and voluntary migration 
that Nicholas Van Hear characterises as follows: 
First, the population is dispersed from a homeland to two or more 
territories. Second, the presence abroad is enduring, although exile is 
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not necessarily permanent, but may include movement between the 
homeland and a new host. And third, there is some kind of 
exchange—social, economic, political, or cultural—between or 
amongst the spatially separated populations comprising the 
diaspora. (1998, p. 6)  
The diaspora is characterised by the political, social, and cultural connections 
formed through the intersection of spaces: the place of residence and the place of 
origin (Kalra et al., 2005, p. 2).  
Perhaps the description that Karim H. Karim (2003) provides is a little more 
nuanced in this regard: 
‘Diaspora’ is derived from the Greek diaspeirein , which suggests the 
scattering of seeds. The term has traditionally referred to the Jewish 
dispersal outside Israel but is now applied to a growing list of migratory 
groups. Research on diaspora is conducted from numerous academic 
perspectives including anthropology, sociology, human geography, 
migration, culture, race, multiculturalism, postcolonialism, political economy 
and communication. (2003, p. 1) 
There are at least two approaches to using diaspora as a concept in the social 
sciences. One approach is to treat the term as a descriptive tool that is useful for 
categorization and its implications. The other is to treat diaspora as a process, and 
to criticize the essentialism involved in the categorical approach (Kalra et al., 2005). 
My approach to the Iranian diaspora in London combines the two approaches above. 
I find the term descriptively useful, but believe it is essential to break through 
conventional views of diaspora and its features. 
The majority of research on the Iranian diaspora has taken place in USA, Germany, 
Turkey, Canada, Japan and Australia (see Bafekr & Leman 1999; Kamalkhani 1998; 
Bauer 1991; Harbottle 2004; Nassehi-Behnam 2000). Literature on the Iranian 
diaspora in London is sparse (but see Spellman 2004; Mcauliffe 2007; Sreberny 
2000). Academic work on the Iranian diaspora covers different topics that are 
relevant to the process of adaptation and to identity issues in the host culture (see 
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Kamalkhani 1998; Sreberny 2000; Ansari 1988; Harbottle 2004; Biparva 1994; 
Kelley & Friedlander 1993; Chaichian 1997). A number of studies on diasporic 
communities in Western countries show that religiosity is heightened by the process 
of immigration (see Bruce, 1996; Halliday, 2003; Mandel, 1990).  
Origins of the Iranian Diaspora in London 
According to Spellman (2004) the first wave of Iranian immigrants came to the 
United Kingdom before the 1979 Islamic revolution primarily to undertake higher 
education. A second wave of immigrants arrived after the Islamic revolution. These 
individuals were either forced to leave Iran, or left voluntarily because of the regime 
change. Many Iranians in this group came to London for work or higher education; 
however, some came to the UK and stayed as refugees. 
Spellman specifies that there were at least three groups who came out of Iran after 
the Iranian revolution that are part of the Iranian diaspora in London. The first is 
the Monarchists, composed of individuals who supported the Shah’s regime and 
were primarily members of the Shah’s government, members of the military, or 
bankers. This population is currently mostly located in the USA. The second group 
were Mujahedin who opposed the Shah’s regime ten years before the 1979 
revolution. After the revolution they were suppressed by the clerics. In 1981, 
Mujahedin started an armed struggle against the new Islamic Republic and 
assassinated many leaders of the revolution. The third group is made up of leftist 
groups like the Tudeh party that were established long before the revolution and 
were also suppressed by the authorities because of their Marxist tendencies. 
Spellman’s research into the diaspora is, however, much more comprehensive as 
she covers various other groups which do not fit into any of these categories. These 
groups include different Sufi orders (2004, pp. 103-146)and converts to Christianity 
(2004, 147-206) In her work, Spellman focusses on the functions of various religious 
and cultural rituals that the diasporic Iranian communities in London are involved 
in, including those of the Baha’is, Zoroastrians, the Shahmaghsoudi Sufi order and 
the Armenians. 
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Spellman’s typology is useful, but is not concerned with issues of dress code in the 
direct and specific manner that I am doing in this research. The groups discussed 
are not the focus of this research. My informants are drawn from a different group 
that I describe in detail in the section on Iranian diaspora in London. 
The way diasporic communities in London relate to issues of modernity and 
secularism shapes the kind of approaches one may have to the issues of practicing 
Islam or finding it integral to one’s identity. In the section below, I provide a critical 
reading of Reza Gholami’s recent work which deals with the secularity of the Iranian 
diaspora and the new concept he proposes for assessing the situation. 
The ‘Islamicness’ of Diasporic Communities 
The presence of Muslims in ‘secular societies’ presents a challenge to the moral 
world they inhabit. Concerns about preserving or maintaining the moral 
constitutions of their lives, has further pushed Muslim communities in the 
diaspora, not necessarily in lesser ways that those at home, to re-negotiate and re-
assess their ways or relating to the cosmologies, epistemologies and peculiarities 
of their religious and cultural backgrounds. 
 
The case of Iranian Muslims in Britain, and in particular that of Iranian Muslim 
women in London, is closely connected to how ‘secularism’ and ‘secular’ concepts 
or values are viewed, challenged or aligned with their religious affiliations. 
In his study of Muslim Iranian diasporic communities in Britain, Reza Gholami 
(2014, 2015) looks at the case of Shi’a Iranian Muslims and proposes a new 
concept in order to make sense of how these diasporic communities make sense of 
challenges of a secular society. Gholami coins the term “non-Islamiosity” to capture 
what he considers a new sphere of interaction with secular societies. Gholami’s 
research is based on a case study of Shi’a Iranians whose boundaries of religious 
and national identities often blur or seem blurred in the research he has 
conducted. 
 
In his earlier work (2014), Gholami describes two angles of approaching the issue: 
one which “often antagonistically polarises ‘the secular (West)’ and ‘diasporic 
Muslims’” and the other “acknowledges that some Muslims are ‘cultural’ or 
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‘secular’ and studies how they often (but to varying degrees) negotiate, sometimes 
strategically, between their religious/cultural and other (secular) identities” 
(Gholami 2014, p. 61). 
 
Gholami’s point of departure rests in very broad definitions of both secularism and 
Islam. In describing ‘secular’, he suggests that it “refers to modern discourses, 
knowledge and sensibilities rooted in European Christendom which define, 
problematise and redefine ‘religion’” (p. 61). Unlike Gholami’s rather linear 
narrative of secularism, Zubaida (2011) is more detailed and theoretically more 
nuanced. Zubaida, unlike Gholami, identifies the connections between secularism, 
capitalism in Western Europe and its institutions: 
 
New institutions and practices, products of modern economic and technical 
developments, of transport and communication, media, sports, arts and 
entertainment, all arose without reference to religion or its institutions. 
This is a process that many historians and sociologists have called 
‘secularization’. (Zubaida 2011, pp. 2-3) 
 
This approach is, of course, clearly different from the way Gholami contextualises 
the case of diasporic communities. Instead of redefining ‘religion’ as such, the 
general direction of secular tendencies is to marginalise or eliminate any reference 
to religion and God in the public sphere. In reality, of course, it doesn’t happen in 
such clear-cut terms, though. Gholami, however, continues to argue that the 
common perceptions he refers to are not sufficient for understanding what he calls 
“Muslim modes of secularism” (p. 61). 
 
One of the important contributions of Ghalmi’s work is how he suggest the idea of 
multiple secularism even though it is not always consistently carried forward in 
his work. He notes that: 
 
…notions of an autonomous/free self are shaped not just by Western 
liberal-secular sensibilities, but predominantly with reference to other 
discourses, histories and sensibilities - they are in simultaneous connection 
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and dialogue with multiple times and places, not least those of the 
‘homeland’. (p. 62) 
 
Here, he actually does move away from peculiarising autonomy and free self and 
making them exclusive to Western liberal-secular societies. However, despite his 
awareness of these multiple modes of engaging with secularism, when it comes to 
Islam, particularly in diasporic communities in the UK, he sounds rather 
categorical, when he describes his concept of ‘non-Islamiosity’: “non-Islamiosity is 
about the ways in which some London Iranians from Shi’a backgrounds construct, 
experience and live diasporic identity, community and consciousness by 
deliberately moving away from or against any notion of Islam - and only Islam” (p. 
63) (the emphasis is mine). The various examples Gholami provides based on his 
cases study, includes how these Shi’a Iranian Muslims combine not only Iranian 
national customs and traditions with ‘non-Islamic’ practices such as drinking 
alcohol, dancing, not wearing the veil but also certain (‘cultural’ and) ‘Islamic’ 
practices which mainly deal with rituals as part of their ‘non-Islamiosity’ (see his 
narrative about a party he has gone to witnessing the curious combination of wine-
drinking with recitation of salawat; p. 65). 
 
The term ‘non-Islamious’ requires critical problematisation but I will first try to 
see how Gholami views this condition or position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. In 
providing some reasons for this shift, Gholami says: 
 
As there is generally strong antipathy within the non-Islamious section of 
the Iranian diaspora towards Iran’s Islamic government, which is blamed 
for Iranians’ dispersal, non-Islamiosity is at one level a strategy for turning 
feelings of suffering, loss and forced dispersion into agentive sentiments of 
resistance, dissidence and community (nation) building and unification. (p. 
64) 
 
The role of dissatisfaction with the dominant policies of the Islamic Republic is 
critical here. However, even though Gholami focusses on a pool of informants who 
seem to endorse or confirm his hypothesis about the ‘non-Islamious’ 
126 
 
characteristics of these people, he fails to provide the narrative of a similarly 
dissatisfied diaspora who do not define themselves in exactly these terms. Here, I 
have assumed that this description is accurate enough to legitimise the term itself. 
As he further elaborates on his point, he suggests that “rather than being about 
‘becoming secular’ as an end in itself, non-Islamiosity is a means by which 
individual and social consciousness are ‘freed’ from Islamic theological, 
cosmological and eschatological doctrines” (p. 64). There are literally no examples 
of ‘theological’, ‘cosmological’ or ‘eschatological’ doctrines he refers to; what we 
find is exclusively about rituals, which fall under a lower category of 
jurisprudential rulings. The fact that someone can drink alcohol or dance at parties 
does not in and by itself signal a shift from cosmology or theology. It requires a 
much more conscious engagement with these concepts rather than a disregard, a 
rejection or even re-negotiation of rituals at this level. 
 
It is ironic that at the end of his narrative about the party, Gholami speaks about 
“the freedom to use salawat as a ‘toasting word’, for example, being gratefully 
aware that, in Iran, you would have been executed for doing so” (p. 66). He is 
probably referring to the perception of the people who would do this who 
exaggerate about the reactions to this practice. Regardless of what one might 
assume about the Islamic Republic, there is no law in Iran or even in jurisprudence 
that would lead to someone’s executing for drinking alcohol or using the salawat 
lightly. Such observations about Gholami’s approach to the issue may sound minor 
and pedantic but the perception runs throughout the entire narrative. 
In discussing how some of these Iranian women speak amongst themselves about 
what to wear and not to wear, Gholami notes that “the aim was to get as close as 
possible to the boundaries of religious acceptability without transgressing them. 
But this also involved a meticulous exercise in Islamic hermeneutics, which could 
sometimes result in the boundaries being slightly redrawn” (p. 73). Again as in the 
case of his reference to cosmology and theology, it is not exactly clear how these 
women would think of ‘Islamic hermeneutics’ and a ‘meticulous’ one for that 
matter. It seems that Gholami has read too much into these narratives at points. 
Gholami proposes a different term to capture the variations of practices among the 
informants of his study. Instead of using ‘tactics’, ‘strategies’ or ‘negotiations’, he 
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uses the term ‘concession’ referring to an act of actively giving something away – 
something that is dear or important to the person. Here, he contrasts concession 
with agency:  
 
By deploying tactics, then, Muslims use secular structures and sensibilities 
to enhance their agency - and, in so doing, reproduce but also refashion 
them… Concessions, therefore, are not a means to enhance agency; they are 
a constant source of anxiety, doubt and guilt. (p. 76) 
 
What Gholami fails to consider is that there are sensibilities and imaginaries 
among certain Muslims – be they diasporic or inhabiting their homelands – that 
allow the person to push these boundaries without having feelings of anxiety, 
doubt or guilt as such. Examples about in literature from medieval periods in 
poetry and various humanist and literary writings which challenge such notions 
(see Zubaida 2011, pp. 17-25 where he specifically discusses consumption of 
alcohol, issues of sexuality and gender, and homosexuality). 
 
One of the key observations to be noted about Gholami’s work is that even though 
it times he puts Islam in quotations (and the very title of his article signals a shift 
from unitary readings), indeed he reproduces the same category in a different 
form. He deliberately uses the term ‘non-Islamious’ to move away from 
‘Islamicness’ in any sense.  Zubaida has lucidly illustrated this point: 
 
The discourse of difference is reinforced by the practice of attaching the 
adjective ‘Islamic’ to a wide range of aspects of the histories and cultures of 
the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and India, each encompassing a 
wide diversity, as well as differing from the others. We have ‘Islamic 
history’, ‘Islamic art’, ‘Islamic science’, ‘Muslim society’… and many other 
such usages. (Zubaida 2011, p. 23) 
 
Zubaida scrutinises the essentialism at the heart of such appellations and proceeds 
to say: 
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The term implies that those regions have Islam as their essence, and 
confirms their otherness from the ‘Christian’ West. Yet this ‘West’ is hardly 
ever given the adjective ‘Christian’ with regard to its history, art, science 
and so on. So, the history of Europe and its offshoots is not ‘Christian 
history’, even though Christianity and its churches play prominent parts in 
it. (pp. 23-24) 
As we can see, Zubaida’s point so vividly resembles Abu-Lughod’s objections when 
she challenges about what ‘Islam’ prescribes for women (Abu-Lughod 2002). The 
same critical reflection can be traced differently in Shahab Ahmed’s work (2015), 
What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic. The narrative that Ahmed (2015, 
pp. 3-4) gives of a Muslim man drinking wine and his encounter with a European 
philosopher is particularly revealing and quite at odds with how Gholami 
describes his ‘non-Islamiosity’. 
 
To be fair, one has to admit that Gholami’s work is probably not about more 
philosophical and epistemological issues surround definitions or interpretations of 
Islam (even though he specifically mentions terminologies such as cosmology and 
hermeneutics). He has tried to make sense to how the practices of these diasporic 
communities are ‘different’ from one would typically assume to be ‘Islamic’. There 
is, however, an element of over-simplification here which overlooks not only the 
complex mentalities of human beings and the cultural elements in their lives, but 
also takes for granted what might indeed have much deeper roots that do not 
necessarily owe their entire explanation to the rise of the Islamic Republic as a 
political entity. 
 
If one pursues that areas that Shahab Ahmed covers in his book, it is perhaps 
pertinent to ask: who do we consider a practicing Muslim? This question has been 
challenging to me and this thesis too. In a more specific sense, one can ask: who do 
we consider a practicing Muslim woman? What is it that gives legitimacy or 
validity to ‘practice’? Is it simply alignment with rigid and fixed rituals and 
customs? If someone negotiates or pushes the boundaries of these practices, can 
we legitimately describe them as ‘secular’ or ‘non-Islamious’ and attributed the 
shift to political circumstances alone? 
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Interrogating the concept of a ‘pure’ Islam, Zubaida (2011) argues that “Islam as a 
distinct culture, then, is illusory”. This does not necessarily lead to Islam being a 
completely arbitrary notion with such loose abstraction that anyone can attribute 
anything to it. There are certain constants in it: “As a religion it has certain 
constants, such as the holy book and the belief in the unity of God and the 
prophethood of Muhammad. But even these constants are constructed through a 
variety of discourses and practices enshrined in differing institutions” (p. 9). As we 
can see, building on how Zubaida problematizes the issue of ‘Islam’ (and also 
Ahmed 2015, pp. 113-175), the idea of being a ‘practicing’ Muslim (woman) is 
subject to similar considerations and qualifications. Therefore, it must be noted 
here that even though while reporting findings of the research and quoting from 
my informants, I do use the term ‘practicing’ but it is by no means a fixed, rigid and 
concrete notion. It is always subject to change, even though certain basic constants 
may remain the same. 
 
One of the other issues which surface in passing in Gholami’s work is the issue of 
citizenship in liberal societies. In pointing out the gap in literature, Gholami notes 
that following the arguments of existing literature: “Secular Muslims can never 
become full members of secular (white) Western society; they will never gain 
‘complete’ citizenship (in a more qualitative sense of the word), whether they want 
to or not, whether they know it or not.” (p. 67). The topic is extensively covered in 
Andrew March’s recent work (2009), Islam and Liberal Citizenship in which he 
challenges the very foundations of the above claim. Indeed, the very claim that 
even if Muslims wanted, they would not be able to gain complete citizenship 
sounds too far-fetched. However, the way Gholami challenges the argument or at 
least tries to open a new avenue, does not seem to do full justice to the issue as he 
does not consider at a critical level theories about citizenship, and questions of 
political theories the way March addresses. This is a secondary note on Gholami’s 
work but living in liberal societies and dealing with challenges of citizenship does 
not seem to have a direct impact on the questions I am addressing in this thesis. 
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Iranian Diaspora in London 
According to the 2011 census in the UK, the number of Iranians living in London is 
36, 250. Gholami (2015, p. 85) provides a detailed breakdown of the number of 
Iranians in London based on the data from the census, with around 13,500 Iranians 
in the inner London area. The figures are not very accurate because there are 
Iranians who do not identify as Iranians or they have changed their names. This 
research relies on information and interviews with a small sample of Muslim Iranian 
women that I am describing below. 
In the recent past, many Iranians came to London for higher education (in the 
leading universities of this city) or due to their father’s job as an Iranian diplomat in 
England. Some diplomats’ children stayed after their father’s job finished. According 
to a recent claim by a member of Iranian Parliament, over 40054 sons and daughters 
of high-ranking prominent Iranian government officials are studying in England. A 
small number of Iranians entered the UK as political refugees, and therefore they 
cannot return to Iran. Iranians who became refugees do not usually go back to Iran 
due to fear of prosecution and the fact that the bad reputation of being an Iranian 
refugee and the consequent stigma can prohibit reintegration within the Iranian 
society. UK, compared to France, Germany, USA and Canada has been less receptive 
towards Iranian political dissidents, even in the course of the new wave of political 
asylum seeking of the Green Movement activists after the 2009 disputed 
presidential election. 
 As Sreberny (2000) and Mcauliffe (2007) also suggest, I argue that the Iranian 
diaspora in London does not necessarily represent a discrete community. Nor can 
we specify a section of the city for the Iranian community in London in the manner 
that Edgware Road is a hub for Arabs or Chinatown is for Chinese. The Iranian 
diaspora in London consists of multiple communities defined by interactions 
between national, religious, ethnic and linguistic identities (Mcauliffe, 2007). The 
multiplicity of these national and religious identities are vividly displayed in 
Spellman’s work (2004), also mentioned above. Like many other countries, Iran is 
                                                        
54 See http://goo.gl/X9uKPR 
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composed of different religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds. The majority is 
Shia Muslim, and Iranians with different backgrounds have their own groups and 
centres in the diaspora.  
We can recognise different features of the Iranian diaspora in London by examining 
the structure of the community around specific Iranian individuals. There are 
Iranians who try their best to stay away from other Iranians, while others interact 
primarily with Iranians (see also Gholami 2014). Other Muslim Iranians in the 
diaspora mostly engage with the non-Muslim community, while some engage with 
Muslim community. None of these markers could exclusively address the problem I 
am investigating in a distinct manner. Similar problems may indeed be found with 
any of these groups as far as it regards the agencies and choices of women and how 
male-dominated dichotomies and mentalities may indeed be deep-rooted among 
them. The cases that I am looking at are all grappling with these issues and the 
responses display the challenge at the heart of decisions to control their own dress 
code. 
As I mentioned earlier we cannot talk about the Iranian diaspora in London as a 
monolithic community because they do not live in a concentrated place and there 
are deep divisions among Iranians with different political and religious beliefs. This 
point, however, requires a further qualification. Even though there are visible 
political, religious and ideological differences, socially, Iranians from different 
backgrounds do interact on many occasions which includes conferences and social 
events. The overlaps in these categories blur the clear-cut distinctions which brings 
under question the religious-secular divide.  
Here I will focus on the group of Iranians that I have been working with in this 
research. The 40 women that I worked with were between the ages of 22 and 57 
with the median age of 30. They are all Shia Muslim, but not necessarily practicing. 
Most come from middle class families and are educated to tertiary level. A number 
of my informants were PhD students, some work in high-ranking jobs in London, 
some are housewives and some are job seekers. They came to London either for 
their own job, for their husband’s or father’s job, or for higher education. These 
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women come from different cities and ethnic backgrounds in Iran, but the majority 
are from the capital city, Tehran.  
All the women that I interviewed were born in and grew up in Iran. This is essential 
to my research because I am interested specifically in how the practice and 
perception of hijab changes in Iranian women who grew up in Iran when they come 
to London. For example, it was important to see how Iranian society, Iranian schools, 
media and families influenced the way women understand hijab and how this 
perception changes after they come to London.  
Being familiar with the history of hijab policies and hijab jurisprudence that I have 
explored in Chapter Three is essential in order to understand the context of hijab in 
Iran. Most of the works on Muslim women are done on second and third generation 
immigrants. These works deal with women who have were born in the West and 
grew up there, and their encounter with the realities, contingencies and challenges 
of the veil is therefore quite different from a person who has grown up in an Islamic 
country like Iran. Iranian media and public education produce their own discourse 
of hijab, and the resultant change in opinion about and practice of hijab after women 
emigrate from Iran and enter a new culture merits increased scrutiny.  
The diasporic Iranians I interviewed do not necessarily have long-term plans to stay 
in the UK. Some of the women may settle in the UK, but when I spoke to them they 
were not sure what they wanted to do. Many of the Iranians I interviewed do not 
feel sure of their position in British society because they do not know if they are 
going to stay or to go back to Iran. Their intentions are strongly dependent on the 
socio-political situation in Iran, which changed dramatically during the 2005-2013 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s term of presidency. A new wave of Iranian elites has 
travelled to Western countries for higher education and for work. Because they do 
not know when or if they want to go back to Iran, they may consider their situation 
temporary and may not try to build a community for themselves. Some informants 
said that when their children reach school age they hope to return to Iran, if the 
economic and political situation permits, because if they stay in the UK their children 
will become more British and less Iranian. Therefore, there is an increased sense of 
identity here: migration and citizenship bring about with themselves challenges that 
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could lead to the erosion of one identity and the development of a new one or at 
least one with newer elements in it. 
Unlike many other diasporic communities, Iranians in London are not centralised in 
any recognisable ‘Iranian town,’ although there are some areas that do 
accommodate more Iranians, such as Northwest and West London and Kensington. 
One possible explanation for the lack of centralisation is that, as mentioned above, 
Iranian immigrants may not have long-term plans to stay in London. Therefore, 
when they arrive, they do not seek out an Iranian community to join. Based on my 
interviews and experience, many Iranians prefer not to live in places that other 
Iranians do. My informants are mainly accommodated in areas near their university 
or workplace, and their priority has not been to find a place with more Iranians. 
Although they do not seek to live in a place with an Iranian community, they do visit 
Iranian centres.  
My interviews and personal observations suggest that the relatively more religious 
Iranians attend Iranian gatherings more frequently that the more secular Iranians 
in London. Most Iranian do not regularly attend the events of Iranian centres, but a 
large percentage of the relatively more religious Iranians do attend weekly or 
monthly religious gatherings in one of the diverse religious centres of Iranians in 
London. A comparative note is warranted here. 
None of these centres seem to play a significant role in the lives of Iranians in London 
when compared to the central role of the community gatherings of, for example, 
non-Iranian Khoja Shias or Ismailis in London. With regard to the Twelver Khoja 
Shias, it must be noted that even though they share a set of doctrines with Iranian 
Shias, their history and background is greatly different: being mainly from the 
subcontinent or East African origins they, like Ismailis, form a strong entrupreneural 
community with strong ties to British society which goes back to many decades ago. 
Therefore, looking into how they would practice the hijab would be interesting but 
does not closely overlap with the main questions of this thesis. As regards the Ismaili 
Muslims, who have successful and function social institutions and a cohesive 
community (with Ismailis from various backgrounds, including Iranians), an 
important point to be noted is that Ismailis believe in a living present Imam (Imam 
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of the Time). Therefore, the question of religious authority is seen in an entirely 
different light: there is a singular, unique authority here which is not comparable to 
the disaggregate and dispersed authority of the scholars and jurists in the Twelver 
community. A detailed recent analysis of Ismaili perceptions of authority is provided 
in Daryoush Mohammad Poor’s Authority without Territory (2014). There is a brief 
section in his book (p. 226) in which he speaks about the emancipation of women in 
the educational efforts of the Ismaili imamate. However, like the case of the Twelver 
Khojas, the example of Ismailis is also beyond the scope of this research, but 
deserves to be studied separated when it comes to practices of hijab (which does 
not exist in this form in the Ismaili community in London). 
 The most important Iranian centres used by my informants are the following: 
 The Islamic Student Association (Kanun Towhid), located in Hammersmith, is the 
base of the Iranian student union. It was established before the Islamic revolution 
and is run by Iranian students. It holds weekly events on Saturday evenings. This 
place is one of the first and most important gathering places for Iranian students 
and other Iranians in London.  
 The Islamic Centre of England (Markz Eslami), located in Maida Vale, is run by 
Abdul-Hossein Moezzi, the official representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran. 
It holds regular daily and weekly Islamic events and classes for men and women, 
especially on religious occasions. Along with Kanun Towhid, it is one of the most 
important gathering places for religious Iranians. Most attendants of the events of 
this centre, in principle, support the Iranian government and do not favor the 
opposition.  
 The Islamic Universal Association (Majma Eslami) is located in Holland Park and 
run by the representative of the late marja’ Ayatollah Mohammadreza 
Gulpayegani. This centre, which attracts the more non-political Shia Iranians, 
only holds events on important religious occasion like Ramadan and Muharam 
(the memorial of the death of Imam Hossein). Some Shia Muslims from other 
ethnic backgrounds attend these events too, but the majority are Iranians. 
 Vali society (Mahfel Vali), located in Royal Park, is run by an Iranian family who 
have dedicated the facility for weekly events. Many of my informants attend these 
events on a regular basis. Iranian religious intellectuals who travel to London 
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usually speak here and most of the attendees are supporters of Iranian reformists 
and a relatively more liberal Islam. This placed is now closed down due to 
political pressures from inside Iran. The update (in 2016) is coming from the time 
when I was completing revisions of the final versions this research. 
 Persian or Iranian societies at London universities, especially those at The School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (SOAS) and University 
College London (UCL), hold events on topics related to Iranian issues and 
politics. These events bring together Iranians of different political and religious 
views in a manner not seen in the places mentioned above. 
While these centres are the most important places attended by my informants, this 
does not mean that all Iranians in London attend one or more of them. There are 
many Iranians who have never attended any of the centres above, or who have other 
public and private places to go to, including the cultural and non-political events 
organized by Iran Heritage Foundation, the political and secular events of Anjomane 
Sokhan, and the events that surround two major London-based Persian satellite TV 
channels with millions of viewers in Iran and around the globe: BBC Persian and 
Manoto (which have gathered more than 300 successful Iranian journalists in 
London). These Iranians may be seen in a broader sense as more ‘secular’ then 
religious as can be seen in Gholami’s narrative (2014). I have earlier contested some 
of the terms for this perception of secularity as discussed by Gholami but when it 
comes to the issue of the veil, it is ironic that secularity seems far off the chart if a 
woman observes the hijab. Hijab is still seen as a powerful marker of religious 
identity. 
The Islamic Student Association (Kanun Towhid London) 
The Islamic Student Association was founded in 1972 by a number of Iranian 
students in London. At first, their meetings were held in their houses. After the 
number of Iranian students increased, they bought and repurposed a church in 
Hammersmith, where programmes have been held since 1976. The founding aim 
was to facilitate conversation amongst students on religious, social, and political 
issues. One of the main purposes was fighting against the Shah Regime in Iran.  
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Before the 1979 revolution, Kanun Towhid had been a central place for Iranian 
students in London. Students themselves manage it. Every Saturday afternoon and 
evening, a programme is held here on a range of subjects. Although it is an 
independent student association, the Iranian government financially supports it. 
Therefore, the content of the events should not oppose Iranian government 
principles and at the same time it is challenging. During the directory of the 
reformists, the conservatives criticized many of their events because they regarded 
them as against the values of the Iranian government.  
A council is responsible for choosing the president and the heads of the cultural and 
scientific sections. These three people are responsible for organising events, and 
new elections are held for their positions every six months. Students with diverse 
political orientations have held responsibility in Kanun Towhid, and as a result the 
tenor of events has varied. For example, when the directors were reformist and 
more liberal, the programmes and events covered controversial topics including 
criticism of the government’s international and internal policies. Religious 
intellectuals were also invited to give lectures. But when conservatives came to 
power, many things changed.  
I was a member of the council for three years, and was the manager of cultural 
events for one year. Many Iranians other than students took part in our 
programmes, and we tried to invite people from all political orientations and cover 
as many topics as we could. The directors who succeeded us were different in 
political orientation (conservative), and they expelled many of the reformist 
members. The nature of the events changed, and after a while I was also expelled 
along with my husband. This story has been repeated throughout the history of this 
student association. My own observation is that in the five years that I have been 
living in London, when the reformist group held power, the events were more 
crowded and more Iranians took part in them. 
This location is central to my research because the Iranians I engaged with all 
participated in Kanun Towhid’s events, especially when the directors were more 
reformist and liberal. For example, they invited Mohammad Khatami at the time of 
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his presidency. This event had the highest attendance seen in events of the centre, 
and this shows that the reformist party has more supporters in London. 
The women who attend Kanun Towhid’s events wear a scarf, even if they are not 
hijabi women. In other words, there is an unwritten norm or rule that almost all the 
women have been obeying since it was founded. In the period during which I held 
responsibility, we organised an event about Iranian women who were active in 
women’s rights and charity work, and many participants came without wearing a 
scarf55.  
The Islamic Centre of England (Markaz Eslami) 
The Islamic Centre of England is a religious centre founded in 1995 by the 
government of Iran that was officially opened in 1998. It directly represents the 
Iranian government, is headed by the official religious representative of Ayatollah 
Khamenei, and offers services to Iranians and, to a lesser extent, to Shia Muslims 
from other countries including as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The 
building is based in Maida Vale, and the hall can accommodate around 500 people 
in chairs or 1,000 seated on the floor. It has a library and classrooms for classes on 
topics such as the Quran or the English language. 
The main purpose of this centre is to provide religious guidance and service and to 
host Islamic rituals. They hold several weekly events such as Friday prayers and Dua 
Kumayl on Thursdays. They also celebrate the birth and commemorate the death of 
Imams. They have the highest level of attendance for Muharam (the memorial of the 
death of Imam Hossein) as well as the month of Ramadan during which periods they 
serve dinner to all guests in their hundreds every night.  
The Islamic Centre is one of the most important religious centres that attract 
Iranians in London. However, after the 2009 presidential election in Iran and the 
birth of the Green Movement, many reformists boycotted attending the Islamic 
                                                        
55 That we were successful in letting non-hijabi women attend Kanun Towhid’s event without a scarf 
and without fear was a very big achievement for us. The open and pluralist nature of our work then 
allowed a more inclusive engagement in which judgments were not made based on a woman’s dress 
code. 
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Centre’s events. Attending their events was a sign of support for Ahmadinejad’s 
government. The lecturers and preachers always supported Ahmadinejad in their 
talks and condemned Mir Hossein Mousavi56 for his actions. Many of the women I 
interviewed attended this centre’s events prior to 2009 but subsequently did not 
like to participate. After Hassan Rouhani’s election to the office of President in 2013, 
this centre is gradually re-attracting their lost members.  
The audience here is not exclusively Iranian unlike Kanun Towhid that has an 
exclusively Iranian audience. 
Since Ayatollah Khamenei (the Supreme Leader of Iran) directly appoints the head 
of the Islamic Centre, the Iranian government views it as a significant position. The 
Iranian government also directly funds this centre, and all the programmes 
represent the principles and value system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Consequently, amongst the Iranian diaspora, attending programmes at the Islamic 
Centre has become a sign of supporting the conservative party, and this is often 
perceived negatively by Iranian reformists and supporters of the opposition 
political groups.  
The Islamic Universal Association (Majma Eslami) 
Ayatollah Mohammadreza Golpayegani’s 57  representative in London established 
Majma in 1974. The building is located near Holland Park station. This centre 
organises regular religious events, and also has a library. Its programmes are very 
similar to those of the Islamic Centre, but it is not financially dependent on the 
Iranian government and therefore is more apolitical and successful in attracting 
Shia Iranians with a wider and more diverse range of political stance. Many Iranians 
who are religious but do not like to be politically engaged participate in Majma 
programmes. 
                                                        
56 Mousavi was the last Prime Minister of Iran, holding office from 1981 to 1989. He was also the 
reformist candidate in the 2009 presidential election, after which he became the leader of the 
opposition. 
57 Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani is a Shia Marja who currently lives in Qom. He is a supporter of 
the Islamic Republic. 
139 
 
This centre is financially dependent on the incomes of the Marja58. This centre is less 
active than the Islamic Centre, although it is very active in Muharam and Ramadan. 
The participants at the centre are primarily religious Iranians, and all programmes 
relate to religious events. Many of my informants attend Majma’s events during 
Ramadan. I have attended its events several times, and it was here that I first saw a 
woman in London wearing an Iranian style chador (see Figure 7 and Figure 8 in 
Chapter Five). Although there are a number of Iranian hijabis in London, wearing 
the Iranian style chador is very rare. This is a very important observation that even 
the staunch traditional and religious women do not wish to wear the chador while 
they are in London. The rationale for it seems to be a practical one. They would not 
want to stand out in society and draw unnecessary attention. This small observation 
shows how the argument of protection vs. restriction can easily collapse as soon as 
the context changes, 
Vali society (Mahfel Vali) 
Mahfel Vali is, in many ways, different from the other centres mentioned, and is 
especially important to my informants. Mahfel Vali is a small saloon in Royal Park 
that belongs to an Iranian family. They have dedicated it to cultural, social, political, 
and religious events that primarily attracts Iranian liberal reformist Muslims living 
in London. The saloon can accommodate about 80 people, but in some occasions up 
to 120 people have attended. The most popular and consistent programme is the 
lecture series on sacred spiritualty by Abul-Ghasem Fanaei (see Chapter Three) and 
interpretation of Quran By Ata’ollah Mohajerani59, each held biweekly on alternate 
Fridays. Apart from these two fixed programmes, there are some events on 
occasions such as Ramadan and Muharam. Many religious intellectuals have 
lectured here when they come to London, and it has been a base for charity work. 
The participants mostly hold reformist political views. Uniquely, some non-hijabi 
women take part in the religious events without wearing a scarf. This is very 
                                                        
58 Marja means religious reference and refers to those clerics who have the authority to make legal 
decisions in the Islamic law for their followers. In Shia Islam after Quran, prophet Mohammad and 
the Imams, marja is the highest authority. 
59 Ata’ollah Mohajerani is a scholar who served as Minister of Culture in Mohammad Khatami’s 
cabinet.  
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uncommon amongst Shia religious gatherings in which even non-hijabis generally 
cover their head. The fact that the owner of Mahfel Vali provides a location where 
women can freely participate in events without worrying about what they wear and 
without pretending to believe what they do not believe is a remarkable gift to the 
community. At no other centre mentioned above is similar freedom allotted. Many 
of the women I interviewed, especially the students, know about Mahfel Vali and 
participate in their events. 
Another unique feature is that women and men sit in the same room, and sit next to 
each other. The other two centres described above have separate spaces for men 
and women, who cannot see each other. Both inside and outside Iran, it is very 
common for religious events to have gender-segregated spaces: either men’s and 
women’s spaces are completely separate, or when there is only one room, men sit 
on one side and women sit on the other. Most of the time, a wall or curtain divides 
the two sexes. In Mahfel Vali, men and women may sit together without concern. 
These two features have made Mahfel Vali popular for many of my informants who 
are religious but whose religiosity is relatively more liberal than the majority of 
practicing Muslim Shia Iranians.  
The unique characteristics at Mahfel Vali have encouraged many people who do not 
otherwise like religious ceremonies to attend its religious events. Many Iranians are 
generally critical about the structures and requirements of religious events, in part 
because religion and politics have become highly intertwined after the Islamic 
revolution. In consequence, people often blame religion for many governmental 
problems. Mahfel Vali provides an environment where Iranians who are politically 
reformist and socially liberal but personally religious can attend religious events 
comfortably. 
Persian and Iranian Society Events at London Universities 
Events hosted by university societies, especially societies at UCL and SOAS, are 
important gathering places for my informants. Events on Iranian political issues 
have received a broad audience. I have attended many of these events, and have met 
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some of my informants here. The majority of the participants are Iranian students, 
or graduates now working in London. 
The government in Iran is very sensitive about events relating to Iran’s international 
and national policy. Following the 2009 election and the emergence of the Green 
Movement in Iran, these societies held several lectures and events that made news 
in Iranian government media. The media allied with Ahmadinejad labelled these 
events fitna (sedition)—that is, endeavours against the Islamic Republic—and 
associated them with the UK government. 
European encounter: shared experience, individual responses 
One of the fundamental arguments of my thesis is that Iranian women have a choice 
and an agency to exercise when it comes to deciding about their dress code. This 
agency is informed by the political and social backgrounds which they come from 
and as such they create and develop their own forms of practice of hijab. 
Nonetheless, all the 40 women whom I interviewed agreed on some shared 
experiences of the Iranian diaspora as they experience it. I believe that these are the 
direct result of living outside Iran and having the experience of living in London, and 
that they can be generalised for this group. 
The first matter that I want to highlight is that all 40 women I interviewed in London 
were against the compulsory requirement of hijab in Iran, including the women who 
had a full traditional hijab themselves. Ahmadi Khorasani (2011) describes research 
done on hijab amongst women attending the University of Tehran. One 2004 study 
solicited female students’ opinions on the legal requirement to wear hijab. 32.9% 
completely agreed, 20.4% partly agreed, 19.7% totally disagreed and 11.1% partly 
disagreed. This shows that even amongst university students in Iran, a considerable 
segment approves of the compulsory imposition of hijab. All my informants 
disagreed with the imposition of hijab, including those who are strictly observant 
themselves. Their perception has changed through living in London, where women 
operate under less structured and strict dress code and are relatively more free to 
wear whatever they like, and where you can see such a variety of dress by simply 
walking in the street. There is a multiple dimension to this shift. On the one hand, 
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maintaining an identity which is Iranian and Muslim is important to them and on 
the other hand conditions of life in a liberal society has enabled them to carve out 
their own identity without having to relinquish what they find integral to their 
identity and values. This is one of the examples that one could trace if we look at 
March’s arguments (2009) about the possibility of being a Muslim and having liberal 
citizenship. It also defies the dogmatic perception of the uniqueness of European 
moderntiy 
The educational system and the media in Iran teach girls from the youngest age that 
if you want to be protected, you have to observe hijab, and that hijab promotes a 
healthy society and family stability and strength. While many hijabi women believe 
this, in reality it might not be true. In fact, those women who have left Iran and have 
seen a city like London have come to the conclusion that the best way to be safe is 
by not wearing the headscarf (see ‘Hijab and Sexual Harassment’, below). It could 
be argued that the rising Islamophobic reactions of the public to Muslim hijab is in 
UK in the 1990s and the past decade might account for part of this conclusion, but, 
at least to some extent, it is also rooted in the personal observations of the Iranian 
Muslims in London that suggest that there is no meaningful positive correlation 
between not covering the head and sexual harassment.  Moreover, what must be 
noted is that the educational system and the media is deeply informed by 
indoctrination and shaped by an antagonistic propaganda which would at times 
distort realities of a different social and political setting if it is not politically aligned 
with it. The reason I am adding this qualification is that one must not assume it is 
purely a matter of reaction to colonial policies or Eurocentric views. Dogmatism on 
the side of the political establishment is also a contributing factor to the 
continuation and also collapse of these perceptions. It continues as long as women 
are convinced that any European dress code not in line with ‘Islamic’ norms is 
morally corrupt. It collapses the moment women realise that this image is deeply 
flawed. 
Compulsory hijab has become the most visibly Islamic stronghold of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, which distinguishes it from other Muslim societies, and, therefore 
the government tries its best to guard it. During the presidency of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, this was done through the moral police (gashte ershad). The 
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government claims that by forcing women to cover, it is protecting them and making 
life easier for them, but, in practice, the opposite has been the result. 
The majority of my informants mentioned these unintended consequences as a 
reason that they oppose compulsory hijab. Khatoon, 26, wears full hijab and is 
pursuing a degree in law. She states: 
I am completely against compulsory hijab in Iran, because this law is 
detrimental both to those women who have chosen to observe hijab 
and those women who wear it unwillingly. In Iran today, there is no 
difference between a woman who likes to receive sexual attention 
and a women who doesn’t like to receive attention, because all 
women follow one dress code. Therefore, you see cars honk at women 
who don’t want to receive this attention.60  Compulsory hijab also 
leads non-hijabi women to feel hatred toward hijabi women. For 
example, my mother went to a shopping centre and some loose hijabi 
girls 61  thought that my mum is a moral police and they were 
scared.62  
My informants who regularly visit Iran believe that compulsory hijab in Iran has 
made the situation difficult for both believers and non-believers in Islamic hijab in 
Iran. In the eyes of some hijabi women and their male protagonists, the non-hijabi 
women have corrupted society because they sexually arouse men. In the eyes of 
non-hijabi women (and similarly among some of their male protagonists), hijabi 
women are responsible for their oppression, and they see full hijabi women as 
government supporters. Termeh, 26, a banker with an MA in Finance, elaborates: 
                                                        
60  Iranian governmental policy prohibits nightclubs and places with a similar function. Streets, 
therefore, function as massive space for choosing, meeting and proposing to potential sexual 
partners, often without the consent of the other party. Men who want to find a girlfriend or sex 
partner will simply stop and honk their horn in front of any women, presuming that all women are 
the same and seeing all women as a potential partner.  
61 Her mother stood out because compared to her full traditional hijab, partial-hijabis wear more 
make-ups, wear shorter and tighter mantos with brighter colours, and reveal parts of their hair and 
body (in addition to the face and hands). 
62 Interview with Khatoon, conducted at Southgate, 16/09/2012 
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I think that the requirement of hijab in Iran is a game played by the 
Islamic Republic, and the people are the players. People are being 
fooled by this game that the government is playing with them. The 
identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran goes hand in hand with the 
imposition of hijab in Iran. It is inseparable; they can’t imagine 
themselves without it. By causing fear and terror they try to convey 
this message to people that ‘don’t even think of doing anything’. For 
example, when inflation is so high and the economic situation is 
really bad, the government keeps people engaged by fear about 
appearance, and doesn’t let them think of anything else. The Islamic 
Republic needs supporters for itself. Those people who support it 
approve of the imposition of hijab, and therefore the government 
forces it upon those who don’t want hijab just to make its supporters 
happy at the price of oppressing those who don’t believe in it.63  
Termeh’s response clearly depicts the ideological and dogmatic penchant of the 
state for control in all spheres of life and it applies to the case of women too. 
In Iran today the amount of makeup that women use is relatively high. Iran also has 
one of the highest rates of cosmetic surgery—especially nose jobs (Jafar and 
Casanova, 2013, p. 55). According to my own observation and my informants’ 
statements, the hijab places a great deal of attention on the face. Although the 
government’s purpose has been to decrease women’s attention towards their 
appearance, they have simply shifted the location of the battlefield. In other words, 
the strict and draconian measures of controlling women in Iran has had unintended 
consequences. One of the findings of this thesis is also about the unintended 
consequences of compulsory hijab. It has become counterproductive and at the 
same time it has opened the eyes of women to a different image or view from that 
the state has been promoting. 
                                                        
63 Interview with Termeh, conducted at Islington, 14/11/2012 
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Hijab and Sexual Harassment 
As I mentioned earlier, the Iranian government supposes that by forcing women to 
cover, they are protecting the women from sexual harassment. But what is 
happening in the society is exactly the opposite. All of the women whom I have 
formally interviewed, and many others I have spoken to, have had at least one 
experience of sexual harassment—for example, in a taxi or in crowded places. Those 
Iranian women who live in London can understand the difference in the way they 
feel in society in terms of sexual harassment and men’s attitude. Fereshteh, 22, who 
has undergone a major transformation in her dress code (see Chapter Six) from ‘full 
progressive hijab’ (women who cover all parts of their body except the face and 
hand) to ‘conservative hijab-less’ (women who do believe in some limits in their 
dress code but do not wear a headscarf), says the following regarding compulsory 
hijab and sexual harassment in Iran: 
My mum started observing hijab just before the Islamic revolution. 
Before that, she was hijab-less. I always ask my mum, ‘Why did you 
accept the imposition of hijab after the revolution?’ She replies that 
Iranians wanted to make a society in which everyone is comfortable, 
even those who don’t have control over their desires. But I always tell 
my mum that they have gone the wrong way, because the entire 
burden is placed on the shoulders of women, and society does not 
expect anything from men. It is always women who must cover and 
be careful about their behaviour. I think this perspective about hijab 
is also offensive to men, because they are seen as animals that have 
no control over their sexual desires. In our society in Iran, all the 
blame is always placed on women, and this is very sad. I think that 
the more women cover themselves in a society, the more bad looks 
and sexual harassment happens.64 
Fereshteh highlights a significant point about the excessive attention to women in a 
disempowering sense: the male members of society are left on their own and are 
                                                        
64 Interview with Fereshteh, conducted at SOAS, 5/10/2012 
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free from any such restrictions while women are assigned the sole responsibility for 
preserving the modesty and moral health of the society. The entire policy is designed 
in a manner which privileges male members of the society while it leaves women at 
a disadvantage. Awareness of such discriminations has been critical in the shift in 
dress code. 
Even before starting this research, I always wrestled with whether hijab protects 
women from the male gaze and from sexual harassment. I have not encountered an 
example of a woman who has never experienced sexual harassment in the streets of 
Tehran. This shows that even in a society where all women are covered, we still have 
problems of harassment, and covering does not eradicate sexual insult. This is yet 
another example of why the protection vs. restriction dichotomy fails to explain a 
problem and provide solutions to it. The entire articulation of the hijab in this 
manner does not relate to the actual problem. In short, it is not a response. It is not 
part of the solution. It is rather part of the problem. 
Living in a city like London gives Iranian women a different comparative perspective 
on the male gaze.  The diasporic location provides Iranian women with comparative 
frameworks and the necessary distance and lens to judge, based on lived-
experience, that male gaze in Iran is more disturbing and sexual that societies where 
hijab is not observed by the majority of women. In Iran, it is very common for people 
to look at each other and to intrude personal spaces of others by sexual gaze, 
especially in public transport. Therefore, many hijabi women believe that the chador 
or full hijab will help them avert sexual attention from men. But in London, things 
work differently. Walking in the streets, one can see all types of dress. Many of my 
informants mentioned that the amount of attention they get in streets of London is 
comparably less with Tehran. According to their testimony based on their lived 
experience, they think men’s disturbing sexual gaze is felt much less in London. 
Therefore, their view on hijab as a protection towards unwanted looks has also 
changed.  
In Iran, the educational system and the media have promoted the belief that 
women’s hair is evocative for men. Those women who have lived in London do not 
believe this to be true. Fereshteh, 22, says: 
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When I was in Iran at the age of 11, I was wearing chador and 
walking in a book exhibition, and a man touched my hip. At that time, 
I was so shocked because I didn’t know anything about sexuality. I 
even couldn’t say anything to my brother, who was walking next to 
me. I couldn’t speak for two hours. I told my mum, and she told me 
that some men are crazy. When I told my dad several years later, he 
thought that this had only happened to me and it’s something rare. 
This is the problem of our culture: women don’t speak out about 
these kinds of experiences because the society always blames the 
woman.65 
Therefore, while scholars such as Motahhari (2010) have advanced the view that 
hijab is protective for women, this view is challenged by the lived experience of 
many hijabi women in London. Some of my informants have mentioned that hijab 
does not simply involve covering certain parts of the body—you can go without a 
scarf and still be modest. This is the result of living in London, where one can see 
examples of modesty and immodesty on the streets in daily life, often independent 
of dress. Many of my interviewees stated that becoming close friends with other 
non-Muslim and Muslim women, who despite being modest and moral did not 
observe hijab, had a profound impact on their perception towards the relationship 
between modesty and hijab. According to all of them, living in London brought them 
to the conclusion that hijab and modesty do not necessarily correlate positively.  A 
part of this shift is due to direct encounter with the other: the anti-Western 
propaganda of the media in Iran often promotes the idea the being without hijab is 
synonymous with the most outrageous immoral conduct. This line of propaganda 
must not if course be confused with a critique of Orientalism, colonial or Eurocentric 
perspectives. While the latter is theoretically coherent and robust, the first is purely 
based in a dogmatic ideology which is meant to serve the grip of the state and the 
male elite on women. Therefore, it is critical to make a clear distinction here about 
this. 
                                                        
65 Interview with Fereshteh, conducted at SOAS, 5/10/2012 
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The Effect of Hijab on Daily Life and Work in London  
Due to my empirical and theoretical interest in hijab practice, I engaged with the 
diaspora differently from other scholars working on the British diaspora (see, for 
example, Alexander et al., 2013; Baumann, 1996; Ware and Back, 2002). Their works 
have concentrated on how the diaspora is shaped. Bauman examines how different 
ethnic backgrounds live in Southall, and how they shape and contest their identity, 
culture, and community. He also problematises the self-conscious construction of 
community in some places. Because the Iranian diaspora does not have this type of 
geographically delimited community, I have not attempted to study multiple aspects 
of the living experience of Iranians in London. Rather, I have only focused on one 
part of the daily life of women: their relationship to hijab.  
As a hijabi myself, I have to admit that the experience of wearing hijab and headscarf 
in London is much easier than in other Western countries.  The cultural context of 
tolerance and acceptance of different clothing cultures in London and the fact that 
the number of hijabi women in London is higher makes it easier and socially less 
costly to have hijab in London. My own personal lived experience and observations 
and that of those of my interviewees who had lived in more that Western country 
suggests that British culture, in general, is more accommodating to religious 
minorities and Islamic life-styles. But this does not mean that all hijabi women have 
the same experience and enjoy the same level of cultural comfort in UK66.  
Most of the women in London I interviewed who do not wear a headscarf said that 
they feel comfortable with how they look. Some other women who wear a headscarf 
believe that if they chose not to do so, their experience in general would improve. 
For example, they might be treated better at their workplace or experience better 
customer service. Unlike many hijabi women from other countries in London, 
Iranian hijabi women do not feel they are protesting with their hijab, and many of 
them do admit that they do not like the way other people behave with them.  One of 
the reasons that Iranian women do not view wearing hijab as a protest is that they 
come from a background where hijab itself has turned into a force for injustice in 
                                                        
66For reports on attacks against Muslim women in UK in media 
see http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/28/women-targeted-attacks-muslims. 
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many segments of society. Growing impatience with male-driven discriminatory 
practices has pushed Iranian women further away from viewing hijab as a protest 
in a Western context. 
Termeh, 26, is a professional women working as a consultant in a well-known bank. 
She follows a ‘partial-hijab’ dress code (that is, she wears a headscarf but does not 
cover all parts of her hair and neck, and she does not follow all the requirements set 
by mainstream Shia fiqh). After she completed her master degree, she applied for 
more than 40 jobs in the city. She received an interview for many of the jobs, but 
after each interview, the companies refused her because of her headscarf. She 
believes that in a place like London, while hijabi women walking down the street or 
doing low rank jobs may be tolerated, most employers do not support hijabi women 
in high-ranking professional jobs. She saw her hijab as a huge obstacle in her career. 
The reason that she still has her hijab is personal, and I will discuss it in Chapter 6. 
This suggests that having a good job in the city is much more difficult for a hijabi 
woman so far as, for example, Termeh states that sometimes when she goes to the 
ladies’ room at her work, she takes off her scarf and waits for someone to come to 
the toilet to see that she has beautiful hair like other women. So, it is also true that 
wearing hijab in London does not automatically get associated with freedom of 
choice or belief. It is also entangled in the politics of contemporary European 
societies (and other backgrounds I have earlier discussed). It is in this context that 
Iranian women have to negotiate their dress code. It is not at all an easy choice. The 
decision to exercise one’s agency in whatever form comes at a price, even if it is in a 
liberal or secular society. 
Several other examples my informants provided demonstrate that hijabi women are 
not always treated considerately or equally. Mahsa, 33, is a dentist in London. She 
also follows a ‘partial-hijab’ dress code. She believes that if she did not wear a 
headscarf she would have a much better position at work. She also mentions that 
sometimes when she is sitting in the tube she sees people choose not to sit next to 
her, and she believes that the reason is her hijab. 
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Conclusion 
The Iranian diaspora in London is in many ways different from other more typical 
diasporas. It is more decentralised: there is no neighbourhood in London specifically 
populated by the Iranian community. The reasons for immigration are diverse too. 
Iranians from varying ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds have migrated to 
London in multiple waves (see Spellman 2004). The political situation in Iran 
following the Islamic revolution produced a large gap amongst monarchists or other 
supporters of regime-change in Iran, the conservative supporters of the Islamic 
revolution, and the increasing supporters of reformist and moderate political forces 
in Iran. The clearest visible signifier of this difference is the hijab. The veil still 
continues to resurface in grounds which are no neutral. It is trapped in social and 
political constructs which are developed, sustained and promoted by patriarchal 
mentalities. It is in this context that women have to negotiate their choices and 
exercise their agency. 
Most Iranians in the UK associate full-hijabi women with the current Iranian 
government and many full-hijabis believe that most non-hijabi women are 
monarchists or are supporting regime-change in Iran. Hijab practice is often treated 
as a display of an individual’s religious and political stances toward the Iranian 
government’s views. The trivial and black and white categorisation and dichotomies 
based on one’s dress code has widened the divide amongst the Iranian diaspora.  
The informants in this study all come from middle or upper class families in Iran, in 
terms of both education and economic situation. Most of them came of age in Tehran 
and lived in Iran for most of their lives. They immigrated to London either for higher 
education or for work. They do not necessarily have long time plans to stay or to 
leave, and their decision is contingent on the situation in Iran. In this chapter, I have 
suggested that this lack of long-term certainty is the main reason that Iranians do 
not seek to live in an Iranian community. Everyone has their own group of friends, 
and unlike in some other diasporas, these Iranians do not want to engage with other 
Iranians all the time. There are some areas in London that have a more concentrated 
Iranian population, including west and northwest London, and especially South 
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Kensington, Ealing Broadway and on Finchley Road. Many of the Iranian shops and 
restaurants are located in these areas. 
As I explained above, religious and political stances play a significant role in the lives 
of most Iranians. The informants in this study are not monarchists or refugees; they 
are all Shia Muslims who hold political views near to that of the reformists, 
moderates or of the non-radical opposition. However, they can be regarded as a 
representative sample of Iranian women since, according to the results of the 
presidential elections in Iran in the past two decades and recent polls and surveys, 
supporters of reformists and moderates, constitute the majority of the Iranians 
living in Iran and London.   
My informants have all experienced change in their hijab practice or in the manner 
that they perceive it after having a few years of living experience outside Iran. The 
cause of this change cannot be explained solely through living in the diaspora, 
because the Iranian diaspora is very diverse. The main cause is the experience of 
living outside Iran and seeing other people’s experiences, as well as how they feel 
about themselves and others. Living in a city like London has changed many 
Iranians’ views about hijab practice. Many of them have put this change into 
practice, while some have not because of competing concerns. This change is 
resulted by the experience of mixing with others, which happens also in Iran and 
non-European countries.  
This shows how strongly the cultural environment one lives in, shapes one’s view 
about the philosophy of hijab. Most women lost the courage to wear hijab in London, 
although they practiced hijab in Iran, because they felt that it had no positive utility 
for them in London or that its costs were more than its benefits. Most of them felt 
that even without hijab, they could be protected and respected. Many also feel that 
hijab decreases their chance of having a better job or life situation. All the women of 
this study were against the compulsory rule of hijab in Iran, and this shows how 
living in London has profoundly influenced their views. Living outside Iran has 
significantly changed the hijab-related views and practices of all of my interviewees: 
they all have cultivated a more positive (or less negative) judgement about non-
hijabis; none of them support compulsory hijab; none of them regard non-hijabis as 
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non-modest; none of them see any positive correlation between the practice of hijab 
and immunity from sexual harassment; many of them have loosened the way they 
dress; and a number of them have stopped wearing the headscarf altogether.   
As I discussed further in chapter Two, the idea of a Muslim woman as a free agent 
has been challenged in many ways and the challenge is rooted in either Eurocentric 
perception of modernity and secularity or in antagonistic reactions to Western 
norms. Moreover, Islamic feminism has contributed significantly to changing 
perceptions not only among women themselves but also among male scholars who 
have contributed to either perpetuating or pushing the boundaries of hijab practice. 
Even though views of scholars such as Kadivar, Fanaei, Ghabel and Eshkevari cannot 
be categorised by themselves as feminists, they, nonetheless, enhance this position. 
What I have discussed in this chapter, based on some of the responses from my 
informants, reflects how these discourses are interrelated and how they influence 
the practice of women, particularly when they are in European contexts. Amer 
(2014) is concerned about how the practice of veil has been turned into a battlefield 
and it is hardly seen as a neutral ground. Centrifugal forces from inside the Iranian 
society, political struggles outside Iran by Iranians and ideological confrontations 
by various political forces have all brought women into the centre of these struggles 
and made their choice of dress an area of contention. The earlier signs of this overtly 
politicised view of the veil was highlighted by Abu-Lughod (2002) in the immediate 
aftermath of the ‘war on terror’. The effects of those policies are still vividly felt in 
the experience of Iranian women in London: the fact that a veiled Iranian woman 
who is highly educated finds it difficult to find a job is a prominent example of the 
challenges they feel and has direct impact on how the can negotiate their choices 
and exercise their agency. 
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Chapter Five:  From the full traditional hijab to the radical hijab-
less 
Introduction 
My primary research question is why Iranian women living in London veil or unveil 
and what factors contribute to their choice of different schemas of dress code. I will 
define what I mean by different schemas of dress codes, although I am not entirely 
comfortable creating a typology of women’s dress codes, because typologies can 
mislead or tend to be an essentialisation of an incomplete picture. However, for the 
reasons that will be discussed throughout the chapter, the schemas I use functions 
as a necessary heuristic device the benefits of which outweighs its disadvantages.  
In order to give an overview of how Iranian women usually dress both within and 
outside of Iran, I need to clarify the categories that I will use in the coming 
paragraphs. I do not aim to over-determine mundane practices, draw a sharp line 
between trends, or put individuals into neat boxes. The schemas are therefore 
heuristic devices with which to begin to arrange the ethnographic material. One of 
my main findings is that we cannot give general meanings to dress codes, and that 
even people with the same type of dress code may have completely different reasons 
for doing so and different understandings of their practice. 
Walking the streets of Tehran, one immediately notices that partial or full head 
covering is common among all women. Because hijab was legally mandated after 
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1980, all women in Iran are obliged to wear a scarf and manto67. In the streets and 
public spaces, women are not allowed to show their body, except for their hands and 
face. The manto should not be very short or close-fitting. Despite these restrictions 
and the commonalities between women’s dress codes in Iran, any observer can also 
easily notice huge differences between various types, schemas and styles of 
women’s dress codes. These differences may be in the colour of the cloth, in how 
tight or short it is, or in the amount of make-up worn. All these factors require a finer 
distinction in women’s public appearance than would be possible if the focus was 
solely on the headwear. 
On the basis of my fieldwork in London with Iranian women and on my observations 
and experiences living in Iran until the age of 22, I have observed five general types 
of dress code. These are ideal types and they are fixed, but in order to achieve a 
better understanding and description of women’s hijab and dress code, it is essential 
to have an analytic tool for categorizing different schemas by which women observe 
hijab in theory, if not always in practice. It should be considered a rough and useful 
heuristic rather than a totalising framework. Not every individual necessarily fits in 
only one of these categories at all times and places. Many of my interviewees have 
undergone transitions in their dress code, which I will discuss in detail in 
subsequent chapters. The five manners of wearing the hijab that I identify and will 
define and explain in the following pages are: 
1. The “full traditional hijab” (which most commonly consists of chador or very 
long and loose manto with dark colours that covers the whole body except the face 
and hands with a headscarf that fully covers the hair)   
2. The “full progressive hijab” (that is comprised of less-strictly-worn chador or 
more stylish manto with more attractive colours that covers the whole body except 
the face and hands with colourful headscarf that fully covers the hair) 
3. The “partial-hijab” (in which the headscarf is worn but parts of the hair, head 
and neck is shown)  
4. The “conservative scarf-less” (in which the head is not covered but short-
skirts, low-neck tops or swimming suits are also not worn)  
                                                        
67 Manto is a piece of clothing resembling a long shirt or tunic that Iranian women must wear in 
public. It can be short or very long, and tight or loose. 
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5. The “radical hijab-less” (in which religion is not a decisive factor for 
determining dress code in any way)   
In subsequent chapters I explore the intentions behind and reasons and causes for 
choosing each type of dress code by my informants. For now, I will elaborate on each 
of the outlined terms.  
Cross-cutting themes in variations of hijab 
Before going into further descriptions of these different styles of hijab, I would like 
to return to the themes I identified in chapter Two (in the section of Muslim women 
as free agents). I had identified three major themes there which I briefly describe 
below: 
1) The conception of hijab articulated within the oppression vs. protection (or 
immunity vs. restriction). This theme is promoted by two opposing forces: 
the conservative or traditional male-dominated society of Muslims and the 
Western protagonists of the emancipation of women who are informed by 
colonial ideas. They are mirror images of one another. 
2) Choice and agency of women: adopting or relinquishing the veil has often 
been portrayed merely as a matter of choice. The exercise of agency is also 
tied to this concept. In reality, choice is far more complex than a mere display 
or expression of one’s desire. Sometimes, women reproduce the mentality of 
a patriarchal order without noticing they do not have much say in changing 
the circumstances of their life themselves. 
3) Negotiating modernity and secularism: this theme is interconnected with the 
previous two. The concept of alternative modernities or mutltiple 
modernities sets women free from being trapped in a Eurocentric perception 
of modernity and secularism. At the same time, it gives the the confidence to 
exercise their agency in a European context without having to play by rigid 
perceptions of secularity. 
These themes can be traced in all of the following styles of dress code to 
various degrees. One can traced them either in a positive light showing how 
women are aware of these or in a negative light where one can discern that, for 
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example, even though women might be viewing their dress code as a matter of 
their own choice, there is little critical reflection as to how this change is 
coming about. 
Full traditional hijab 
Women to whom this category applies come from different backgrounds, especially 
in their education and occupation. They can be medical doctors or homemakers. I 
know many women very well in Iran, including my own mother, who wears full 
traditional hijab. I know many fewer women who fit in this category in London. This 
category applied to only 3 out of 40 of my informants.  
 
Figure 5: Image of chador-rangi, which full traditional hijabi women wear indoors. 
 
Figure 6: Image of chador-rangi, which full traditional hijabi women wear indoors. 
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Figure 7: Image of the black chador that hijabi women wear in public. 
 
Figure 8: Image of the black chador that hijabi women wear in public. 
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Yeganeh, age 52, is a very well-known gynaecologist in Tehran. She came to London 
six years ago to be with her two boys, who are both medical students. Although she 
has had a very successful professional life in Iran, she left everything behind to be 
with her children and she is not working as a doctor in London. She is currently 
taking courses related to her profession at the hospital. 
On the very first day that I went to Yeganeh’s house at the invitation of her son, I saw 
her with a chador-rangi.68  She asked me if I wanted a chador-rangi. Traditional 
Muslim women most commonly wear hijab inside the house when there is a 
namahram (men who are not mahram) amongst the guests. When there is a 
namahram man amongst the quests (in this case her husband and sons that were 
namahram in relation to me), It is common for the female host to offer her guest 
chador-rangi upon her arrival—but I refused, as I was comfortable with my own 
outfit. Under her chador, she was wearing a large white scarf pinned below her chin, 
a long loose shirt, black trousers, and thick black socks. The way she held her chador 
is also noteworthy. Like the most traditional religious women in Iran, she held her 
chador in a way that in addition to the body, the head and hair, it also covered parts 
of her face including the lips, forehead and parts of the eyebrows.  Generally, 
amongst the more religious, the chador is also used to cover the lips and the 
forehead. This act is called roo-gereftan or roogiri (that is, ‘covering parts of the 
face’).  
The environment of their house reminded me of houses in Iran, even though still 
distinct to the diaspora. The smell, light, and decoration of the house were very 
similar to that of my aunt’s house: very-well lit; all the walls full of Islamic art-works 
and family pictures; the smell of Persian rice in the air; and all the floors covered by 
Persian carpet (the reason why everyone took off their shoes before entering the 
house). I went to the kitchen to see if Yeganeh needed any help. The way she talked 
and behaved resembled many practicing Muslim women I know in Iran. After she 
entered the room, she sat on the floor, and while she covered parts of her face, she 
                                                        
68 Chador-rangi is a brightly coloured chador with colourful prints. This kind of chador is very popular 
to wear indoors amongst religious women in Iran. Women who wear black chador outside the house 
keep the same type of chador for use in house, but the fabric and colours are different. Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 show an example of chador-rangi. 
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also participated in an on-going discussion with her sons. On the first encounter 
with her I found that she is a very knowledgeable woman. Although she was trained 
to be a consultant, she had left her career to take care of her children in London. 
I subsequently interviewed Yeganeh in my home. She arrived wearing a very long 
loose dark blue manto and a big white scarf pinned under the chin. I asked her about 
what she wears in Iran and what she wears in London, and she said: 
Since I was very young—perhaps seven—until now, I have worn 
chador. I don’t wear chador here in London because it draws the 
attention of many people in the street, so I wear a very loose and long 
manto. It is very important for me not to draw any attention from 
men due to my appearance. I don’t wear matching colours and I don’t 
use any make-up. I believe that wearing make-up with hijab is a very 
silly act, because you wear hijab to be less attractive and sexy, and 
wearing make-up is precisely for looking more attractive, so it does 
not feel right to me. In London, it feels much more comfortable 
without chador. My hands are free and I can do my work much more 
easily here. When I go back to Iran, I wear the chador. Many people 
in Iran respect me because of my chador. This is so because they don’t 
expect a consultant to wear a chador. I always attend hospital 
meetings with my chador, which impresses my colleagues. It is not 
common for female medical doctors to wear a chador.69 
As we can see in her response, the matter of wearing the chador is framed in the 
pragmatic needs of a Muslim woman. Even though she strictly follows the practice 
at home, she would refrain from doing so in public in London as it draws attention. 
This is contrary to the very philosophy of the hijab she believes in. It is meant to 
‘protect’ the woman from the unwanted gaze of people. What immediately falls 
apart here is the ‘sacred’ importance which is attached to the chador itself. One can 
easily move beyond it. So, we can see that there is an element of agency here. The 
woman, albeit within the general prescribed norms often produced by male 
                                                        
69 Interview with Yeganeh, conducted at Golders Green, 12/11/2012. 
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scholars, moves beyond a strict observance of the veil here. Yet, while she is in Iran, 
even though it is uncommon in the professional setting, she keeps to her chador: it 
is a marker of her conscious religious identity. Does the idea of the ‘sacredness’ of 
hijab change here? It seems to be yet again another manifestation of practicality. It 
is part of the peer expectations among the people she associates with in Iran. This 
practicality  is fluid: it changes when she is in London. 
Yeganeh precisely follows the most strict guidelines for covering in the mainstream 
traditional Shia fiqh: she covers all parts of her body except for her face and hands, 
and she wears something loose so that her figure and curves do not show (see 
Chapter Three for further). She strictly believes in observing these limits in any 
situation, and she obeys them fully. She is not a gynaecologist in London but she has 
taken some courses in the hospital. I asked her if she has had any problems shifting 
from her hijab in London, and she answered: 
I feel very comfortable with the dress code I follow, and thank God, 
here in UK no one cares how you look, and they don’t stare at you. 
However, at the hospital, where I am taking some courses, in the 
theatre room there are regulations requiring you to wear special 
clothes, and arms should not be covered. I usually wear long gloves 
for this course. During the break for lunch, we are not allowed to 
wear gloves or change the clothes, so I can’t enter the break space 
because I cannot show my arms. For that reason, I usually stay 
outside the theatre room alone. This means that almost always I 
cannot take a break. I wait outside until all other doctors come out.70 
Yeganeh’s account demonstrates how strictly women who adhere to this category 
believe and act regarding their hijab. Even in special circumstances they do not 
compromise the limits stipulated by traditional fiqh. They always wear chador in 
public and in private spaces when a namahram is present. The colours they wear 
are very simple and dark to minimise attention from men. We can see that even 
though she is flexible with the chador, other rules and conditions do actually 
                                                        
70 Ibid.  
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restrict her social participation because she is convinced that this is how she must 
practice her faith. Such stipulations which have to do with a woman’s body are 
still integral to the mentality of women in this category. It diminishes any active 
role of these women in challenging such norms. One can hardly see any feminist 
(Islamic or otherwise) engagement with such rules here. 
Those women who fall under this category understand hijab not just as a dress 
code, but also as having a wider meaning. For them, the word hijab not only refers 
to the clothing that physically covers certain parts of the body (veiling), but also 
includes a set of rules concerning the behaviour and guidelines for interactions 
between the two sexes (purdah). As I mentioned in Chapter Three, hijab entails 
both the covering of the body (veiling) and the codes of behaviour with the 
opposite sex (purdah) the most important element of which is the separation of 
male and female spaces (see Papanek, 1973 for further).  
The women who are closer to the full traditional hijab type observe purdah more 
seriously than the other four categories, although it is important to mention that 
they do not think women and men should be separated completely, as was the case 
before the modernisation of Iran. Many of these women work outside the home, and 
therefore they see hijab as a tool to attract minimal sexual attention and to be able 
to work next to men without insisting on their sexuality. Yeganeh worked at 
hospitals and has studied alongside men for a very long time back in Iran. She said: 
I have studied medicine and have worked with men in hospitals. This 
is only for work, and I do not consider it appropriate to go out and 
talk with my male colleagues during breaks or spare time. I only talk 
and work with men when it is necessary to achieve a certain goal. 
Otherwise, it is not permitted for men and women who are 
“namahram” to talk or laugh. My husband does not like it if I talk to 
men without an important reason, and I do not like it as well if he 
chats unnecessarily with his female colleagues or secretory. 
Unlike the next four groups, for women in this group, having a male friend who 
they spend spare time with and talk to or laugh with is unacceptable. Their 
preferred interpretation of Islam corresponds with teachings of traditional Shia 
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marjas71and differs from that of the more progressive Muslim scholars. Therefore, 
women in this category are still not very open to mixing with men in spaces other 
than the workplace. For example, in many gatherings, women and men sit in 
separate rooms and have lunch or dinner at separate tables. Such arrangements 
minimise unnecessary encounters between the sexes. Nonetheless, women who 
work outside the home have frequent encounters with men, unlike their 
grandmothers, who were always inside the house. Under no circumstances do 
these women have any kind of bodily contact with men, including the shaking of 
hands. Even Yeganeh, who lives in London and works and studies in hospitals, will 
not shake hands with men.  
This restrictive hijab practice may cause some social difficulties. For example, 
addressing the issue of shaking hands with men, Setareh, age 30, who is a third 
year PhD student in electrical engineering, said: 
I don’t feel that much disadvantage in my hijab, but one of the things 
that really bothers me is what I will do in my viva. It is necessary to 
shake hands with the examiners, and I cannot do this because it’s not 
permitted for us to shake hands with namahram.72 
The women in this group are the ideal women of the conservative leaders of 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Their dress code and mentality fits the ‘good lifestyle’ 
prescribed by the government for the younger generation. The government has 
tried to depict and encourage this kind of dress code in the educational system 
and the media, and they have met with partial success. According to all available 
studies, a considerable portion of the population thinks and acts exactly in this 
way, although it is still less than what the government is aiming for.  
It is also important to mention that women in this group are more judgmental and 
critical of those in the other four groups. Hijab is an important part of their life, 
and they filter their relations with others due to their conception of hijab. For 
                                                        
71 Marja means religious reference and refer to those clerics who have the authority to make legal 
decisions in the Islamic law for their followers. In Shia Islam after Quran, prophet Mohammad and 
the Imams, marja is the highest authority. 
72 Interview with Setareh, conducted at North Finchley, 26/12/2012. 
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example, I know women belonging to this group who find it hard to even walk 
with someone in the street if they do not observe full Islamic dress code. They 
believe that if they walk next to someone who is not fully covered, it means that 
they are endorsing their way of dressing. 
Those of my interviewees who belonged to this group clearly stated that their 
belief in and commitment to following the order of God as explained in the 
mainstream Shia jurisprudence is the main reason why they observe hijab so 
strictly. Their system of religious belief requires following a literal understanding 
of the fiqh as elaborated by the most senior traditional marjas in Qom or Najaf. In 
contrast, women who belong to the other four categories are more likely to follow 
the more progressive ‘hermeneutical’ approaches to fiqh developed by the 
contemporary revisionist Muslim scholars and reformist marjas (as discussed in 
Chapter Three).  
Full progressive hijab 
The women in this group are also practicing Muslims, but they differ from the first 
group in many aspects. They still follow the mainstream traditional fiqh as it 
relates to the dress code (veiling), while being flexible in passing some limits that 
the conventional fiqh has set for behavioural hijab (purdah). They cover all parts 
of their body and hair fully. They do not wear very tight clothes, and their clothing 
is long enough that at the very least their hips and thighs are covered.  
 
Figure 9: Different styles of full progressive hijabi women dress code in London 
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The dress code for full progressive hijab and full traditional hijab mainly differ in 
the style of dress and colours used. In behavioural hijab (purdah), women in this 
group are much more open. They are comfortable in the company of men, and can 
be close friends with them or even shake hands with them if they initiate. Unlike 
the first group, the full progressive hijabi woman is situationally flexible, and they 
are at times willing to pass the limits that conventional fiqh has set for behavioural 
hijab (purdah). 
Arezoo, age 30, is currently a postdoctoral student in cosmology. She has lived in 
London from the age of 17 until today. I discuss her experiences in detail in 
Chapter Six because she has undergone a major transition in dress code from 
“conservative scarf-less” (non-hijabi) to “full progressive hijab”. I saw her at 
several formal and causal events and gatherings, and she always wore the same 
style of clothing. I interviewed her in our mutual friend’s house, where we went 
to an empty room. She was wearing a black tunic with jeans, a green scarf, and 
very light make-up. After we sat down, she took off her scarf. She looked very 
different and much more beautiful without the scarf. I asked her about the limits 
of her hijab and she responded: 
I always wear manto or a long tunic and long sleeves, and never very 
tight clothes. I usually wear plainly coloured scarfs because it suits 
me better, and I fully cover my hair and neck with them. This is my 
typical dress code, regardless of where I am going. I don’t pass these 
limits under any circumstances—that is, I cover all parts of my body 
except my hands and face.73  
I asked her whether she thinks that hijab, as depicted in fiqh, is a religious 
obligation for all Muslim women. She replied: 
I can’t say that covering all parts of one’s body except for the hands 
and face is obligatory for all Muslim women, but I can say it for 
myself. I think it is necessary for me, but for others it depends on each 
individual and the time and place they live in. This is the limit of my 
                                                        
73 Interview with Arezoo, conducted at Ealing Broadway, 1/12/2012. 
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hijab, because my appearance is very important to me, and if I free 
myself I will be more occupied with my looks. However, this may not 
be true for other women, and everyone should find their own way of 
being modest. 
From my analysis of interviews of women in this group, I conclude that for them, 
hijab is more often a personal choice than a religious obligation. Although many 
of them do not believe in the limits conventional fiqh has set for women, they 
practice it for other reasons. The reasons they do this will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter Six.  
Many women who I interviewed in this group wear chador when they go to Iran, 
although they are not very happy about it. They don’t see chador as hijab-e bartar 
(the best hijab). I asked Shiva about the experience of wearing chador in Iran after 
she came to study in London, and she stated: 
I still wear chador when I go to Iran, and every single time I say to 
myself, “Why am I doing this?” Although I have many objections, I 
can’t convince myself not to wear it. Following the 2009 presidential 
election74 , many things have changed, and when wearing chador 
people look at you as if you are a supporter of Ahmadinejad’s 
government. I don’t want to be seen that way at all. When I go 
shopping or to the cinema, the looks that I receive give me the 
impression that I am not welcome at all. I really don’t like the 
impression that wearing a chador gives, but at the same time, I 
cannot put it away. This is because other people might say that I have 
become loose and less religious after studying in London. Therefore, 
I prefer to wear the chador since I don’t want other people to think 
of me in that way.75 
                                                        
74  After the disputed 2009 presidential election in Iran the society became very much divided 
between the supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who was officially announced the winner of the 
election) and supporters of Mir-Hossein Mousavi (Ahmadinejad’s reformist rival who claimed victory 
and believed the results of the election were fraudulent).   
75 Interview with Shiva, conducted at Colindale, 16/10/2012 
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One can easily discern the effects of peer-pressure in her response. The desire is 
there to relinquish to chador and she does not find any rationale for wearing it 
any more. It is quite evident that if peer-pressure is lifted, she would be more 
comfortable in moving to other styles of hijab without tying it to religiosity. As 
Amer (2014) pointed out (discussed in chapter Two), the issue of choice is also 
about feeing comfortable with one’s sense of belonging. It is clear that even though 
the terms of the practice of hijab is mainly set by the peers or the environment, 
once the atmosphere changes, these women would more freely welcome the shift. 
Golnaz, age 27, has recently finished her PhD in biomedical engineering. She is a 
practicing Muslim observing all her religious duties according to the conventional 
fiqh and has a full progressive hijab. She said: 
I didn’t feel good about my chador when I was doing my BA at the 
University of Tehran. All of my female classmates were open-minded, 
and none of them wore chador. It took a long time for me to show 
them that I was not the kind of person they thought. They thought I 
was a fundamentalist Muslim supporting Ahmadinejad’s 
government. After a while, I got closer to them and we became 
friends, but chador was always a barrier in communicating with 
other people at university. I like hijab, and it is very important for me, 
but I think chador is useless because it brings lots of social costs, and 
it is really difficult to handle when you want to use public transport. 
Also, it’s heavy and becomes dirty because it is long and drags on the 
floor. Furthermore, the fact that chador is black causes its own 
difficulties.76 
This story exemplifies why many practicing Muslim women in Iran prefer to wear 
types of hijab other than chador. The major difference here between full 
traditional hijab and full progressive hijab is that the former group of women wear 
chador with complete informed consent, despite the fact that it is difficult for 
them, whereas the latter group wear it with doubt and dissatisfaction. The full 
                                                        
76 Interview with Golnaz, conducted at Imperial College London, 19/7/2012 
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progressive hijabi woman knows that it is irrational to wear chador, but the force 
of discursive power relations (Foucault, 1995), obliges her to wear it; she does 
this because she wants to fit in with a group of modest women. Wearing a chador 
is at certain times the only way to show that you are very modest, although as we 
shall see later, changes are happening even in this regard. 
As I mentioned earlier, another difference between “full traditional hijab” and “full 
progressive hijab” can be found in behavioural hijab relating to interactions 
between men and women who are namahram. The purdah, that is, the segregation 
of women’s and men’s spaces, is much less evident in full progressive hijabi 
women’s lifestyles compared to those of full traditional hijabi women.  
One of my interview questions was about the effect of practicing hijab on 
becoming close friends with, travelling with, and shaking hands with men. All 
women in the first group refused to engage in any of these three practices. 
However, the women in the second group were much less strict in this regard. 
Some of the women in the second group usually shake hands with men if the latter 
put their hands forward first. They do not shake hands with men in Iran. Many of 
them have close male friends and spend time with men in the same way as they 
do with women. For example, Bita told me: 
I am very happy with having this type of hijab, but one of the 
disadvantages—both in Iran because of my chador, and in London 
because of my scarf—is that my hijab sends this signal to others that 
they should keep their distance from me. This is a positive impression 
on some occasions, but in university, it has been negative for me. I am 
not the kind of person that they think I am. I really like to be close 
friends with many of my male classmates, and I already have close 
male friends. I always have to explain that this kind of hijab does not 
mean that I don’t want to have any contact with men77. 
Figure 9 shows different styles of veiling worn by full progressive hijabi women. 
They wear colourful scarves and clothes. They do not have any problem with 
                                                        
77 Interview with Bita, conducted in Euston, 28/9/2012 
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looking beautiful in public spaces, but this was not to be interpreted as sexy, as 
Soraya explained: 
Hijab does not mean to make yourself look ugly. There is a difference 
between looking beautiful and looking sexy. Some of my family and 
friends who are very religious think that hijab means being very 
normal and not wearing nice clothes. However, I think you can be 
modest and beautiful without being sexy and attracting sexual 
attention. I am very careful about what I wear all the time. I try to 
wear clothes in which I feel confident, but not clothes that are 
unusual and that cause everyone to turn their eyes toward me. I don’t 
wear make-up, but I do wear colourful scarfs and matching clothes, 
and my friends like it. I don’t look sexy, and this is what matters to 
me most, as opposed to making myself look ugly so that I don’t draw 
attention.78  
Women who have full progressive hijab are much more socially integrated and 
have closer relations with other men. Their behavioural hijab is less strict. These 
women therefore combine both abiding by the conventional fiqh and being active 
in society. Regarding the relations between men and women, these women see 
hijab as a means to minimise their sexuality attractions in order to have good and 
healthy relationships with men. Soraya, a married woman, said: 
I see hijab as a way to minimise my sexual attractions, but at the 
same time I do like to look beautiful. I have many male friends who 
are very close to me, like my female friends. The level of intimacy is 
strong, but the shape of it is different from the intimacy I share with 
my female friends. I hang out with them, even one-on-one, and my 
hijab helps me have a healthy relationship with my male friends and 
not to get engaged in sexual attraction, which I think is not ethical. I 
hate it when people say women and men should not laugh and hang 
out, because it implies that the first thing men see in a woman is her 
                                                        
78 Interview with Soraya, conducted at SOAS, 26/12/2012 
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sexuality. I don’t use make-up because if I wear make-up while I am 
talking to men, they might become distracted to how I look rather 
than my personality. I want them to see me as a human being and 
not as a sexual object. Although I am married, my husband and I are 
very welcoming toward my male friends and his female friends, 
because we have drawn lines for ourselves. I think if hijab has one 
positive effect, it is that it allows women to be present in more social 
spaces while remaining protected and comfortable, and not to be 
deprived of places where males and females mix.79  
Partial-hijab 
As a child, whenever I saw a woman with parts of her hair showing beneath her 
scarf, I wondered why she did not cover fully. I believed that, by revealing her hair, 
she committed a sin that on the Day of Judgment would send her to hell. The state 
media and educational system in Iran advocate that by disobeying the 
conventional Islamic dress code of hijab, one may receive the worst otherworldly 
punishment in hell. Religious families raise their children based on this belief, 
instilled during the earliest years. 
Many women in Iran are so-called bad hijab (improper covering) because the way 
they veil themselves differs from what the conventional fiqh prescribes. Due to 
the imposition of hijab, many women who do not believe in veiling have to veil 
when they enter public spaces. Many people thought, as I did, that anyone showing 
their hair outside of their scarf did not believe in hijab, and that if such women left 
Iran they would not wear the headscarf. After I came to the UK, I started seeing 
many women who did not cover completely but who were still partially veiled, as 
they had been inside Iran. 
Partial-hijabi women generally wear a scarf, but their hair and neck is not fully 
covered, and their limits for covering other parts of body are less strict than in 
previous groups. Some show parts of their arm or below their knee but there is no 
                                                        
79 Interview with Soraya, conducted at SOAS, 26/12/2012 
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general rule. Figure 10 depicts a woman following a partial-hijab dress code in 
London and Figure 11 depicts them in Iran. Their behavioural hijab is generally 
more open when interacting with men, but it depends on the individual. There 
might be cases where a woman wears partial-hijab but thinks much more 
conservatively than a woman who wears full progressive hijab. People who follow 
this type of dress code in the streets of Iran might not believe in hijab, but when 
you see someone with a scarf (partial-hijab) in London, it means that this person 
is voluntarily veiling, as discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
Figure 10: Image of a partial-hijab dress code in London 
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Figure 11: Image of a partial-hijab dress code in London (the consent of women in the pictures has 
been obtained for the publication of their picture in this thesis) 
Termeh, 26 is a graduate analyst at a well-known bank in London. She has attained 
a finance BA degree from Columbia University and MA degree from London School 
of Economics and Political Science. She believes that the partial-hijab dress code 
is a product of the Islamic Revolution. She commented: 
I believe that if there were no Islamic Republic and consequent 
ideologies in Iran, women like me with bad hijab [incorrect covering] 
would not exist. That we wear something like this is a product of the 
Islamic Republic, and we are happy about it. I have friends who wear 
a scarf with hair showing. They may also dance in front of men, which 
is completely unexpected of a woman amongst religious people. 
Another friend told me that this type of partial-hijab is no good, 
because her mother does not approve of her. At the same time, my 
other group of friends who do not believe in hijab accept her. Women 
like my friend and I are suffering, because we do not belong to the 
groups of hijabi or non-hijabi women. We are mid-line. In Iranian 
society being a hijabi or non-hijabi means a lot. The two sides deny 
each other in order to define themselves. The hijabi side claims that 
we are pure and modest. They believe that partial-hijabi and non-
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hijabi women are the same, in that they are loose women. On the 
other side, the non-hijabi women say that full hijabi and partial-
hijabi women are oppressed by their men, or that they veil because 
of their father’s job. Meanwhile, someone like me, who has a scarf and 
at the same time dances in front of men, becomes a target, because 
we deconstruct the game of hijabi/non-hijabi. It is just like the 
transsexuals, who have deconstructed the game of gender and who 
are the target of much criticism from both sides. Being a partial-hijab 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. Society pushes you to say 
where you stand. People don’t allow you to be in the middle. Society 
likes drawing sharp lines and having boxes to put people in. It does 
not like people who don’t fit into one of the categories and boxes. 
Many people say to me, “What is this you are wearing? You should 
either wear it completely or don’t wear it at all.” So far I’ve discussed 
the disadvantages. The advantage of this type of hijab is that women 
like myself have the option to hang out with both sides. We are a 
bridge between the two.80 
Termeh is quite sophisticated in her analysis of the situation. What becomes clear 
in approaches like hers is that it is evidently based on informed choice and active 
exercise of agency: a woman whp pratices the veil in some degree but is 
comfortable with dancing in front of men. It sounds like an oxymoron. If one were 
to view this from the perspective of Reza Gholami (2014), it appears like an 
examply of ‘non-Islamiosoty’ but Termehs self-identification is categorically at 
odds with such ‘secular’ readings. 
As Termeh put it clearly, the partial-hijabis are the group that bridge between 
hijabis and non-hijabis because they transgress the divisions. Amongst my 
interviewees, partial-hijabis were the ones whose social and friendship networks 
transcends the hijabi/non-hijabi divide. Interestingly, most of those experienced 
a transition in their own hijab scheme from hijabi to non-hijabi went through a 
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period of being partial-hijabi between the two phases. In other words, partial-
hijab often functions as a bridge both between hijabi and non-hijabi circles of 
friends and also between the hijabi and non-hijabi period of one’s life.  
Precisely describing what women in this group wear is not possible, because 
unlike the first two groups, they do not have fixed limits on their clothing. They 
do not necessarily abide by conventional fiqh, and the way they veil varies from 
case to case. Each individual must decide what to wear. However, to provide a 
general overview, one can say that they all wear a scarf on their head, but parts of 
their hair are out of the scarf. They do not wear short tops or very short skirts. 
They wear long-sleeved tops with trousers, even if the shirt is not long. They also 
wear make-up. Moving beyond a mere description of their attire, the more 
fundamental issue is their active individuality. The self-confidence which is quite 
palpable in their approach puts people like Termeh in an entirely different 
category. In the face of all odds, both from the context of traditional conservatives 
and from a liberal and secular setting in London where she would find difficulty 
finding in job, she has maintained her choice in a visible manner. 
The behavioural hijab amongst this group depends on many factors. Generally 
speaking, this group is more comfortable interacting with men. For example, 
Termeh said: 
Many women say that they veil to show that they are Muslim and to 
protect themselves from things like shaking hand or hugging. But the 
thing is, someone like me ruins this game, because nowadays I shake 
hands, and sometimes I even hug. Before I got my job I didn’t do this, 
but after I got this job there was no other option for me. Sometimes 
my boss comes from New York and says hello, and I can’t stop him 
from hugging me. My profession requires it. Therefore, the act of 
shaking hands or hugging when performed by someone like me may 
ruin the image of other veiled women.81 
                                                        
81 Interview with Termeh, conducted at Islington, 14/11/2012 
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In general, women in the partial-hijab category do not wear a scarf in order to look 
less attractive. Based on my own experience and from my interviews, I find that 
this type of hijab does not necessarily make an individual less beautiful than not 
wearing a headscarf. Their reason for wearing the headscarf has more to do with 
identity codes and social pressure from family members, which will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Six. For example Termeh said: “I even think I look more 
attractive with this partial-hijab compared to wearing the same clothes without 
the headscarf”. 
Mahsa, age 33, is a dentist who follows a partial-hijab dress code. She always 
wears trousers with short or long shirts, and with the front of her hair out of her 
scarf. She believes that behavioural hijab is much more important than veiling. 
She has many friends who veil very strictly but who flirt with men, as well as 
friends who are very open in what they wear but who follow behavioural hijab. In 
Mahsa’s opinion, hijab as a dress code is legislated in order to tell women to 
behave in a particular way, and its purpose derives from behavioural hijab. In her 
words: 
There are some people who are fully veiled, but the way they look at 
men makes them quite like a naked person. In contrast, while 
wearing a bikini, some people have hijab in their eyes, and you 
perceive that they are very modest. My own experience is that I 
should wear different clothes in different places. For example, when 
I want to go to Iranian gatherings, I always dress up much more 
conservatively, wearing long tunics and never a short shirt. The 
reason is that the gaze of Iranian men is different, and it makes me 
uncomfortable. In places that there are no Iranian men, if I take off 
my scarf I won’t feel bad, although I definitely feel I am doing a sin. 
Although I wear a shirt and trousers in London, when I go to Iran I 
never take off my manto inside the houses of my family and friends, 
because I feel bad for the looks I get.82 
                                                        
82 Interview with Mahsa, conducted in South Ruislip, 2/10/2012 
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Mahsa’s comments show what women in this group choose to wear is partly born 
out of a sense of reciprocal or reflexive interactions, and does not specifically and 
necessarily come from women’s views themselves.  
I have presented only two examples of the partial-hijabi women who I 
interviewed, but I have tried to provide as representative an understanding of the 
characteristics of their hijab. Given the scope of my research, critically, I would 
point out that due to the imposition of hijab in Iran, we cannot infer from a 
woman’s dress code in Iran whether she belongs to the partial-hijabi group or the 
non-hijabi group. Even women who do not believe in veiling appear in public in 
the partial-hijab dress code. However, outside Iran there is no compulsory dress 
code, and therefore it is possible visually to identify their group. 
Conservative scarf-less 
With each subsequent group, characterisation becomes more complicated 
because the limits to which they adhere are less fixed. Every woman in this group 
has her own understanding of hijab, but there are some unifying characteristics. 
‘Conservative scarf-less’ refers to women who do not wear the headscarf but who 
still cover certain parts of their body. For example they will not wear a short skirt 
or conventional swimming costume. They might be practicing Muslims or they 
might not be religious, but they all believe in the virtue of modesty (efaf).  
The women I interviewed in this heuristic group do not endorse the conventional 
hijab requiring covering all parts of the body except for the hands and face. They 
do still believe in hijab, though their definition is different. Hengameh, aged 30, 
has a postgraduate degree in international relations, and works in a bank. I met 
her at a café in London’s Oxford Street. She wore a pink cardigan with a black skirt 
and thick tights. She wore very light make-up and her hair was quite short—below 
her ears. She is a practicing Muslim, and when asked whether she believes in 
covering according to conventional fiqh, she said: 
I don’t believe in hijab being obligatory at all. In my view, hijab is not 
physically covering the body and hair. I don’t believe in this hijab. For 
me hijab is something internal. If someone has inner hijab, they will 
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not wear very revealing clothes. I myself don’t wear short skirts or 
sleeveless tops, and I am very careful about my breasts. I always wear 
high neck tops. I think that area is very private, and I feel bad 
showing it off.83 
By internalised hijab, Hengameh means that the behaviour of women is the most 
important thing, rather than what they wear or how much make-up they wear. In 
this, she agrees with Mahsa, above. Behavioural hijab, which many of my 
interviewees mentioned, involves modesty in the way a woman looks at and 
interacts with men, as well as in her body language: it is not entirely about how 
much she covers herself. This category is, therefore, about the internalisation or 
embodiment of values associated with hijab in the conservative sense. In Muslim 
contexts, and especially amongst Iranians, the first thing women judge each other 
for are their dress codes. This form of judgement is criticised by many of the 
interviewees in this thesis. 
Parisa, age 30, is a PhD student in Sociology. In our meeting, she was wearing a 
black turtleneck top, a long cardigan, a black skirt, and high boots. She had on very 
light make-up. Her hair was tied back in a simple ponytail. I asked her how she 
defines hijab, and she said: 
I define hijab as modesty (efaf). If someone asks me what hijab should 
be like, I would not, in any sense, say that all women should dress as 
I do and not wear a scarf. At the same time, I would not say that all 
women should wear a scarf, because although I am a practicing 
Muslim, I don’t see hijab in the same way it is defined in our 
conventional fiqh. I have a problem with this being obligatory for all 
Muslim women. The way I see and define hijab for myself is different 
from place to place. My definition and practice of hijab is different 
when I am in London, and when I travel with my friends. In general, 
I can say that there is no one fixed definition of hijab for me. What 
matters to me is modesty. Modesty is the essence of hijab, and it is the 
                                                        
83 Interview with Hengameh, conducted at Oxford Circus, 9/10/2012 
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dominant characteristic of hijab. In a sense, modesty is the spirit of 
hijab, and it determines what we should wear and how we should 
behave in different contexts.84 
As I mentioned earlier, the limits of covering vary according to the different places 
these women go. For this group, there is still a fixed limit that they will not cross 
under any circumstance. This limit is the main difference between this group and 
the radical hijab-less group. Conservative scarf-less women do not wear low cut 
tops, and they will not wear shorts or skirts above their knees in any situation. 
Their dress code in Iran is much more conservative; they are more comfortable in 
London as they do not receive unwanted judgment or character evaluation. Mina, 
a 22 year-old lawyer, said: 
My dress code doesn’t have anything to do with my religion. I see it 
as an ethical issue. If I wear concealing clothes, it is because I feel I 
am responsible not to dress in a way that makes men uncomfortable. 
For example, if I don’t show my thighs, it is not because I think I would 
be committing a sin, it is because I see it as unethical. Therefore, when 
I go to Iran, although I don’t believe in covering my hair even in 
private gatherings, I sometime wear a scarf. In the streets of Tehran, 
I wear very modest clothes and I don’t wear make-up. Unlike in 
London, you get a lot of attention and bad looks if you go out dressed 
the way you would in London.85 
Fereshteh is 22 years old, and is doing a degree in history. She has gone through a 
major transition in her dress code from full progressive hijab to conservative 
scarf-less that I will discuss further in Chapter Six. Describing the limits of her 
dress code at present, she said: 
                                                        
84 Interview with Parisa, conducted at UCL, 1/11/2012 
85 Interview with Mina, conducted at Euston, 24/10/2012 
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The limit of my dress code depends on the place I want to go to. There 
is one rule that I always try to follow. I always dress so that my 
sexuality will not be the first indication of me as a person.86 
As was clearly stated by my interviewees in this group, their main reason to 
choose this form of dress code is more to do with morality than Islam. They 
believe hijab in Islam is all about modesty and not about specific universal 
religious limitation to what one wears. Generally speaking, in this group, relations 
with men are more easy-going and much closer. All the interviewees in this group 
shake hands with men. Some of them hug as well. They all have male friends, and 
believe in a healthy friendship with men. 
It is apparent that different people define modesty differently. The limits of 
covering are also variable, especially for the conservative scarf-less group, in 
which there are no fixed lines. The image that every individual has of their body 
is very important in choosing what to wear and what limits are set by their 
understanding of modesty. For example, Sayeh, a 25 year-old PhD student in 
history, told me: 
Through my entire life, my dress code has been the same, and I have 
never had a scarf except in public spaces in Iran, where it is 
compulsory. Although I don’t veil, I believe in haya (modesty) in my 
dress code. I can’t wear short skirts or very low neck tops. I am not 
even comfortable in changing my clothes in front of my female 
friends or my mum. To some extent, this is due to the feeling I have 
about my body, but at the same time I believe in covering as a way of 
showing modesty. Covering gives me peace and tranquillity but this 
does not mean that more covering shows more modesty for other 
people. In my case, it is good.87 
The type of dress code people choose does not necessarily connect to the religious 
or cultural beliefs that they have. The feeling and image that people have about 
                                                        
86 Interview with Fereshteh, conducted at Oxford SOAS, 5/10/2012 
87 Interview with Sayeh, conducted in Paddington, 2/12/2012 
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their body is also very important. In Chapter Six, I discuss the relation between 
hijab and body image in more detail. 
In all of the above categories so far, women are faced with the underlying issue of 
how their sexuality and femininity is viewed. All of them are aware of being 
targets of sexually motivated interactions. For them, observing the hijab may 
seem like a solution to this problem, but it does not always work (as I observed in 
the case of sexual harassment). As we can see, when a woman is viewed as a sexual 
object and erotism becomes a driving force in male-female interactions, neither 
approaches to the veil address the root cause of the problem: among Iranian men, 
the problem seems to persist. At least many women are convinced that ‘culturally’, 
Iranian men have this ‘problem’. It is in this sense that the idea of hijab as 
protection comes into play. 
What remains to be problematized is how and under what circumstances male 
members of a society view women as sexual objects. The next question is if this 
situation is peculiar to Muslim societies and Muslim men. Once we look at the 
issue in this context, yet again the centrality of hijab as a counteracting measure 
falls apart. With or without the veil, women may continue to be seen as sexual 
objects. This observation is present in the views of the last two groups about hijab. 
However, the interactions of Iranian women with various forms of hijab with 
erotism and sexual conduct is under-researched. It is, however, beyond the scope 
of my research. 
Radical Hijab-less 
This category relates to women who are mostly non-religious, and who in theory 
do not believe in veiling. Their dress code depends on context and physical 
location. They wear clothes very much like a typical European women. The limits 
of their covering are much more flexible than the previous group. They might 
wear a short skirt, a sleeveless top or a bikini, depending on the situation and 
locale. Taraneh is an old friend of mine from my undergraduate days. She has been 
living in London since 2008, and has an MA in sociology. I have seen her wearing 
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different kinds of clothes, including shorts, low cut tops, and a bikini. In my 
interview with her I asked her to describe her limits for dress. She replied: 
The only parts I would never ever show are my nipples and my 
vagina. Apart from that, I am comfortable wearing anything 
depending on the place and situation. I also have chubby legs, 
therefore I don’t like to wear shorts very much, but sometimes I do 
wear them.88 
This quotation clearly shows that women who belong to this group dress free 
from any religious concern. Like it is common amongst women in general, the 
body image of my interviewees in this group is a pertinent factor in determining 
what they would wear. For example, Hasti, who is 27 years old and has a MA in 
gender studies, said that she does not believe in any limits in her dress code. 
However, because she has always been fat, she does not wear sleeveless tops or 
short skirts. In theory, however, she does not have a problem with wearing more 
revealing clothes. It is evident that the image individuals have about their body 
determines what they wear. It is evident that the choice of dress code of women 
in this group is determined by non-religious concerns, including their body image, 
rather than specifically Muslim discourses about dress code.  
                                                        
88 Interview with Taraneh, conducted at Golders Green, 25/10/2012 
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Figure 12: Image of a dress code in Iran that could represent one of the following three types: partial-
hijab, conservative scarf-less and radical hijab-less. 
The women I interviewed in this group, like the conservative scarf-less group, 
have a more conservative dress code when they go to Iran than when they are in 
London. Fariba, age 27, has lived in London for three years and has a Master’s 
degree in social sciences. She said: 
Here in London I have many options in my clothing. Depending on 
where I go, I wear different clothes. I might wear short skirt or 
décolleté dresses. In London, I feel that no one judges me based on 
what I wear. The only thing I don’t wear is a bikini, but I do wear a 
swimming suit. But when I go to Iran, I don’t take many of the clothes 
that I wear here. In Iran, wearing clothes that cover more fully is a 
sign of respecting some of our old family members, and wearing a 
short skirt or low cut top does not give a good impression. In Iran, 
you are not free to wear what you like because people will judge 
you.89 
In Iran today, even in non-religious and secular families, wearing very revealing 
clothes is not always acceptable, and women might be judged negatively for it. 
Fariba, discussed above, belongs to a non-religious family, but as is evident, there 
                                                        
89 Interview with Fariba, conducted at Golders Green, 1/10/2012 
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are still some restrictions upon her. The other women in this group who I 
interviewed also had similar experiences. They felt comfortable wearing many 
things where Iranians are not present, but they did not feel good wearing those 
clothes in front of Iranians or inside Iran. 
Delara, aged 32, provides another perspective. She has followed many types of 
dress code, from conservative scarf-less to full progressive hijab, and after that to 
partial-hijab and again to conservative scarf-less. At the moment she may be 
described as radical hijab-less. The reasons for her historical or temporal 
transitions will be discussed in Chapter Six. For now I want to present her own 
words on this issue: 
I don’t have a specific limit for my clothing. Depending on where I go, 
I choose what to wear. I have had the experience of wearing a bikini 
at the beach in Dubai where I didn’t know anyone and I was alone. 
But I didn’t wear a swimming suit in a hotel in India. We were there 
with my Iranian classmates, and I didn’t feel comfortable wearing a 
swimming suit in front of them. Also, I have been photographed 
naked, but I don’t wear very revealing clothes in Iran, especially when 
I don’t know the people attending. In front of my close friends, I am 
more relaxed and feel free to wear what I want. In general, the way I 
choose my clothes is very different when I am in Iran or in Iranian 
gathering compared to when I am in places like London or Spain.90 
Due to the imposition of hijab in Iran, many women suffer from not being able to 
wear what they are comfortable in. In addition, it is difficult to wear something 
they do not believe in and carry the burden of extra pieces like the manto or the 
scarf. Further, the way “the moral police”91 treat women who do not abide by 
Islamic rules is very tough for hijab-less women. Women in this group have the 
                                                        
90 Interview with Delara, conducted at Tufnell Park, 20/10/2012 
91 Moral police (gashte ershad) is the branch of police in the Islamic Republic of Iran responsible for 
fighting against those citizens who do not obey the conventional Islamic codes of dress and behavior 
with the other sex—for example, women who do not follow a proper Islamic dress code or women 
or men who engage in ‘improper interactions’ with the other sex. The moral police are located in 
important and crowded parts of the city, and they have large vans that drive around the city. They 
will first tell women to cover their hair, and if the women disobey they arrest them. 
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same type of dress code as partial-hijabis or conservative scarf-less women in 
public spaces in Iran. They always have to wear a manto and scarf. I asked my 
interviewees about their experiences of being in public in Iran with manto and 
scarf. Many of them said that from the time they were born this has been the 
obligatory dress code in public. They, therefore, do not feel the pressure since they 
have gotten used to the practice. For their mums it is more difficult, because they 
experienced a period before the 1979 Islamic Revolution when they were free to 
wear whatever they wanted, comparatively speaking. Every time this generation 
wants to go out, they feel the pressure of wearing a dress code imposed by the 
government. I also talked to some women who were under 30 years old but who 
were still not used to this obligatory law of dress for women. I asked my 
interviewees if they had encountered the moral police in Iran regarding their 
dress code. Hasti replied: 
In Iran, I am not one of those girls with ‘illegal’ dress code, therefore 
I have never been noticed by the moral police. I dreamt as a kid that 
I would become a good lawyer or president. Because I was a person 
with this type of dress code and I was not a full hijabi, I believed these 
goals were not accessible for me, and only women with full hijab can 
aspire to that position. When I attended university I wondered why 
bad hijabi girls were engaged in political societies. I thought it was 
not their right in the eyes of Islamic republic to go into societies 
reserved for full hijabi girls. Women with this type of dress code have 
always been the “other” for the government, not insiders. This is the 
feeling of many hijab-less women in Iran, and it is the reason they 
might resent the full hijabi women. The government has always 
excluded them. Before the Islamic Republic, there was hatred from 
religious women toward women who appeared in public with a very 
open dress code. One of the results of the Islamic Republic is that this 
hatred has become bilateral. The non-hijabi women feel that the 
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hijabi women have much more opportunity in terms of jobs and 
social advantages from the government, which they don’t have.92 
The relation between men and women for radical hijab-less women is much more 
open in comparison with the other groups, because most of them do not have 
religious boundaries regulating men and women meeting, and they do not believe 
in limitation with regards to mahram/namahram. All of the women I interviewed 
in this heuristic category shake hands with men. They are also open to hugging 
men and kissing them on their cheeks when greeting them. Many of them dance 
in the company of men. Even if they do not dance, it is not because they believe it 
is wrong. They do not do it because they do not like dancing, or because they do 
not know how to dance. They all have close male friends, and do not believe in 
separation between males and females. Their gatherings and parties are all mixed, 
unlike with the first two groups, where, for example, men and women at weddings 
are segregated. In general, the concept of purdah is absent in their lifestyle. 
Behavioural hijab also has a different meaning for this group. For example, 
laughing with a namahram might be perceived by a full traditional hijabi woman 
as flirting with men and as a sin, so according to her behavioural hijab she is 
careful not to laugh. For a radical hijab-less woman, the limits of behavioural hijab 
might involve not kissing a man (other than her partner) on the lips. 
As we can see the most important marker is that religion in the sense of strictly 
practicing – or practice in any sense – is not part of the equation for determining 
dress code for these women. It is this group of people who might fit much more 
easily into the ‘non-Islamious’ category of Gholami (2014). 
Notions of veil and interconnected themes 
In what follows below, I will provide some of the dominant notions about hijab as 
Zib Mir-Hosseini (2011) has covered. They are briefly categorised under: 1) 
seclusion; 2) protection, 3) protest; 4) imposition; and 5) choice. 
                                                        
92 Interview with Hasti, conducted at Hendon, 18/10/2012 
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Mir-Hosseini (2011) presents and explores five notions of hijab in Iran. The first 
one is hijab as “seclusion” which mainly refers to pre-modern Iran, in which hijab 
was a means to exclude women from the social sphere completely and a kind of 
confinement for women. The second notion is hijab as “protection”, introduced by 
Morteza Motahari (2010), and it became the ideology of the Islamic republic after 
the 1979 Revolution regarding the issue of hijab. This explains hijab as a tool to 
bring women into society while protecting them from sexual harm. In this sense, 
the burden and responsibility is on women not to be provocative.  
The third notion is hijab as “protest”, introduced by Shariati (1994). Unlike 
Motahari, Shariati did not engage with fiqh regarding the issue of hijab. He offered 
a new meaning for hijab: hijab as a symbol of protest against Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s regime, rather than hijab being a symbol of tradition. Shariati 
differentiated between two groups of women. The first group is of women who 
wear hijab because of tradition, imitating their mothers. The second group refers 
to women who chose to wear hijab by their own volition, against Westernised 
consumerism.  
The fourth notion is hijab as “imposition”, which appeared after the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979. Due to the imposition of hijab, all women are obliged to wear 
a specific dress code and they will be arrested or punished in cases of 
disobedience. 
The last notion of hijab presented by Mir-Hosseini is hijab as “choice”. She argues 
that, after all the debate around the notion of hijab in Muslim countries between 
feminists and Islamists who see hijab as oppression or as women’s liberty; it is 
important to illustrate that some hijabi women have chosen this dress code by 
their own volition and for their own reasons.  
The five part schemas that I described in this chapter cannot be directly linked to 
one of these five notions, because not all women in my study practice hijab in 
London. Nonetheless, these notions can be used for most of the women who I 
interviewed. Hijab as “protection” is the most popular rationale for full traditional 
hijabi women, and to some extent for full progressive hijabi women. Full 
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progressive hijabi women can also be linked to the notion of hijab as “choice” and 
hijab as “protest”. Partial-hijabi women may embody hijab as protest and hijab as 
imposition. For the conservative scarf-less group, hijab is more of a choice, and for 
the radical hijab-less women, they wear hijab in Iran only due to imposition. 
While exploring the reasons for following certain dress codes is not the aim of this 
chapter, which attempts to give a thick description of the features of each type of 
dress code, one point deserves mentioning here: religious belief is not the only 
determining factor in choosing what to wear. For example, a woman’s self-body-
image, too, profoundly influences her decision to wear or not wear certain clothes. 
Self-perceptions of body size and shape might lead to wearing certain clothes. We 
cannot therefore attribute what people choose to wear only to their religious or 
women’s rights-related beliefs.  
All full traditional hijabi women and full progressive hijabi women began wearing 
hijab from the age of nine (the age from which girls are expected to observe 
religious duties according to conventional Shia jurisprudence) or earlier (except 
those who have had a transition in their dress code). Partial-hijabi women started 
wearing a scarf at various ages depending on the shape of their body and the age 
of puberty. 
In the hijab-less group there are people who think conservatively about men’s and 
women’s interactions with each other. Therefore not wearing the headscarf does 
not necessarily imply not believing in purdah or behavioural hijab. 
In this chapter, I have described different dress codes of London-based Iranian 
women both when they are in Iran and in London. I have also problematized 
certain aspects of these approaches to hijab with some critical comments. As I 
mentioned earlier, not all women can be neatly categorized under one of these 
schemas. Nevertheless, it is necessary to lay out general characteristics and 
associations of women’s dress codes apparent amongst the Iranian diaspora 
before we can go on to enquire further into to their dynamic relevance with 
respect to individual histories. 
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Different styles of head covering practised by Iranian women  
As I mentioned earlier, the covering for the head, including the hair and neck, is the 
most important part of the hijab amongst the Iranian women both in Iran and in 
London. My informants who wear the headscarf follow varying covering styles. 
Rusari, shal and maqnae are the three different styles. I have previously referred to 
all of them with the word headscarf. Here I will define each in detail. 
1. Rusari is the first and most popular style of headscarf worn by Iranians. It is a 
square piece of fabric made in different sizes, materials, and colours. Some hijabi 
women tie the rusari under their chin, as shown in Figure 9 by the first three persons 
from the right. Iranian hijabi women around the world are mostly recognisable as 
Iranian because they wear a rusari tied under their chin. Different nationalities 
follow different manners of wearing the rusari, and the most common and popular 
style amongst Iranian women is tying it. Another style is pinning the scarf to one 
side. This style is borrowed from the Lebanese, and in Iran it is called ‘Lebanese 
style’. Most of the women from the first two groups wear the rusari in the Lebanese 
style, and to do so signifies having a stricter hijab. 
 
188 
 
 
Figure 13: Image of the Lebanese style of wearing a rusari. 
2. Shal is the second kind of headscarf. It is a rectangular piece of fabric made in 
different sizes and colours. It is the same as the scarf that non-hijabi women use in 
cold weather to cover their neck, but hijabi women use it to cover their head. Arabs 
mostly use this style of headscarf, but Iranians also use it. Figure 10 shows a woman 
wearing shal that covers their hair fully. Figure 12 shows women wearing the shal 
in Iran who may either be partial-hijabi (in Iran and London), conservative scarf-
less (only in Iran) or radical hijab-less (only in Iran). 
3. Maqnae is a kind of scarf that is closed in front. It only comes in plain colours. 
Figure 14 shows a woman wearing a maqnae. In Iran, girls and women are required 
to wear maqnae at schools, universities and all governmental offices. In primary 
schools, it is mostly worn in white colour. In high school, universities and 
government offices, it should be darkly coloured (black, grey, brown, or dark blue). 
All of my informants have worn maqnae in Iran but I did not see any of them wear 
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maqnae in London. This shows that, aesthetically, women do not like the maqnae, 
because when they can choose what to wear, they never choose maqnae, although 
they have had to wear it most of their life in Iran.  
 
Figure 14 - An Example of Maqnae 
Conclusion 
In order to understand why Iranian Muslim women in London have certain kinds of 
covering, and why they change after they moved to London, I have given a full 
description of the five schemas which I have identified. I have also provided both in 
this chapter and in preceding ones how social, political and religious factors and 
sensibilities have contributed to this shift. Shifts in the structure of political power 
after the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini, the rise of the reformist discourse, the Green 
Movement and migrations of the most recent generation of Iranians to Europe have 
all contributed to the social and political aspects of the issue.  
This chapter explained each of these five schemas: full traditional hijab, full 
progressive hijab, partial-hijab, conservative scarf-less and radical hijab-less. 
Although I have interviewed roughly the same number of women in each of the five 
schemas, the majority of the Iranian women who live in London belong to the last 
three categories (partial-hijab and especially conservative scarf-less or radical 
hijab-less) as they are less conservative and traditional compared to average 
Iranians living in Iran. Iranians in London are not generally known as hijabi women, 
and I myself have encountered many people who were surprised when I said I was 
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Iranian because of my headscarf. Although there are a considerable number of 
Iranian hijabi women in London, in general Iranians are not associated with hijab, 
unlike other Muslim countries. This is a sign of the fact that the majority of Iranian 
women in London do not wear the headscarf. 
By describing the features of each of the schemas I have tried to provide a useful 
descriptive and explanatory tool that will enable the reader to have a better 
understanding of hijab dynamics amongst Iranian women in London. In the next 
chapter, I will go through the reasons behind each dress code and the reasons for 
transformations in dress code, using both the interviewees’ own views and my 
overall understanding of the topic and its context. 
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Chapter Six: Hijab Rationales and Transitions through Life 
Histories 
Introduction 
As a Muslim hijabi woman living in London, I am asked many questions about my 
veil and about why I observe hijab. Londoners ask, “Why do you hide under a veil? 
Why do you wear a scarf? Do you wear it at your house too? Can I see your hair?” 
Living in the Western world means that I hear these questions much more 
frequently, because most people are not familiar with the intimate and daily 
practices of veiling. Moreover, the political climate of the past two decades has 
further complicated the issue as Afshar (2008) also notes. 
In an Iranian context, the word hijab immediately evokes associations with the 
headscarf. A hijabi woman is most often envisioned as a person who wears the 
headscarf, and in the eyes of many Iranians, a woman who follows all codes of hijab 
but who does not wear the headscarf is non-hijabi. In fact, hijab is far more than the 
headscarf and the correct covering for the body. Hijab is a set of rules and 
behavioural codes that I have discussed throughout this thesis. I have explored some 
of the political, social and intellectual contexts of these associations in chapters Two, 
Three and Four. 
In Chapter Five, I provided a thematic perspective elucidating approaches to 
protection vs. restriction, choice and agency and problematizing concepts of 
modernity and secularity and I have extensively discussed the literature about these 
interconnected themes in chapters Two and Four. Also, I described categories of five 
dress codes that I find to be a useful heuristic when interpreting my informants’ 
choices of clothing and the causes and rationales for these choices. The five 
categories of dress are: 1) ‘Full Traditional Hijab,’ the strictest form of covering; 2) 
‘Full Progressive Hijab,’ which is more colourful and relaxed but still completely 
follows mainstream traditional Shia jurisprudence; 3) ‘Partial-Hijab,’ referring to 
women who wear a headscarf but do not cover all parts of their hair and neck; 4) 
‘Conservative Scarf-less Hijab,’ referring to women who do not wear a headscarf but 
restrict their dress in other ways; and 5) ‘Radical Hijab-less,’ referring to women 
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who do not believe in limiting what they wear (based on religious rulings), although 
in practice they may or may not be comfortable in revealing clothes.  
In this chapter, I highlight my informants’ understanding of their hijab practice and 
the transformation of their dress code, often in their own words. Even women who 
practice the same scheme of dress might have completely different reasons for doing 
so. 
Addressing this issue, one has to separate two sets of questions. The first question 
is why women who believe in Islamic dress codes have such different schemas of 
dress and limits to their practice. In other words, the question is about 
problematizing unified and singular perceptions of ‘Islam’ and self-identity. What is 
prominently important here is the shift from ‘Islam’ as an abstract idea to which 
many interpretations may be attributed to ‘Muslims’ (in plural) which also includes 
Muslim women, who have brought in their own voices and choices in determining 
the dress code. One of the key points in this discussion is how one can move from 
viewing ‘Islam’ which is synonymous with fiqh (which gives rulings for every single 
aspect of a Muslim’s life in a maximalist manner) to a civilizational, more humanistic 
idea of being a Muslim. The problematic side of this issue is that Islam as manifested 
in jurisprudential rulings, even when some scholars speak of the dynamism of 
ijthiad in fiqh, supersedes other manifestations of Islam which may be best seen in 
literary, poetic and philosophical traditions which have developed over centuries in 
Muslim societies. The works of Lenn Goodman (2003) and George Makdisi (1990) 
give us a much wider and more inclusive perspective into the multifarious genres, 
different from the jurisprudential approaches that have dominated the intellectual 
discourses in Muslim societies at the expense of non-jurisprudential aspects of 
Islam. 
The second question is to what extent women within the same scheme have 
different motives and rationales for their practice. The most general conclusion 
derived from my fieldwork is that women follow a certain dress code either because 
of their beliefs, motivations, or an element of obligation or coercion. I will provide 
examples for each of these categories in this chapter. 
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A second general way of categorising reasons for hijab is as follows. The first four 
dress codes are followed by women who have specific but varying limits for 
covering their body. They do observe hijab, but do so in different ways. There are at 
least six general reasons for their observance.  
Hijab as an ethical duty 
Viewing hijab as an ethical duty is deeply rooted in a jurisprudential articulation of 
faith. The most prominent element in such perceptions of hijab is the role of the 
classical religious authority of the faqih in describing religious duties. One can 
hardly see deviations in this approach from a jurisprudential perspective to a more 
humanistic one. Therefore, ethics is closely tied with what religion is meant to 
prescribe in terms of rituals. As I briefly mentioned above, humanism is much less 
present in such approaches. This jurisprudential approach is not reflective of all the 
more complex theological debates about the primacy and priority of ethics over 
religion. Such discussions are present in the works of people like Fanaei (2005) 
among Iranian scholars, but they are not part of the mainstream discourse about the 
relation between ethics and faith as such.  
Hijab as legal requirement 
State law in Iran is one of the most influential reasons for dictating the terms of dress 
code in Iran. Even though the general blueprint of the Iranian constitution was based 
on the French model, the introduction of Islamic principles in the constitution was 
followed by a jurisprudential interpretation of Islam. Here, there is an interplay 
between the secular and the religious. A constitution which deals with political 
power is infused with religious elements which provides broader prescriptions 
about the lifestyle of citizens in Iran. Citizens who make a distinction between the 
political nature of the state and its religious aspect may reduce the practice of hijab 
to a legal requirement. Even if they are not happy with it, they are forced to observe 
it by law. Those who do not make this distinction and believe in the inseparable 
nature of politics of the state and religion, would have to live with the uncomfortable 
tension that arise at different times when state policies become stricter or looser. 
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The inevitable consequence of this politicisation of religious rulings is the increased 
disillusionment of a new generation of ‘practicing’ Muslim women with such norms. 
Expediency and aesthetic preferences 
Apart from conforming legal requirements, playing by the society’s customs is 
another driving force behind variations of hijab. Within these limitations, women 
have gradually developed their own aesthetic preferences too, while at times out of 
expediency, they observe different forms of hijab depending on the context. When 
they are at work, they may have to observe the legally prescribed norms but the 
moment the leave work space, they freely move to a dress code with which they are 
more comfortable. 
I will provide examples for each of these and break them into smaller sections in the 
following paragraphs. Women may have one or more of the reasons above. For 
example, an individual can observe hijab both because she sees it as a religious 
obligation and out of ethical duty. Here, the boundary between ethics and religious 
obligation is blurred. There is no conscious problematisation of being ethical and 
being religious. 
Another reason for observing hijab that is especially prominent amongst women in 
the diaspora is to use hijab as a statement of identity or a form of political protest. 
Showing that you are a Muslim has more function in Western countries because 
Muslims are in the minority and hijab becomes more a matter of identity. Political 
protest led many Iranian women to observe hijab before and after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution both in and outside Iran. Many of my informants mentioned that their 
mothers or aunts began wearing hijab before the Revolution to protest against Reza 
Shah’s dictatorship. By political, here I refer to conventional politics. I do agree with 
some feminists (e.g., Hanisch, 1969) that personal life can be seen as political, even 
though I agree there are important connections between personal and political life. 
Hijab practice can provide a sense of security to the women who wear it. Amongst 
the Iranian diaspora in London, many stated that they feel more secure wearing full 
hijab when they walk in the streets of Tehran, while in London they do not see 
security as a reason for observing hijab. 
195 
 
Another important reason behind having or not having hijab can be to fight against 
an inferiority complex, which is related to the ‘class’ dimension of hijab. Only one of 
my informants mentioned that the reason she removed her hijab was that she 
wanted to be like those women who belong to the upper class and do not wear a 
scarf. After Reza Shah’s unveiling order in 193693, hijab became a sign of the working 
class (contrary to what we find in MacLeod’s study of the women of lower-middl-
class in Cairo), and non-hijabi women were associated with modern and high-class 
elite. Both before and after the 1979 Revolution, many Iranian movies and television 
serials depicted poor women wearing chador, and rich and educated women 
following a relaxed or ‘partial-hijab’ dress code. 
A final, very general way of categorising the rationale behind each scheme of dress 
code is to divide them into individualistic reasons, religious/jurisprudential 
reasons, and socio-political reasons.  
All these different classificatory systems can interact and overlap. An individual can 
have a mixture of different reasons. In the following sections, I demonstrate the 
contexts and differing rationales for each scheme of dress in the lives of my 
informants, and feature the personal stories of individuals who have experienced 
transitions in their dress code throughout their life history. 
Individualistic Reasons / Reasons of Expediency 
Many of the informants mentioned reasons behind their dress code that could be 
categorised under individualistic reasons and also expediency. By expediency 
(maslahat andishi), I mean that it is done in order to benefit the person. This benefit 
could be spiritual, worldly, or both.  
Khatoon, age 26, is married and has a master’s degree in law. Her current dress code 
can be classified as ‘full progressive hijab’. In the past, she transitioned from non-
hijabi to partial-hijabi, and after that to full progressive hijab. She usually wears a 
                                                        
93 The banning of hijab, also known as the unveiling order, was legislated in 1936 during the period 
of Reza Shah’s kingdom. According to this law, women were not allowed to wear chador (a long round 
shape black fabric covering from head to toe), headscarf, or piche (a face veil) in public. The state 
police forcibly removed the hijab from women who appeared with them in public. 
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scarf with a tunic and trousers. She told me that she agrees with the limits fiqh94 
states for Muslim women, but at the same time, she does not see these limits as an 
Islamic obligation for everyone. I asked Khatoon about her reasons for veiling and 
her answer, which relates to personal belief, was as follows: 
I think that when women limit themselves in the way they wear 
clothes, this physical hijab transmits to their behavioural hijab as 
well, if they know why they are doing it. It is not only about what you 
wear. It could also be not using lipstick in some places. Observing 
hijab would only be valuable for me if I wear it with attention and 
not because of habit. It should be observed because you want to put 
limits on yourself to become stronger. When I started wearing a full 
hijab, I sometimes thought that I would be more comfortable without 
the scarf. But I asked myself what would happen after I took off my 
scarf. I might feel more comfortable wearing sleeveless tops, and then 
after a while all clothes will become normal for me, and I will lose all 
the hijab I have. I think this is dangerous for my life. In my view, the 
nature of women is different from men, and the reason women should 
veil is not to make it easier for men not to be attracted to women. 
Women should veil for their own sake, and I veil for my own good and 
not for men. I think pleasure for men is in looking, and that is why 
Islam has advised men to have hijab in their eyes. It means that they 
should be careful about what they look at. But pleasure for women is 
different. Women like to be admired and show their beauty, and it is 
a pleasure for them to be caressed by men. Therefore hijab for women 
means to hide their sexual beauty and coquetry.  
The reasons Khatoon mentioned were very interesting and different from 
those of the rest of women whom I interviewed or I know myself. She is 
aware of her sexuality and erotism seems to be quite present in the way she 
                                                        
94 According to Mir-Hosseini (2000b), there is a distinction between fiqh and sharia regarding the 
concept of law in Islam. Muslims do not usually distinguish between these two terms. Sharia refers 
to revealed law about the blueprints of mankind for both this world and the other world. Fiqh refers 
to jurisprudence, meaning understanding and knowledge. Fiqh is the intellectual activity that tries to 
discover the divine blueprints, bring rules and legal systems out of these divine terms, and enforce 
duties upon the believers. 
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relates to her dress code. Hijab appears like a strategy for regulating issues 
of sexuality and erotism for her. Unlike some of the informants, she 
observes hijab only for herself and her own good. It is common for Iranians 
to wear hijab to protect themselves from the gaze of other men. But for 
Khatoon, hijab is a way of protecting herself from being attracted to other 
men. Hijab has a benefit for Khatoon: her mental calmness. That is why I 
have drawn upon her as an example of expediency and individualistic 
motivation which is evident in the following quotation from her. The 
narrative we find below is peculiarly conscious of sexuality: 
In our culture, to attract the opposite sex, men are told to be nice and 
to caress the women they like, and women are advised to wear fancy 
lingerie in front of men. Pleasure for men is to look, and for women it 
is being looked at. No one recommends that a man walk naked in a 
fancy dress in front of his partner to provoke her, but they 
recommend that women wear fancy lingerie. I like to be beautiful, 
and to be admired for my beauty as a woman. I think that without 
my hijab I look more beautiful, and therefore my behavioural hijab 
will be weaker. By wearing hijab, I don’t let other men be attracted 
to me, and as a result I won’t be attracted to them. My beauty will be 
kept for my own family, and only my husband will pleasure me, and 
this will reinforce our bond and family welfare, which is important to 
me. The real reason I observe hijab is not to be attracted to men who 
find me beautiful, because that will harm my mental health. Hijab 
preserves pleasure for the family. Some might say that if I don’t wear 
hijab it will not harm me and therefore that is okay, but I think people 
have to be like robots in order to stop themselves from enjoying 
someone looking at their beauty, and that could lead them to lose any 
sexual interest. For me, being cold and robotic is not possible. That’s 
why I choose to wear hijab. What happens if one day I have a crush 
on another man and I am married? It might lead me to be cold with 
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my husband or to betray him. Therefore, hijab helps me protect my 
family and enjoy the relationship I have with my husband. 95 
The above narrative provides a starkly ‘secular’ approach as it is not driven by or 
predicated on the conventional jurisprudential ruling. The fact that the idea of ‘sin’ 
is here shifting to preserving one’s mental health or family bond gives the entire 
narrative a totally this-worldly dimension. In this sense, it is quite ‘secular’ by any 
definition. 
Pegah also provides an answer that can be categorised as an individualistic reason. 
Pegah, age 29, is married and has a PhD in medical engineering. At our interview she 
was wearing a slightly tight brown cardigan with jeans and a scarf. The front part of 
her hair was out, and she wore light makeup. Her scheme of dress was ‘partial-hijab.’ 
In discussing her hijab she raised a number of issues but the one that exemplified 
individualistic belief is demonstrated in the following response: 
My dress code is a mixture of different elements, but the most 
important thing for me is modesty. In different societies, modesty is 
understood differently. The rule I follow in my dress code is not to 
attract attention. I don’t want to get sexual looks from men, and I feel 
cheap if I do so. I don’t need a stranger’s endorsement of my beauty. 
In addition, this hijab helps me to prevent myself from committing 
other sins, and this is very important to me. With hijab, I feel like 
myself. I have become used to it, and that is why I am comfortable 
with it.96 
Yet again, reasons provided here are not inspired by a religious perception of 
morality. It is a this-worldly articulation and explanation of her choice of dress code. 
This individuality is not only reflective of a secular attitude to hijab but also 
represents an agency which is not highlighted or overtly identified. 
Many of the women I interviewed said that they feel comfortable with hijab. The 
question, then, is what led them to feel like this. In response, one could argue that in 
                                                        
95 Interview with Khatoon, conducted at Southgate, 16/09/2012 
96 Interview with Pegah, conducted at North Finchley, 25/12/2012 
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a society where only women who wear the full hijab are recognised as modest 
women, not wearing hijab for modest women will be uncomfortable. In religious 
families like my own, girls who wear full hijab are rewarded and encouraged from a 
very young age. A child that wants to be rewarded therefore presumes that wearing 
a full hijab is the only way to be a good girl.  
Another example of a rationale I identified as individualistic belief is from Shiva aged 
26, who wears ‘full progressive hijab’. Although she has full hijab according to fiqh, 
she does not see it as a compulsory Islamic rule for all women. In answer to my 
question about her reasons for her dress code she stated: 
I think hijab is not a compulsory rule in Islam. My hijab makes my life 
better and easier, and this is why I wear it. It is my lifestyle. I wear it 
because I like to wear it, and not because I am forced to do so. Hijab 
has made my life better in many ways. I feel very comfortable with 
my hijab. I think that I gain more respect when wearing full hijab, 
and this dress code adds to my hormat (dignity).97 
Shiva’s narrative of seeing the veil as part of her dignity and social conduct is once 
again making jurisprudential considerations obsolete and redundant even though 
in letter it seems compliant with rulings of fiqh. 
From my own experience growing up in Iran, I can clearly understand what Shiva 
means about being more comfortable in full hijab. Sometimes the only way to show 
that you are a modest women and to protect yourself from the gaze of men is to 
observe the full hijab. This seems problematic; because Iranian society has reached 
the point that most men think that if a woman does not wear full hijab they have the 
right to sexually enjoy looking at her. Many women prefer to wear the chador98, not 
necessarily out of personal belief, but to protect themselves from unwanted 
encounters with men that are sexually intrusive.  
                                                        
97 Interview with Shiva, conducted at Colindale, 16/10/2012 
98 Chador is a black full body-length fabric that some women wear in public. It is open in front, and 
they hold it with their hands. Chador is known as the most rigorous traditional way of observing hijab 
amongst religious people. 
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Soraya, age 26, is a PhD student in sociology, and she wears full progressive hijab. 
She specified the following reason of expediency of hijab for her: 
I don’t think that hijab is an Islamic obligation for Muslim women, 
but I myself wear hijab. The main reason that I wear it is because it 
helps me in my spirituality. It gives me power over my nafs 
(egocentricity). It diminishes my attention toward my body. Wearing 
or not wearing hijab makes a big difference in my appearance. With 
a scarf, I look less attractive, and I feel good about this, but not 
because it will prevent men from looking at me in a bad way. I think 
that sometimes if you put yourself in challenging situations, like 
wanting to look beautiful but not doing so, it will empower your soul. 
Hijab, for me, is a way of practising my spirituality. Hijab, for me, is 
not only covering certain parts of my body and my hair: it is how I 
present myself and what kind of clothes I wear. For example, if I wear 
makeup, I will look more beautiful. However, because I wear hijab, I 
don’t wear makeup because I don’t want to be noticed—not for other 
people, but for my own good and my own soul. I always try to be 
normal and not to draw attention. Being normal is dissimilar in 
different societies, and the way I dress up in Iran is different from the 
way I am in London. Sometimes I think that if I wore a red scarf I 
would like it because everyone would look at me and say, “She is 
beautiful.” This is not good for my spiritual wellbeing.99 
These spiritual reasons can be categorised as individual reasons for hijab. Although 
the underlying reason is spiritual, Soraya frames this in terms of its benefit to her—
that is, hijab helps her pay less attention to her body, which she values. Spirituality 
is however viewed in entirely non-jurisprudential terms. It may as well be 
categorised as a ‘secularised’ version of religiosity which is released from the grips 
of institutional authority. 
                                                        
99 Interview with Soraya, conducted at SOAS, 26/12/2012 
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Termeh, aged 26, wears partial-hijab, and regarding the point that Soraya raised 
about the spiritual reasons behind her hijab, Termeh said: 
I have seen many full hijabi women who talk about having hijab 
because of spiritual matters and caring less about their body. But if 
they want to play this game, they should also wear hijab in front of 
women. In my view, hijab is about sexuality and about forbidding 
people from having sex with ones they are not allowed to. Connecting 
hijab with spiritualty is very risky, because in that case it should be 
worn in front of everyone, and not only men.100 
Termeh is practically exposing the inconsistency of attributing a spiritual element 
to hijab. Connecting the hijab with sexuality, however, does not make the issue any 
less problematic. It displays a more structured gender bias in which the feminine 
body is hostage to stereotypes of sexuality. 
Soraya raised a point that could be seen as her response to Termeh’s concern: 
Hijab concerns caring less about my appearance in front of both men 
and women. I do not only care about being modest and wearing 
ordinary clothes in front of men. I also have this concern in front of 
women. For example, if I go to a wedding party, I don’t want to wear 
something that draws everyone’s attention. Even getting too much 
attention for my appearance and beauty from women is unwanted 
for me. I always like to be ordinary, and also don’t like to wear very 
revealing clothes. Even for my own wedding, I didn’t wear a décolleté 
dress. Also, I don’t wear too much makeup. Of course, the level of 
covering is higher in front of men, but I have my own limits, even in 
exclusively female gatherings.101 
The limits that Soraya speaks about doesn’t find its reference point in jurisprudence. 
Nor does it identify with a ‘spiritual’ desire. It is more about social conduct and how 
a woman may feel comfortable with her body and her appearance. Here, the 
                                                        
100 Interview with Termeh, conducted at Islington, 14/11/2012 
101 Interview with Soraya, conducted at SOAS, 26/12/2012 
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distinction between men and women fades away and with it the central focus of 
hijab being a means of segregation between men and women becomes irrelevant. 
In this section, I have provided examples of individualistic and expedient reasons 
for hijab observance, which in effect de-sacralise religious pronouncements about 
norms and limits of dress code. The personal reasons cited by non-hijabi women are 
mostly about their comfort and about being themselves. Many of my informants 
across all schemas of dress code said that they follow a certain kind of dress code 
because they have become used to it, and they are comfortable with it because they 
grew up that way. Therefore, it is an issue of stepping out of one’s comfort zone 
rather than suggesting a feeling of guilt connected with other-worldly 
considerations. 
Another set of reasons that can be categorised under expediency is related to social, 
professional and political benefits of wearing or not wearing hijab. Hijab is not 
always or only about costs; it can also be a source of ‘symbolic capital’ that can be 
translated into political, economic, cultural and social capital in a network of 
religious families and ties within an Islamic society that is governed by an Islamic 
state.  A number of my interviewees would not have been able to marry their current 
husbands (whom they loved), enjoy their current close friendships and have their 
current job or social and economic status if they had chosen a different way of 
dressing/hijab.  
Custom and Culture 
The term ‘cultural’ has a complex history within anthropology that makes it 
challenging to use. Many anthropologists have criticised using the term. I use culture 
here because it is a term used by my informants.  
It is essential to differentiate between reasons and causes behind each type of dress 
code. By reason, I mean each individual’s personal rationale for how they choose to 
define and defend what they wear and how they behave. By causes, I do not mean 
what people themselves mention as the reason, but rather what actually led them to 
act in a certain way and follow a certain dress code. Not all causes are consciously 
known for the agents, and not all the reasons an agent mentions are, in practice, 
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what actually led her to behave and dress as she does. In this section, I will discuss 
cultural factors including educational systems, media, norms, workplace standards, 
and pressure from strangers that can be the reason and/or cause behind one’s way 
of dressing and hijab. 
Out of the 40 women who I interviewed, two of them mentioned culture as one the 
main reasons for their dress code. The first is Nazanin, age 28, who is married and 
has a master’s degree in architecture. She has lived in England for 6 years. Her dress 
code is full progressive hijab, with very colourful clothes and headscarf, and light 
makeup. In answer to my question about her rationale for hijab, she said: 
One of the reasons that I observe hijab is that it is a part of the culture 
that I have grown up in. Asking why I wear hijab sounds like asking 
me why I eat Iranian cuisines. The answer to both questions is the 
same: because it is my culture. I don’t wear a headscarf because of 
my religion in any sense, although I am a religious person. The reason 
people wear hijab from a religious point of view is to protect them, 
and I think that this hijab doesn’t give protection. If you wear a black 
abaya [a very long black dress], it might provide protection, but you 
put a barrier between yourself and society. This protection has no 
use, although practically speaking it provides protection. I have 
always wanted to present a positive image of Muslim women in my 
workplace by wearing nice clothes, and I think I have been successful. 
The most important reason for the type of dress code that I have is 
my culture. I see it a matter of culture and not religion because I have 
experienced the worst impure and dirty looks from men in religious 
settings. At that point, I realised that hijab doesn’t necessarily protect 
women, because there are men who are labelled as religious and yet 
offer these impure looks toward me. For example, in the holy shrines, 
this feeling is extreme for me. I believe that there is no difference 
between a woman who doesn’t observe Islamic hijab but has a 
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modest dress code and myself as a hijabi woman. Therefore, I cannot 
call my dress code a religious act. It is a cultural practice.102 
Nazanin’s response reinforces the points I made earlier: the sense of belonging to 
religion, as an all-encompassing worldview which can even determine your dress 
code is replaced by a sense of belonging to a community which incidentally happens 
to share some of these norms. Wearing the veil is essentially incidental to Nazanin’s 
lifestyle. It means that if she was born into a different society, she might have easily 
followed the predominant norms of that society. This may seem like a truism but the 
underlying element is a shift from viewing religion as a maximalist set of rules and 
rituals to viewing religion as a minimalist system of values. Abdolkarim Soroush’s 
articulation of the difference between maximalist and minimalist religion can 
vividly explain this point (Soroush 2009, pp. 93-117) 
Termeh, discussed above, also mentioned that culture is one the main reasons for 
her dress. My interview with Termeh was very long and rich. She has had a lifelong 
deep engagement with the issues surrounding hijab, and although currently she 
follows a partial-hijab dress code, it is likely that she will become a non-hijabi. She 
has faced many difficulties finding a job, and in her new job, she is under pressure 
because of her headscarf. Despite these concerns, she still observes hijab, but not 
very strictly. When describing her reasons for still being observant, she stated: 
Although I have many criticisms of hijab, the main reason that I wear 
hijab is my cultural background. Honestly speaking, I don’t feel good 
about wearing a headscarf, but I have to admit it has become a habit 
for me, and giving up habits is not easy. I don’t see my beliefs as anti-
Islamic, but I want to reform and show that there are different ways 
of understanding and seeing Islam. My hijab is also a form of social 
activism. In the presence of Islamophobia in this society, I want to 
stand out and say, “I am a Muslim, but I don’t think like the 
fundamentalists, and you can come and talk to me.” I cannot see 
myself as someone who fights against capitalism because I do wear 
                                                        
102 Interview with Nazanin, conducted at Hanger Lane, 12/12/2012 
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and use commercial brands, but I like the way some women use hijab 
as a sign of resistance and protest against capitalism and 
consumerism.103 
Given Termeh’s experience, if one assumes that Islamophobia became further 
marginalised in European societies and less intrusive into the lives of Muslim 
women, people like her would find little motivation to continue with the form of 
hijab, however much less strict, that they already have. Once can clearly see the role 
of the politics in which these women have had no role. Women like Termeh have 
had no say in determining the direction of such discriminatory and often racist 
policies. Hence, their reaction to a policy for which they have had no choice or 
agency reflects itself in a dress code which is the product of their own reflection and 
active choice. 
Having considered the two informants who mentioned ‘culture’ as key reasons for 
their dress code, I will provide an example of the role of norms, customs, and 
educational systems on what interviewees wear. Fariba is 27 years old, and comes 
from a non-religious background. She follows a radical hijab-less dress code. She has 
lived in London for three years, and came here to get a master’s degree. She does 
not have a problem with wearing revealing clothes in London, depending on where 
she goes. However, in Iran, her dress code is more conservative and she will not 
wear very short skirts or low-neck tops. When I enquired about this choice, she 
answered: 
The most important factor in my choice of dress code in Iran is the 
social education that I had as a kid, growing up in an Islamic 
environment like Iran. For example, when I attend a place where 
everyone wears a headscarf, it is not hard for me to wear a headscarf, 
and sometimes I don’t even question it. But for someone who has not 
lived in such a place, wearing a headscarf might be very difficult. For 
example, in London I didn’t feel good about eating during 
                                                        
103 Interview with Termeh, conducted at Islington, 14/11/2012 
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Ramadan104  because for 25 years I didn’t eat in public places 105 , 
although I didn’t fast myself. This background shapes the limits of 
covering that I follow in my own dress, because I have lived in Iran. I 
have become used to being told what to wear and what not to wear, 
both by the government’s moral police and even by my own family, 
who are not religious.106 
Here is a very vivid example of a woman who actively challenges the prescriptions 
of dress code, whether it is by the state or by family. It is an active, even though 
probably unconscious effort to get released from the grips of any authority. The 
individuality and agency of woman becomes central here. This example is however 
not a reflection of the overall attitude of other women, but as we can increasingly 
see signs of turning hijab into a more neutral territory, in all likelihood the centre 
of emphasis may as well shift towards a more personal narrative of dress code. 
Religious and Jurisprudential Reasons 
When asked why they are wearing hijab, most hijabi women’s first response is to 
state that it is a religious requirement. According to the traditional mainstream Shia 
fiqh (jurisprudence), women are obliged to cover all parts of their head and body, 
except for their hands and face. The majority of Shia jurists believe in this limit. Some 
jurists have defined a different limit for Islamic dress, and I describe these 
exceptions in detail in Chapter Three. As a result, Muslim women who practice hijab 
for religious reasons can still have varied practices, and this is true amongst my 
informants. Despite these shifts and the anomalies one finds in such prescriptions, 
what tends to be implicit in all these approaches by women is the significant 
distinction between ethics and religion, which I briefly discussed above. 
For many people, that a woman is veiled is sufficient to conclude she is practising 
hijab because of her religion. This is true in many cases, although as I have shown in 
                                                        
104 Ramadan is one of the Islamic calendar months, during which Muslims from all around the world 
fast. Fasting is one of the five pillars of Islam, and it is obligatory for all Muslims except the ones who 
are ill or travelling. Fasting lasts from dawn in the morning until the sunset of the same day, and 
observant Muslims should not eat, drink, smoke, or have sexual intercourse during the fasting period. 
105 In Iran, it is illegal to eat, drink, or smoke in public places during the month of Ramadan. 
106 Interview with Fariba, conducted at Golders Green, 1/10/2012 
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this chapter, it does not mean that religion is the only reason for hijab, or even the 
most important one. In this section, I will illustrate the jurisprudential and religious 
reasons behind veiling from my informants’ points of view. 
Amongst the full traditional hijabi women who I interviewed, the most important 
reason they practice hijab is religion. Yeganeh, age 52, is a very well known 
gynaecologist. She has lived in London for 6 years with her family. She wears full 
traditional hijab, and states: 
The main reason that I veil is that it is God’s mandate. I think the 
reason God has ordered this is that it helps both men and women to 
have a better life, work together, and differentiate between sex and 
work. It helps men and women to have healthy relationships.107 
The women who have jurisprudential reasons for their hijab generally believe in 
strictly following the traditional fiqh. As mentioned, the limits defined in fiqh do vary 
according to religious authorities, and there are examples of women who have 
changed their dress code to maintain accord with changing juristic positions. What 
remains obscure in the narrative of Yeganeh is that it yields to the dominant 
jurisprudential reasoning. The narratives and problematisations of Ahmed (1992) 
and Amer (2014) even when they engage with a female driven ijtihad seems 
peripheral and even completely invisible in her approach. Equating the practice of 
hijab with God’s command suffers from a lack of historical perspective and 
incomplete assessment of the social and political grounds of the codification of legal 
prescriptions in various Islamic communities. 
I interviewed women who do not wear a headscarf, but still believe that they are 
observing hijab according to fiqh but with an understanding of different limits. A 
greater number of women who believe in hijab religiously observe the full hijab 
rather than choosing not to wear a scarf. Even fewer women who are religious have 
changed their dress code from wearing a scarf to not wearing a scarf while 
maintaining religious reasons.  
                                                        
107 Interview with Yeganeh, conducted at Golders Green, 12/11/2012 
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Shahrzad, aged 29, is an example of a practising Muslim who does not wear a scarf. 
She is married and has a master degree in media. She has lived in London for two 
years because of her husband’s work. From the time she arrived in London, she 
started going out without a headscarf, and her current dress code is ‘conservative 
scarf-less’. Before coming to London, she lived in Tehran and wore full progressive 
hijab as well as chador. I asked her whether she believes in hijab, and she replied 
that she does still believe in hijab, but not in the conventional way, and she has her 
own limits. Torkashvand (2010), whose work I discussed in Chapter 3, strongly 
affected Sharhrzad’s view about hijab. Shahrzad believes108 that hijab is divinely 
mandated and that Muslim women should wear hijab, but in her view, covering 
one’s hair and neck is not a necessary part of the hijab. She thinks that the rule of 
hijab in fiqh can be interpreted in different ways. She describes her first experience 
of not wearing a scarf in London: 
When I came to London, after a while I started not wearing the scarf. 
Contrary to my expectations, I did not have a sense of guilt. I was very 
happy, and I felt that I was doing the right thing. I can clearly 
remember the feeling of wind against my ears. Before that, when I 
lived in Iran, I had read Ghabel’s and Torkashvand’s views of hijab. 
Wearing the chador became hard for me. After I came to London, I 
felt comfortable changing, because although I am still religious, I 
don’t believe in the same limits as before. The reason that I am 
comfortable is that I have not announced that I am not wearing the 
scarf to my family or my husband’s family. I also have not put a 
picture of myself without a scarf on Facebook. Because our family is 
religious, they will get upset if they find out.109 
In London, Shahrzad covers from her neck to her knees. She does not wear tops 
without sleeves or short skirts. But because she does not wear the scarf (which puts 
her under the category four of hijab – conservative hijab-less - in this thesis), the 
                                                        
108 In this thesis, by stating someone believes in hijab, I mean he/she believes Muslim women should 
wear hijab as a religious obligation and that hijab is divinely mandated by Allah through Prophet 
Mohammad. 
109 Interview with Shahrzad, conducted at Golders Green, 22/11/2012 
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majority of Iranians name her as a non-hijabi, although she believes that she follows 
hijab. This is stricter amongst religious families, where when a woman does not 
wear the scarf, they call her bi-hijab (meaning ‘without hijab’). Shahrzad has not told 
her family and will not announce that she does not wear the headscarf, because the 
social and emotional costs for someone like her are very high. It is common that 
there is a social cost for those women who remove their scarf or hijab, and I will 
mention more examples in other informants’ lives later in this chapter. 
Transitions in dress code 
In this section, I discuss the causes behind transitions in dress code amongst Iran-
born women living in London. By transitioning in dress code, I mean changing from 
one of the five schemas of dress code to another. 
Amongst the 40 women I interviewed, 20 experienced one or more transitions in 
their dress code. Out of these 20 women, 12 experienced this transition after they 
came to live in London. In this section, I focus on their stories. It is not possible to 
categorise these personal reasons for transition in dress code into overarching 
themes in the manner of the previous sections. Instead, it is best to tell the 
informants’ stories one at a time in order to understand the trajectory of these 
changes in the context of their individual lives.  
Mina 
Mina is 30 years old, and has lived in London for five years. She has a master’s degree 
in law, and is currently pursuing a second master’s degree. She is married, comes 
from a religious background, and is currently a practising Muslim. Like many other 
girls in religious families, she started wearing a headscarf at the age of nine. In 
mainstream traditional Islamic jurisprudence, girls have to start praying, fasting, 
and wearing hijab at nine, while boys must start observing religious duties at 15.  
Unlike other girls who like to wear the headscarf because it makes them feel like the 
adults around them, Mina did not enjoy wearing the headscarf at first, especially in 
front of her cousin with whom she always played. Although she disliked it, her dress 
code was partial-hijab until the age of 15. Then she started wearing a chador, and 
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her dress code changed to full progressive hijab. The reason behind this change, in 
her words, is: 
When I started wearing chador of my own will, I really loved my new 
dress code, because my family was religious and with chador, I 
gained credibility with them. It gave me a sense of being more 
spiritual, and provided extra protection. Although in my school, 
wearing chador was not compulsory, I wanted to wear it myself.110 
Mina retained her full progressive hijab dress code while she completed her 
undergraduate degree and her master’s degree. Meanwhile, she married. Her 
husband’s family were not like her own family, and did not wear hijab. At the same 
time, she was studying human rights at university, and she started encountering 
more people who did not wear hijab. She started questioning her dress code and 
Islamic hijab in general, but she continued wearing chador until she completed her 
master’s degree. She wanted to work for the government after her studies and knew 
that if she does not wear the chador it will be a disadvantage for her career. 
Mina first encountered new interpretations about hijab in Islamic jurisprudence 
while still in Iran. She read Torkashvand and Ghabel’s views on hijab (arguing hijab 
does not include covering the head and the hair), which caused a large shift in her 
perspective. Because Mina was a religiously observant Muslim, she believed that full 
hijab was obligatory, and treated full hijab as part of her devotion. After reading new 
juristic positions, encountering more non-hijabi women, and researching human 
rights, she started questioning her own dress code and stopped wearing chador. 
After a while, she loosened her headscarf, and she shifted her dress code to partial-
hijab at the age of 25. Mina and her husband came to England when she was 26. The 
way she changed, in her own words, is as follows: 
When I came to London, I still wore my headscarf, although my hair 
was out of it. I was scared of not wearing it. At that time, I did not feel 
any guilt from showing some of my hair, but I did feel guilty taking 
off my headscarf. Once I went out without a headscarf, and it was a 
                                                        
110 Interview with Mina, conducted at Euston, 24/10/2012 
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very bad experience for me. I felt terrible about myself and felt I was 
committing a sin. Thereafter, I kept my scarf. After a while, we moved 
to Cambridge, and the situation there was very different from 
London. In London, there are many hijabi women in the streets, but 
in Cambridge, it was very uncommon to wear a headscarf. We lived 
in a flat with a shared kitchen, and it was difficult for me to wear a 
scarf every time I had to go there. One day, I stopped wearing a 
headscarf. I did not believe in hijab as I used to, and wearing a scarf 
had many social costs for me. After I took off the headscarf, I stopped 
feeling stared at and I felt very comfortable. I felt I was a person like 
everybody else, and that was pleasant for me.111 
Mina changed her dress code from partial-hijab to conservative scarf-less, and after 
she returned to London, she maintained this manner of dress to the present. In her 
own view, the change in the strength of her belief in hijab and the new juristic 
positions changed her mind. She still limits her dress, but she is happy about her 
transition. 
I asked Mina about her family’s reaction, and she said that her parents were upset 
at first. Her aunts told her that she would not achieve salvation. Nevertheless, after 
a while, they accepted her. She attributes their acceptance to her continued religious 
Islamic practice. Many women who take off their hijab do so because they are no 
longer practising Muslims. Mina is proud of being religious and yet, at the same time, 
she does not wear the conventional Islamic dress code. She wants to fight against 
the stereotype that any religious Iranian must wear the headscarf. 
Coming to England affected Mina’s transition. She believes that without having 
experienced life in England she might have remained in doubt but unable to act. 
Although she read Torkashvand’s and Ghabel’s ideas while living in Iran, she could 
not change her manner of dress while there. She gained self-confidence in London 
that allowed her to make the change.  
                                                        
111 Interview with Mina, conducted at Euston, 24/10/2012 
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Fereshteh 
Fereshteh is 23 years old, and has lived in London for 9 years. She is studying History 
and Middle Eastern Studies. At our interview, which we conducted on a weekday at 
SOAS, she wore a tunic and jeans, with her hair in a ponytail and without makeup. 
Currently she follows a conservative scarf-less dress code, but she underwent a 
major transformation from full progressive hijab. Although her life story is unique, 
it is representative of the types of experiences that women in religious families have 
when they change their view and practice regarding hijab. The cost and pressures 
they face are immense.  
Fereshteh, like many other girls in religious families, started wearing hijab from the 
age of nine. In her case, hijab meant wearing a scarf and manto112. At that age, she 
was happy about wearing the scarf, because she saw herself as like her mother and 
other grownups. During her primary and secondary school, both of which were very 
strict religious environments, she liked her hijab and she also wore chador. For high 
school, she changed schools, and her new school was more open. Girls from non-
religious backgrounds also attended. The first month was challenging for her, but 
after a while, she became used to the new environment.  
Fereshteh believes that her high school environment forced her to think differently 
about her hijab. For the first time, she saw other girls who wore the scarf differently. 
Most of the mothers of her classmates were partial-hijabi. At the age of 13, Fereshteh 
and her family moved to London because of her father’s job. From the age of 13 to 
16, she followed the same dress code that she did in Iran, but without the chador. 
She wore a loose manto and a scarf with no hair showing. After the age of 16, she 
started questioning the hijab and was no longer happy with it. She also did not wear 
the scarf tightly, as she had done as a child. Now she showed her hair at the front.  
It took her three years to convince her parents to accept her without the scarf. 
Finally, her parents were convinced, but they told her that she should still wear the 
scarf until they left London. Therefore, throughout her first year of university, she 
                                                        
112 Manto is a piece of clothing resembling a long shirt or tunic that Iranian women have to wear in 
public. It can be short or very long, and can be tight or loose. The purpose of wearing it is to cover the 
body and hide its shape.  
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wore the scarf, and after her parents moved back to Iran, she stopped doing so. She 
is still very concerned that what she wears should be loose and long, because her 
mother wants her to wear very modest clothes. 
I asked Fereshteh at what point she no longer felt any guilt at not wearing hijab, 
contrary to her childhood teaching, and what allowed her to reach that point. She 
responded: 
From the age of nine, I started wearing hijab. I didn’t understand why 
I was doing it. I just imitated the grownups. They encouraged me 
about my hijab, and I was completely happy, but I didn’t understand 
its meaning. By 15, I understood that the reason to wear hijab had to 
do with sexuality. I got to the point that I realized my hijab no longer 
protected me from sexual harassment. Even when I wore chador, I 
received unwanted looks and sexual attention. I realised that my 
hijab did not protect me, and that it had no use. I also found that 
revealing my hair did not attract sexual attention and, in fact, it 
decreased sexual curiosity. At that age, I read many blogs. One of the 
bloggers mentioned that chador is the sexiest clothing from a man’s 
point of view. The other important change was that I realised Islam 
does not require women to wear the scarf or long clothes. Hijab in 
Islam is more about identity. In my case, I don’t like to show that I am 
a Muslim in the first place. All these things caused me to stop wearing 
the scarf. 
Fereshteh’s father told her that if she removed her headscarf, other parents in Iran 
would not let their girls study abroad alone. Parents would conclude that if 
Fereshteh removed her veil, their girl might do so as well. On the contrary, Fereshteh 
believes that the act of removing her headscarf could trigger girls and women within 
Iran to think about why they are wearing it. In the end, Fereshteh convinced her 
father and mother to accept her choice by telling them that wearing a scarf to protect 
other people is not fair to her. 
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Fereshteh’s experience of removing her headscarf in London shows how hard it is 
for a person from a religious background to undertake such an act. There are many 
costs for these people, and they often go through an emotionally challenging time. 
Fereshteh’s extended family still does not know that she does not wear the 
headscarf in London. She still wears the headscarf when she accompanies her 
parents to Iranian gatherings in London, and she wears full progressive hijab in Iran. 
Arezo 
Arezo’s story is different from those mentioned above. She has undergone a major 
transformation from radical hijab-less to full conservative hijab. Amongst the 
Iranian women in London, the number of women who have changed from non-hijabi 
to hijabi is much smaller than the inverse. Arezo’s story is unique because the 
context in which she changed is very different from the rest of the women who have 
transitioned. 
Arezo is 31 years old and has lived in London for 14 years. She is currently doing a 
postdoctoral fellowship in astronomy. At the age of 23, she underwent a transition 
in her dress code and started observing hijab. With the exception of one of her aunts, 
her family are not very religious and they do not wear the headscarf. Before wearing 
the headscarf, Arezo had limits to her dress, and her mother did not allow her to 
wear very short skirts and very revealing tops. 
After Arezo and her family moved to London, she started questioning the correct 
path and researching different religions. She came to the conclusion that she had 
found the right choice in Islam, and she investigated Islam in consultation with 
specialists, because her family were not strict practising Muslims. She reached the 
point that she knew that it was right to wear the hijab, but doing so was very hard 
for her. I asked her to describe the final trigger that led to her transition, and she 
said: 
After I came to the conclusion that Islam was the right thing for me, 
I was happy about fasting and praying. Accepting hijab was hard for 
me because it made me envision some of my teachers at school in Iran 
who were very bad. I did not like them, and therefore I did not like to 
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wear it. One day, I was sitting in university with my friends, and one 
of them said, “Wow, check that ass out!” I turned my head around, 
and he was staring at the shape of a girl. I became very sad, and from 
that day on, I started noticing the way men look at women. Another 
important event was that my grandmother died. Deep inside me, I felt 
how lonely humans are. At the end, we will die. Therefore, the only 
one who we should please is God, and God wants us to observe hijab. 
On a Monday, I started wearing the headscarf, and from that time 
until now, I have not changed.113 
Arezo and many other Iranian women have a binary of hijabi versus non-hijabi in 
their minds, which they associate with being modest verses immodest. Many hijabi 
religious women think that a woman is either hijabi and modest or non-hijabi and 
immodest. Arezo believes that if a woman wears hijab, she can control who can look 
at her and who cannot.  
Women like Arezo accept the conventional belief that God requires women to cover 
all parts of their body except their hands and face. Furthermore, she associates 
salvation and other-wordly happiness with observing a humanly-constructed idea 
which is attributed to God. As discussed above and in Chapter 3, specialist historians 
or Islamic jurists do not universally approve this judgement. I have argued that while 
wearing modest clothes and not covering her head, a woman can still demonstrate 
that she does not welcome unwanted looks. However, there are religious Iranian 
women believe that if you want to be modest and powerful you have to observe hijab 
according to conventional Islamic jurisprudence. The two important causes of 
Arezo’s transition come from accepting this view: first, she wears hijab because she 
believes it is the order of God. Secondly, she thinks that with hijab, men cannot take 
advantage of women or look at them sexually. Both of these came about as a result 
of existential encounters and social contacts which were unpleasant or challenging 
for her. 
                                                        
113 Interview with Arezo, conducted at Ealing, 1/12/2012 
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Wearing hijab has had many consequences for Arezo. The first and the most 
important of which is that she feels that her relationship with God is better, and she 
feels more spiritual, which gives her satisfaction. She also feels that she has more 
power to control who can look at her. At the same time, she experienced pain. 
Regarding the challenges of adopting more conservative dress, she said: 
When I started wearing hijab, at first it was hard for me. The 
behaviour of people in society toward me changed dramatically. No 
one talked to me as they had done, or paid enough attention to me. I 
can remember that one night I was lying down in my bed and crying. 
I asked God, “Are you really happy that I am going through this much 
pain?” But now I am completely happy with my decision, and I am 
comfortable with it. Before wearing hijab, I would receive many 
comments about my appearance, as well as sexual proposals. I did 
not think that this was good. I haven’t done anything for my 
appearance; it is God’s creation. When someone plays good music, we 
should appreciate it, because the person who plays it has worked and 
practiced for it. I don’t like to be appreciated based on how I look by 
random people in public.114 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there are general systems for 
classifying different reasons for observing hijab. Although many of my informants 
state that they have chosen to wear hijab, when their lives are examined more 
closely, multiple issues and pressures are often at play, and the word ‘choice’ is 
therefore frequently too vague to be useful.  
Arezo, however, is one informant that I can unequivocally say has chosen to wear 
hijab by her own will, regardless of societal or family pressures. The context in which 
she was raised and her life situation do not normally lead someone to observe hijab. 
Her family are not hijabi, and they disagreed with her choice. The environment of her 
university and her job discouraged her from wearing the hijab. She is a beautiful girl, 
and her appearance is much better without the hijab than with it. Therefore, she 
                                                        
114 Interview with Arezo, conducted at Ealing, 1/12/2012 
217 
 
chose to observe hijab because she concluded it is the word of God. The only element 
missing in her approach is the issue of informed decision or choice. It is not clear how 
she would respond to arguments of people like Ghabel and Torkashvand (or for that 
matter Leila Ahmed and Sahar Amer). Having a more historically sensitive narrative 
could challenge many of the underlying assumptions of Arezo. The bottom line for 
her seems to be the equation of the practice of hijab with God’s will and command. 
The immense social pressure of traditional Islamic upbringing often leaves no room 
for women to think about different hijab options and to choose the most appropriate. 
The power behind the conventional interpretation of hijab in Islamic jurisprudence 
is often strong enough to push practising Muslims to wear hijab. Arezo has chosen to 
wear it, and she has faced many problems, but she is happy with it because she 
believes that it makes her a better person. 
Wearing the hijab has changed Arezo’s social life in a city like London. Many hijabi 
women I interviewed said that they feel respected when wearing their hijab in 
London. It may be that they say this because they have never experienced going 
without hijab, and therefore have not felt the difference. Arezo has experienced both 
wearing and not wearing the hijab, and she finds that the behaviour of people in 
society changes strikingly.  
Even if we accept that this kind of hijab was an obligation in Prophet Mohammad’s 
era, we have to note that hijab at the time of Prophet Mohammad was a privilege for 
practising Muslim women, and a sign of respect. The headscarf, when worn by a 
Muslim woman living in the West, is not a privilege—it actively reduces their social 
status. Arezo has experienced this directly, as she felt more welcome in public places 
when she did not wear the hijab. Nonetheless, hijab also helped her being more 
welcomed in the religious circles and amongst hijabi women and earned her a new 
network of Muslim friends.  
Leili 
Leili is 35 years old, and has lived in London for nearly three years. She is married 
and is pursuing her master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies. Before coming to 
London, she lived in Turkey for two years. Since leaving Iran five years ago, she has 
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not returned due to her political activism for women’s rights. Leili was born into a 
religious family, and was brought up as religious. She attended strict religious 
primary, secondary, and high schools. Her parents were very active in the Islamic 
Revolution, and are conservative and ideological.  
Throughout her life, Leili has experienced different transitions in her dress code. 
Like other girls in Iran from religious families, Leili started wearing the hijab at the 
age of nine. Leili asked her mother to buy her a chador at the age of 13. In her school, 
they gave gifts to those who wore chador, and with chador she felt grown up like her 
mother. From 13 to 22, she wore chador with complete consent and satisfaction. But 
during her time at university as an undergraduate, she started reading the works of 
religious intellectuals including Abdolkarim Soroush and Shabestari. After a while, 
her interpretation and understanding of religion changed. One consequence was 
that although she still believed in hijab, she came to believe that wearing the chador 
was not necessary. At 22, she stopped wearing chador.  
At 26, Leili underwent another major change in dress code. Until then, she wore full 
progressive hijab. By this point, she had married. Her husband is not religious, and 
he preferred her without hijab, but never asked her not to wear the headscarf. One 
day, she returned home after work, and her husband and their close male friend 
were in the sitting room. Without telling her husband, she decided not to wear the 
headscarf anymore. Therefore, her dress code changed from full progressive hijab 
to conservative scarf-less. She only went without wearing the hijab in front of 
certain friends, and her family did not know anything about her change for close to 
a decade. Addressing the reason behind this change, she said: 
Before I stopped wearing the headscarf in front of my friends, I had 
several investigations about religion and the status of women in 
Islam. I was also an active feminist in Iran working for an NGO 
focused on women’s rights. For quite a while, I did not believe in hijab 
as I had in the past. The main reason was that hijab lost its function 
for me. I did not feel that it protected me. I had friends who told me 
that hijab even makes women sexier. In the beginning, it was hard for 
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me not to wear it, even though I only went without it in front of 
certain friends. I was scared of people judging me.115 
Leili did not tell her family that she was not wearing the headscarf. From the ages of 
26 to 30, she only went without a headscarf during certain private gatherings, and 
she wore partial-hijab in front of her family and in public places. At those private 
gatherings, however, her attire was conservative scarf-less. Even her choice of 
partial-hijab instead of full hijab was difficult for her family to accept, and that is why 
she could not tell them about her transition.  
After she left Iran at age 30, she did not wear hijab either in Turkey or in London, but 
her family did not know. Currently, her dress code in London is radical hijab-less, 
because when she goes to swimming pool she wears a swimming suit. But when she 
goes to Iranian gatherings, she always takes care to wear clothes that are more 
conservative. She says: 
After I left Iran and lived in London, I noticed that people don’t look 
at you. You are free to wear what you want and not to be scared of 
people staring at you. In London, limiting my dress code didn’t have 
a function anymore, and therefore I am okay with wearing different 
styles of clothes. This is because, from the time I stopped wearing 
hijab, I have felt more comfortable about my body. When you cover 
yourself strictly, it sexualises your view of your own body. In my 
experience, going without hijab has not been a means of looking 
more beautiful or attractive. In my case, I look much more beautiful 
with the manto and the headscarf. But I decided not to wear it 
because I didn’t feel myself in hijab anymore.116 
Leili had a second transition in her dress code after she left Iran—from conservative 
scarf-less to radical hijab-less. She announced this change publicly. As I mentioned, 
her family are very strict practising and ideological Muslims who are also supporters 
of the Islamic republic. Therefore, she did not tell her family while she lived in Iran 
                                                        
115 Interview with Leili, conducted at Belsize Park, 27/12/2012 
116 Ibid. 
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that she went without the headscarf in some places. While she lived in London, many 
of her friends in Iran were detained because of their political activities. She was very 
unhappy that she could not be interviewed by the BBC or take part in conferences on 
her friends’ situation in Iran’s prisons. Finally, she decided to have an interview with 
the BBC about the situation of the prisoners. Many of her family members and friends 
saw her on TV, and the consequences were extreme.  
Her parents did not speak to her for three months. After three months, they were so 
hurt by her act that they insisted that she stop appearing without hijab in the media. 
Leili found this time very painful, and emotionally she was broken. She started 
psychoanalysis because of her nightmares. She is still fighting for her rights, and her 
family is still angry with her. Every time they speak on the phone, her mother cries 
and begs her to wear the hijab again. Mothers love their children, and in our culture, 
when a child does not obey a command of God (in the mother’s view), they cannot 
stand letting their child burn in hell in the afterlife. They become sad to their flesh 
and bone because of their child’s act. 
The consequences of Leili’s transition of dress code have been very hard to manage, 
even though it was not sudden but happened over a long period. Leili’s story is 
characteristic of the stories of many women from very religious families who remove 
their hijab. The amount of pressure and emotion on both sides is very high, and the 
damage done can prove unforgivable.  
Living in London helped Leili decide to share her new identity as a non-hijabi woman 
with the public. When I asked her to describe the changes caused by coming to 
London, she said: 
When I came to London, after a while I noticed that I no longer grip 
my hands when I walk in streets. In Iran, when I walked, I gripped my 
hands unconsciously because anything can happen to you and you 
always feel unsecure. I also had some male housemates in a flat in 
London, and after a while, I noticed that I don’t lock my door at night. 
This shows that I felt secure. I am sure that this would never have 
happened in Iran—having a male housemate and not locking the 
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door. These two changes made me realise how differently this society 
makes you feel. I think that hijab highlights sexuality, and it makes 
your sexuality more obvious in your interactions.117 
Because of the situation in Iran, many people who believe in hijab see it as protection 
against sexual harassment. However, according to many of my informants, hijab did 
not provide them with protection, and even women wearing chador are sexually 
harassed. Those Iranians who have not experienced any place other than Iran cannot 
understand women who say that in London, we are stared at less and we are 
comfortable without the hijab. 
Some critical reflections 
The cases I examined above provide some overall themes for reflection about shifts 
in the practice of hijab or maintaining what a Muslim Iranian women has grown up 
with. In all of the above examples or or a number of the elements I discuss below is 
at work. 
Familiarity with scholarship on Islam and the hermeneutics of hijab 
Even though all of these women are highly educated, not all of them are exposed to 
or familiar with views of scholars such as Fanaei, Ghabel or Soroush (among others). 
Some who may have been exposed to them resist these views because of their 
attachments to a more conservative narrative. Therefore, it is both an issue of 
education and development of critical skills to engage with the history and doctrines 
of a Muslim community. Those who are exposed to such critical debates and are 
sympathetic to them, find it much easier to change their practice of hijab. 
Peer pressure and resistance from family 
Women may have come to conclusions about adopting or relinquishing the practice 
of hijab purely on the grounds of peer pressure or resistance from family members. 
Such pressures create difficulties for women to exercise their choice and agency but 
they often fail to have a lasting effect and once the inner justification for observing 
                                                        
117 Ibid 
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the hijab goes away and women find the arguments redundant or impractical, they 
would sooner or later relinquish it. A vivid example can be seen in experiences of 
sexual harassment: women feel it with their flesh and blood that the hijab is in no 
way a singular or effective deterrent for sexual harassment. 
Disillusionment with the Islamic Republic 
The ruling state in Iran has played a very significant role in determining the limits 
and rules of hijab. The coercive and unreasonable policies of the centres of power 
combined with the rampant hypocrisy and weakening of broader ethical norms has 
further weakened the grip of the state on more personal codes of conduct including 
the practice of veil. Political events such as the reformist movement and the Green 
Movement with its tragic social and political consequences have played a part in 
opening up the space to further interrogate and question the validity and 
authenticity of the claims of the state. This reaction may not necessarily be based on 
a rational argument. It is often an emotional response and resulting from a feeling of 
desperation and being discriminated against. Yet, this feeling is also corroborate by 
arguments which are hardly scarce after over three decades of the history of the 
Islamic Republic. 
Breakdown of clichés of protection against sexual harassment 
I briefly mentioned this point earlier but it is fundamentally related to how women 
change their perspectives about the hijab. One of the most dominant arguments in 
favour of practicing hijab has been this binary of protection vs. restriction. Once the 
felt experience and existential encounters of women both in Iran and in London 
allow the argument to be tested in real life situations, the entire dichotomy becomes 
subject to refutation.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the various rationales behind schemas of dress and 
transitions in dress within my group of informants. Although each individual has her 
own story, these examples demonstrate that hijab plays a central role in the 
everyday life of Iranians, even in the diasporic context. Due to the political situation 
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in Iran, hijab has become a potent symbol. It is the first cue that people use to judge 
each other. In the Iranian context, the style of hijab worn and dress code followed 
are statements of political and religious views. Transformations in dress code can 
have pervasive consequences and produce profound challenges in women’s 
personal and social lives. This is especially true for women from religious families. 
Many of my informants said that they observe hijab to be a better person, because it 
is the word of God. Often the primary reason women wear hijab is that they think it 
is obligatory for Muslims. Therefore, they claim that they have chosen to wear it, and 
that they are happy with it. As I discussed in detail in Chapter 3, there are different 
ways of interpreting hijab practice in Islam. However, the common view in Iran and 
amongst Iranians is that covering all parts of body except hands and face is required. 
If in the future other interpretations become predominant, and covering the head 
and hair is no longer seen as obligatory, then I believe that many women will not 
feel they are disobeying God when they do not wear the headscarf. 
Living in London has prompted some of my informants to think about the rationale 
behind their dress code choices, and provided them the opportunity to change. The 
social pressures preventing women from removing their hijab in Iran are very 
strong. London has prepared some women to make this change, although they still 
face major consequences.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the aftermaths of the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2016, the political and 
social climate of European societies turned even more difficult for Muslim women. 
In an essay published by Charlie Hebdo in March 2016, the author sharply attacks 
the foundations of arguments that try to exonerate Muslim women or keep them 
out of this ideological battle and proposes: 
 
Take this veiled woman. She is an admirable woman. She is courageous and 
dignified, devoted to her family and her children. Why bother her? She 
harms no one. Even those women who wear the total, all-encompassing veil 
do not generally use their clothing to hide bombs (as certain people were 
claiming when the law to ban the burqa was being discussed). They too will 
do nothing wrong. So why go on whining about the wearing of the veil and 
pointing the finger of blame at these women? We should shut up, look 
elsewhere and move past all the street-insults and rumpus. The role of 
these women, even if they are unaware of it, does not go beyond this118. 
 
At the end of the essay, the author turns the table around and charges: 
 
The first task of the guilty is to blame the innocent. It's an almost perfect 
inversion of culpability. From the bakery that forbids you to eat what you 
like, to the woman who forbids you to admit that you are troubled by her 
veil, we are submerged in guilt for permitting ourselves such thoughts. And 
that is where and when fear has started its sapping, undermining work. And 
the way is marked for all that will follow (ibid). 
 
Here, women and all those who argue that the choice of their dress code must be 
left out of this fierce argument are all guilty by association. The response which 
was published shortly after in the London Review of Books was uncompromising. 
                                                        
118 See https://charliehebdo.fr/en/edito/how-did-we-end-up-here/ last accessed 30 April 2016. 
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The author, Adam Shatz, pointed out a conflation which is all too familiar when it 
comes to issues of women: 
 
…A robust contribution to this amalgame, or conflation, between Islam and 
citizens of Muslim faith or origin, is also being made by people who claim to 
be merely criticising Islam, but go out of their way to insult Muslims. They 
deploy a tactical ambiguity, not unlike those who deplored the influence of 
Judaism in French life in the late 19th century, and accused anyone who 
denounced anti-Semitism of suppressing free speech119. 
 
The above critique follows the same line of argument that Miriam Cooke provides 
when she assesses the position of Moghisi towards Islamic feminists (discussed in 
earlier chapters). But what goes on in the academia already has a political partner 
in the public space. This, however, is only the European side of a battle in which all 
Muslim women are caught. 
 
In 2010, in a sermon delivered in Tehran’s Friday prayer, Ayatollah Kazem Sedighi, 
the Imam of the prayer, declared that bad hijab is one of the contributing factors to 
the emergence of natural disasters including earthquakes120. His comments faced 
strong reactions from a wide range of women but the core of his argument 
reflected the more entrenched perception of a traditional and conservative society 
which viewed disregard for hijab in the strict sense a sin which would have other-
worldly repercussions. 
 
In a more recent expression, Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhada, the Friday prayer 
Imam of Mashhad, made some comments published on his Instagram account 
which quickly went viral121. He argued that badhijabi is a great sin which leads to 
other sins and damages other people including the men who are tempted and 
aroused at the sight of a woman’s hair and makeup. He even went further and 
claimed the badhijabi is even worse than embezzlement which is now one of the 
                                                        
119 See http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2016/04/05/adam-shatz/how-did-we-end-up-here/ last accessed 30 April 
2016 
120 See http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8901270510 last accessed 30 April 2016 
121 See http://khabaronline.ir/detail/525043/Politics/parties last accessed 30 April 2016 
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hottest topics of discussions after the legacy of the 8 years of the presidency of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Complicity of the former government in financial 
corruptions is thus downplayed when compared to women’s dress code. 
 
These examples, one from a radically secular society and one from senior 
conservative religious figures in Iran, vividly capture the precarious situation of 
women who are constantly caught in the crossfire of comments that specifically 
target their body, their dress code and their choices in life. Both of these 
approaches turn the case of veil into a common battlefield. They are mirror images 
of one another. In both cases, it is women who are the the receiving end of such 
attacks. 
 
In this thesis, I studied the shifts in the dress code of Iranian women who live in 
London. I embarked upon a more critical assessment of the problem: why do these 
women change their dress code? This question opened a wide array of other 
questions too. I investigated further the historical, political and social background 
of the seemingly opposing narratives of the likes I just mentioned. In chapter Two, 
I provided an assessment of how colonial policies in Middle Eastern and Oriental 
societies were informed by a view that defined Islam as the categorical opposite of 
modernity and secularism which was uniquely and specifically defined in 
Occidental terms. The narrative traces back the history of these confrontations to 
the colonial period but recent events in the past two decades have added fodder to 
the flame and reignited an already paralysing debate. 
 
The view that ‘Islam’ denigrates women and is the key most fundamental 
contributor to oppressing women and depriving them of their rights stood in sharp 
contrast with the view that modernity in its colonial vehicle was the most 
important factor in the decline and decay of Muslim communities. Muslim 
reformers oscillated between these two sides. Men and women who were seen as 
champions and forerunners of women’s rights in the Muslim world had to find 
their way through these narratives. State sponsored and enforced project of 
modernisation in Iran and Turkey in early 20th century resulted in all kinds of 
reactions whose consequences only reflected themselves in later generations. As 
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much as these impositions of secular modernity brought about greater 
improvements in women’s access to education – which was viewed by the 
conservative and religious people as an anathema connected to the West – the 
reactions remained dormant but active. The 1979 revolution in Iran brought to 
power a state that introduced measures for making the veil compulsory for all 
Iranian women. The revolution itself also led to the mass migration of Iranians in 
different episodes for different political, social and religious reasons. 
 
In this research, given the backdrop of political and intellectual movements, I have 
interrogated some of the key questions and themes that are central to shifts in the 
practice of hijab among Muslim Iranian women in London. In the broader 
framework of analysis, I identified three interconnecting themes that were part of 
the debates on women’s dress code.  
 
The first one was the issue of women’s choice and agency. In all cases where 
women have changed their dress code (either adopting the veil or relinquishing it), 
the issue of choice and agency is problematized and interrogated. In neither case 
can one automatically assume that a change in practice is a result of choice or 
agency. Women’s exercise of agency is often hampered by patriarchal orders and 
male-dominated narratives about women’s body, sexuality and dress code. Yet, 
with the rise of Islamic feminism, women themselves contributed significantly to 
developing new discourses which were no longer exclusively dictated by male 
scholars, intellectuals or authorities. Nonetheless, male scholars and innovative 
thinking of certain jurists – who also had political reasons for their rethinking of 
the norms of hijab – did contribute positively to these shifts. I have provided 
evidence of how the contributions of people like Kadivar, Ghabel, Torkashvand and 
Fanaei opened up a new perspective for women who were not otherwise aware of 
these alternative or different views about Islam and its rules on hijab. 
 
The second issue which has been a dominant and almost perennial theme in 
discussions about the veil was the false binary of oppression vs. protection. The 
argument that the veil should not be seen as limitation and restriction for women’s 
social and political participation was forcefully promoted after the 1979 revolution 
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in Iran but the negative effects still remained to unravel themselves in the coming 
years. Women realised over the years that the veil in and by itself did not provide 
any visible protection against undesired or unwanted affronts of men in their 
social interactions on their body and the sexual aspects of their lives. The findings 
of this research demonstrates that this binary has been prone to collapse and as 
Iranian women see the shaky grounds of the argument in Iran and more evidently 
in London, they can no longer convince themselves of the veracity of the argument. 
The rational assessment of most of my informants who were highly educated 
women deeply questioned the premises of the argument in defence of a fixed and 
strict observance of hijab on traditional and conservative lines. 
 
The third theme which runs across the findings of this research deals with the 
encounter of Muslim women with modernity and secularism. Both theoretically 
and practically, these women were concerned about modernity but did not view it 
in Orientalist and colonial terms which had led to confrontations in their home 
countries and abroad up until contemporary times. They did not express any kind 
of reaction to modernity when they thought of their own value systems. Even 
though their understanding and interpretation of Islam is not the product of 
scholarly engagement with it, they do not see Islam inherently at odds with 
modernity. They have carved out their own versions of modernity which runs 
parallel to the radical secularism (the likes of which are displayed in positions of 
Charlie Hebdo). Nonetheless, there is a growing sense of secularity in the way 
these women practice the hijab. And by secularity, I do not mean the totalising and 
all-encompassing grip of European and Orientalist perceptions of it (that people 
like Edward Said criticised). In discussions about hijab, I noted instances in which 
Iranian women in London visibly described their veil and its practice outside 
categorisations of moral standards. They are increasingly moving towards making 
their dress code more neutral. In a sense, they are rescuing their dress code from 
norms dictated by a male-driven discourse. 
 
This narrative is not always so straightforward to explicit. There are often other 
forces at play which condition these factors in different ways. Political 
developments in Iran which continued to resonate in the daily lives of these 
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women in London have contributed significantly to their revisiting of the issue of 
hijab. The coercive policies of the state in Iran has had unintended consequences 
not only among women who did not already define themselves as practicing 
Muslims but also among those for whom the practice of hijab seemed integral to 
their Muslim identity. 
 
Politics in Iran has not simply affected women directly leading to their 
repositioning towards hijab. Shifts in the power structure after the first decade of 
the revolutionary state, the succession issues and the emergence of new political 
ideologies led to marginalisation of forces which were otherwise at the centre of 
giving an ‘Islamic’ narrative of the social and political participation of women. The 
discourse of protection vs. restriction (which has continued from the early days of 
the revolution) has now found new protagonists who define themselves in 
contradistinction with forces who were once viewed as revolutionaries and now as 
reformists. Reforms and the development of the discourse of religious intellectuals 
in Iran had far reaching consequences. One of them was about questioning the 
pervasive influence of fiqh in all aspects of life for all Iranians including Iranian 
women. The expectation that religion – read fiqh – could provide answers to every 
single question and problem was gradually replaced by a more modest claim that 
allowed more room for the rational engagement of individuals with their faith. 
Religious intellectuals closely identified with the political project of reforms in an 
effort to limit the powers of the state which presented itself under the mantle of 
religion as the perfect system. 
 
One of the other themes which surfaced during the course of this research was the 
issue of consumerism and fashion. My research concluded that women who wear a 
make-up (mild or thick) do not correlate fashion (either in dress or make-up) with 
the veil. Almost all of my informants had some degree of make-up and keeping up 
with fashion was evident in their dress code (the exception being the very 
traditional women). In short, fashion and consumerism did not inhibit these 
women from negotiating their choices of dress code. 
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Islamic feminism also flourished in the midst of these tensions. Even though 
Islamic and secular feminists were equally targets of state restrictions which often 
displayed itself in the form of confrontations with the reformist government of 
Mohammad Khatami, the discourse has gained traction. Iranain women were 
directly or indirectly exposed to these debates. The rise of the social media 
contributed to the spread of feminist views and their campaigns in the online 
environment. The campaign of ‘No to Compulsory Hijab’ brought together people, 
men and women, from all walks of life in response to the coercive measures of the 
state which have relentlessly continued until the present time. These campaigns 
were in no small measure insignificant to a shift in the opinions of some of my 
informants. 
 
While Islamic feminists have vociferously struggled to push the boundaries of the 
discourse on hijab, as findings of my research suggests, there is still a large number 
of women whose knowledge about hijab relies almost exclusively on what male 
scholars produce. Their assessment of shifts in dress code and how they challenge 
the arguments which support hijab remains limited to the views of these scholars 
who happen to be among supporters of the political project of reforms. Several 
stages of reformist struggle in Iran, from the presidency of Mohammad Khatami to 
the emergence of the Green Movement and the rising to power of Hassan Rouhani 
have been significant events for boosting these shifts. Even though at the state 
level, these policies have remained strong, they have further disillusioned more 
Muslim Iranian women, including those who live in London, about the rationale of 
the imposition of hijab. But what continues to be the problem is the perpetuation 
of the male-driven discourse. There were no women who referenced the work of a 
single female writer or feminist (Islamic or secular). Despite their lack of reference 
to the vast body of literature which is often translated into Farsi, the actual 
outcome is still a visible shift in the practice of hijab. 
 
The years ahead may prove bumpier to Iranian women in London than one might 
envisage given the intensified focus on ‘Islam’ and Muslims in the wake of 
contemporary political incidents both in Europe and in the Middle East. Women 
continue to be thrown into the midst of these debates. Some of my informants 
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were particularly cognisant of this climate. Even though they now found the 
conventional arguments in support of hijab no longer convincing, the current 
political atmosphere led them to maintain a peculiar form of hijab to assert their 
identity and at the same time express their objection to the discrimination and 
racism which prevails in some cases at the expense of a secularism and a 
modernity which is supposed to move away from such parochial reactions to the 
other.   
 
In this research, I have endeavoured to provide my critical observations in 
between the responses from my informants to make connections with the themes I 
have identified as important for this shift. I have been critical of a linear and strict 
narrative of secular ways of life. Yet, a mild version of secularity seems growing 
among Muslim women when it comes to the issue of the veil (and all the other 
aspects which are associated with it such as shaking hands with men). The fact that 
for many of my informants the veil itself is getting disenchanted and they no longer 
consider the veil an inseparable article of faith is interesting even though none of 
them have specifically articulated the point in these terms. 
 
One of the immediate findings of this research for me was to come up with a more 
nuanced and problematized narrative of choice and agency. Where adopting the 
veil may be easily seen as an act of conscious choice (and while questioning 
informants, they point this out), there may be other factors in play such as peer 
pressure at work or in university that might have contributed to the adoption of 
veil. Similarly, relinquishing the veil could have a similar caveat. None of these are 
either way in total contradistinction with the exercise of agency in and by 
themselves. The most important factor is that these women live in a liberal 
European society which does provide them something which they could not 
otherwise have: civil liberties which are not overtly restricted by state policies 
against women. This descriptive account might play into the hands of those who 
would emphatically argue against the opponents of colonial narratives of 
modernity. It is as if they seek and provide further evidence of this Oriental 
despotism which is irrational and oppressive. Such arguments are more than 
anything else inductive and tend to rely extensive on justification, verification and 
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evidence rather than being open to falsifiability. The case of these Iranian women 
provides ground for falsification of such claims. 
 
I am aware of all the limitations of this research. A more comparative study which 
could look at the case of other Muslim women in London could have probably shed 
more light on some other aspects of this issue. In particular, the question of 
religious authority seems a relevant question. Comparisons of different models of 
religious authority could further boost the arguments I have provided here, but 
they fall beyond the scope of this research. 
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